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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the relationship between an experience of familiarity and a 
motivational state of challenge with how information is processed in a persuasion context.   
Previous research on social cognition has suggested that familiarity not only impacts a 
wide range of cognitive processes, but also regulates the activation of a more analytic 
information-processing mode, an assumption of the Familiarity of As a Regulation 
Mechanism model (Garcia-Marques, 1999; Garcia-Marques et al., 2010). On a different field, 
research on the Biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat (Blascovich et al., 1993, 1999) 
has suggested that familiarity influences the activation of a motivational state of challenge. 
These two approaches suggest, therefore, that an experience of familiarity is able to influence 
both cognitive and motivational processes features. The overlap between the assumptions 
underlying both approaches is here explored being suggested the possibility that they might be 
closely related. For example, both approaches assume that an experience of familiarity signals 
individuals with necessary resources available and accessible in memory to deal with the 
situation. In this thesis, we have explored the relationship between these two approaches 
developing four experiments that could simultaneously inform about information-processing 
modes and assess the cardiovascular responses that typically map the motivational state. 
Experiment 1 showed the expected association of familiarity with non-analytical 
processing and at the same time the exhibition of a challenge type of cardiovascular 
responses. Interestingly these two effects that were activated by the same source, familiarity, 
did not seem to be related. Neither the observed cardiovascular indexes explained why 
individuals engaged in less analytic processing, nor did this processing mode was associated 
with the cardiovascular indexes. To continue exploring the relationship between these two 
effects, experiment 2 tested if the motivational state of challenge could promote less analytic 
processing by itself. Although the manipulation of motivational challenge did in fact influence 
how information was processed and was associated with the correspondent cardiovascular 
pattern of challenge, once again, the cardiovascular indexes were not related with the 
cognitive effect. 
The subsequent studies were designed to directly test the observed independence of 
both processes. We hypothesized that this observed dissociation could be in some way related 
with the fact that both processes depend on different levels of task-engagement. Experiment 3 
replicates experiment 2 by manipulating the motivational state of challenge and adding to it a 
manipulation of task-engagement (presence versus absence of an observer). Results revealed 
that the two previously observed effects were only found in the task-engagement condition 
(i.e. in the presence of the observer). In experiment 4, we went back to the original study of 
the experience of familiarity and thus replicated experiment 1, adding to it the same 
manipulation of task-engagement. Results revealed that although the motivational effects 
disappeared in the low engagement condition (i.e. those who were alone), the cognitive 
impact was always observed regardless of the task-engagement level. To our view, these 
results are suggesting that the two effects here approached – the cognitive and motivational 
impact of familiarity, are related indeed. However, they are related under specific conditions, 
for example, the degree with which individuals are engaged with the task. As such, we claim 
that their co-occurrence does not mean that they are part of the same process. This assumption 
is discussed and a set of new experiments is proposed to further support it.  
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Overview 
 
A previous encounter with a performance task is known to impact subsequent 
cognitive and motivational processes. However, theorists and researchers generally focus on 
one or the other of these effects. Here, we aim to interrelate these perspectives, specifically 
two well-grounded models: the Familiarity as a Regulation Mechanism Model and the 
Biopsicossocial Model of Challenge and Threat.   
 The Familiarity as a Regulation Mechanism Model (FARM model, Garcia-Marques, 
1999; Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2007) is anchored on a large corpus of empirical evidence 
that shows that previously encountered information is processed analytically and in less 
detail.  It assumes and empirically demonstrates that familiarity is a regulation mechanism 
responsible for decreasing the probability of analytic processing. The main rationale of this 
model is that when individuals reencounter a stimulus that was previously processed, it 
matches information stored in memory resulting in an implicit feeling of familiarity. 
Consequently, individuals learn to rely on familiarity as a signal that they can rely on an 
already available response in memory with no need to engage in deeper processing; that is, 
individuals can process the stimulus superficially rather than on its specificities (see Chapter 
1).  
 Social psychophysiological theory has also focused on and demonstrated the impact 
of familiarity on motivational states. According to Blascovich’ Biopsychosocial Model 
(2008), challenge and threat are activated as a function of whether or not individuals 
evaluate themselves as having sufficient or insufficient resources to meet or exceed 
situational demands (see Chapter 2).  In this evaluation process, familiarity signals resources 
increasing the likelihood of challenge motivation. Specifically familiarity is based on 
previous successful learning and/or prior exposure to the stimulus or situation. 
Consequently, individuals evaluate the task as challenge, an effect typically marked by a 
specific pattern of cardiovascular responses. For example, cardiovascular responses 
consistent with challenge are exhibited when individuals perform in a motivated 
performance situation involving a well-learned task (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter and 
Salomon, 1999) or when well-rehearsed attitudes are accessible to decision-making 
processes (Blascovich Blascovich, Ernst, Tomaka, Kelsey, Salomon & Fazio 1993; Fazio, 
Blascovich & Driscoll, 1992).  
2 
  
  
  
 These two lines of research suggest that the experience of familiarity is related to 
specific cognitive and motivational processes. Here, we purpose that both Blascovich’s and 
Garcia-Marques’s (1999) views are congruent and complementary. They overlap in one 
central aspect – they both argue that familiarity signals the cognitive system with an 
experience of resources available and complement each other by offering the motivational 
and cognitive implications of engaging in such experience. This overlap allows us to deduce 
several assumptions and test relevant hypotheses. Here we explore that deductive process 
and approach empirically some of these assumptions.  
 Our first approach was to integrate the cognitive and motivational impacts of 
familiarity and to study the relationship between them. Replicating Claypool et al.´s 
experiment (2005) on how familiarity induces non analytic processing, we aim to show that 
motivational state of challenge (measured by physiological activation indexes) accompanies 
such processing. We further address the relationship between these two effects, expecting 
the physiological correlates of the motivational state mediate familiarity effects on how 
persuasive information is processed. 
 Our second aim was to test if the motivational state of challenge generally (i.e., even 
if not elicited by familiarity) engages individuals in non-analytic processing. In the relevant 
experiment, challenge and threat were manipulated prior to the information-processing task 
(the same used in experiment 1) eliminating the familiarity path. If the motivational state of 
challenge impacts information-processing through an experience of resources availability, 
then, challenge should reduce analytic processing.  
 The relationship between the cognitive and motivational effects of familiarity on 
information-processing was further explored by manipulating task engagement. Both models 
assume task engagement as a modulator of how familiarity impacts cognitive processing or 
motivational processes. However they differ in how they describe such modulation. 
According to the FARM model, the impact of familiarity on processing is not dependent 
upon a high level of task engagement. On the contrary, the effect is more noticeable when 
engagement in moderate. For the BPS model task engagement is a necessary condition for 
engagement in challenge and threat motivation. As such, if our previous experiments show 
that both challenge and familiarity decrease analytic processing, it is expected that challenge 
only affects information-processing when task engagement is increased, whereas, it is 
expected that the familiarity effects are independent of such variable. We tested this 
hypothesis in the subsequent experiments (3 and 4).    
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Chapter I: Familiarity, Cognitive Processing and Motivational States 
 
 The impact of familiarity on information-processing has been a topic of growing 
interest in recent decades. In different subfields of social psychology, research has 
demonstrated that the familiarity of contexts affects various cognitive processes. For 
example, familiar situations can affect the way information is retrieved from memory 
(Jacoby, Woloshyn & Kelley, 1989); the way other people are perceived (e.g. Garcia-
Marques & Mackie, 2007); the perceptions of available resources to cope with stressful tasks 
(e.g. Blascovich, Ernst, Tomaka, Kelsey, Salomon & Fazio 1993); liking towards abstract 
(ambiguous) stimuli (e.g. Zajonc, 1968; Zajonc, Shaven, Tavris, & Van Kreveld, 1972); and 
even mood (e.g. Garcia-Marques, 1999; Garcia-Marques, Mackie, Claypool & Garcia-
Marques, 2010).  
This dissertation focuses on the impact of familiarity on cognitive processing and 
motivational states. Familiarity impacts a wide range of cognitive processes including 
perception, memory and impression-formation. Importantly here, familiarity impacts 
cognitive evaluation processes involved in the activation of motivational states of challenge 
and threat. In this thesis, possible links between cognitive processes and these motivational 
states were examined. The main purpose was to clarify whether the effects of familiarity on 
cognitive processing and motivational states involve independent parallel processes or 
whether they result from a single shared process.  
 
The impact of familiarity on cognitive processing.  
The demonstration that familiarity impacts cognitive processing has been well 
documented in different domains. For example, familiarity, increased via repetition, can bias 
judgments and the way information is retrieved from memory. One typical demonstration is 
provided by the well-known false fame paradigm (Jacoby, Woloshyn & Kelley, 1989). In 
this study, participants read a list of non-famous names under a condition of divided 
attention (where they had to monitor an audio list of random numbers and signal any time 
they identify three consecutive odd numbers) or a condition of full attention (where they just 
reading the names). Then, participants read another list which now included famous names, 
repeated non-famous names (i.e. names previously shown in the first list) and new non-
famous names. Their task was to read each name and judge it as famous or non-famous. The 
results revealed that the repeated names (i.e. old non-famous names) were judged mistakenly 
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as famous more than were the new ones (i.e. new non-famous names) in the divided 
attention condition. This means that, under certain circumstances like cognitive load, 
familiarity can impact cognitive processing directly.  
Additionally, familiarity can also serve as an informative cue to one´s decision 
processes. Evidence for this is found in all the experiments regarding the truth effect. These 
studies (e.g. Arkes, Hackett & Boehm, 2006; Begg, Anas & Farinacci, 1992) consistently 
find that repeated statements are judged as more truthful than unrepeated ones. This has been 
interpreted as a sign that individuals use their subjective experience of familiarity with the 
stimulus to ground their decisions (Begg & Armour, 1991). Another example of how 
familiarity cues decision processes is provided by Halberstadt and Catty (2008). In their 
investigation, participants rated the popularity of a pair of tunes in terms of which was the 
most popular.  One of each pair was a repeated tune and the other a new one. Half the 
participants were instructed to think about the reasons why they thought the tune they chose 
was the most popular (reasoning condition). The other half (control condition) did not 
receive this instruction. The results demonstrated that those in the control condition were 
more likely than “reasoners” to choose in accordance with their subjective reactions, i.e., 
their own familiarity with the stimuli. “Reasoners”, on the other hand, chose according to 
other valid information besides their subjective experience.  
These examples demonstrate how the experience of familiarity has a direct impact on 
cognitive processes by serving as a cue to drive information-processing. However, other 
evidence suggests that familiarity does not only have a direct impact on cognitive processing 
via these cognitive biases, but it also seems to affect how deep information is processed. 
Researchers in the cognitive and social cognitive literature have argued that when one 
reencounters a person or an object, he or she likely experience fluency or ease in processing 
its details (Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Specifically, some have 
argued that this fluency is experienced as a feeling of familiarity (e.g. Garcia-Marques, 1999; 
Jacoby & Kelley, 1990; Schwarz, 2004; Whittlesea, 1993) and such an experience is related 
to depth of information-processing. Garcia-Marques (1999, 2003, 2009) and her colleagues 
(Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2001; 2007; Garcia-Marques, Mackie, Claypool & Garcia-
Marques, 2010) grasped this idea and explicitly posited that such feeling of familiarity may 
signal the need/or lack of need of deeper processing of information. Indeed, evidence within 
the FARM has demonstrated strongly that repetition can modulate the activation of the 
“modes of processing”. 
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Modes of processing and the regulatory role of feeling of familiarity. The 
assumption that familiarity regulates information-processing modes implies that information 
can be processed in different ways. The notion of “modes of processing” is associated with 
the widespread dualistic view that information can be processed in two qualitatively 
different modes:  one based on the activation of prior knowledge (referred to as non-analytic 
processing below) and another one based on the computation of a new response (referred to 
as analytic processing below). Despite some conceptual differences that go beyond the 
purpose of this thesis (for appropriate reviews see, Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2008; 
Smith & Decoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), non-analytic processing is characterized 
by the activation of top-down processes  that require little processing resources and 
motivation, whereas analytic processing is characterized by the activation of bottom-up 
processes that require resources and motivation.  
 Because top-down processes are driven by superordinate knowledge structures in 
memory, like schema or stereotypes (e.g. Higgins, King & Mavin, 1982; Bodenhausen, 
Kramer, & Siisser, 1994) non-analytic processing is more associated with superficial 
treatment of information. Evidence of non-analytic processing is found, for example, in the 
greater impact of category-based information on impression-formation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske 
& Neuberg, 1999); in a greater impact of stereotypic information on judgments (Devine, 
1989; Payne, 2008); and in an equal impact of strong and weak arguments in attitude-change 
(Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1999; Wagner & Petty, 2011).  
 On the other hand, because bottom-up processes are guided by new stimulus input 
rather than by pre-existent knowledge structures, analytic processing is associated with the 
detailed processing of the information as demonstrated in research revealing a greater use of 
individuating information when forming impressions about a target (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, 
Lin & Neuberg, 1999); in the control of the impact of stereotypical information on 
judgments (Devine, 1989; Payne, 2008); or in a greater persuasive impact of strong over 
weak arguments (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1999; Wagner & Petty, 2011). 
 Researchers such as Higgins (1989) and colleagues (Higgins & Brendel, 1995), have 
suggested that the activation of a bottom-up type of processing is determined by the 
adequacy of the match between the input and its mnesic representation. Assuming that the 
information stored in memory varies in terms of frequency and recency of activation and that 
activation declines over time as a negative function of the frequency of its use, the 
investigators argue that if information is activated before the stimulus presentation and if it is 
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applicable to it, then, the information-processing is likely to be guided by these principles of 
associative information activation.  
 A similar argument is made by Johnston and Hawley (1994). According to these 
authors, cognitive resources are managed in order to be applied only to relevant situations. 
Thus, the cognitive system does not waste valuable attentional resources deeply processing 
expectancy-consistent or familiar material that can be encoded quickly and efficiently by 
simple and associative processes. As expected, when information matches existing templates 
in memory, individuals will only extract the gist of the material. However, in the presence of 
novel or unfamiliar stimulus, individuals cannot rely on memory templates or other previous 
existing knowledge and have to engage in active searches in order to generate a novel 
response (Norman & Shallice, 1986).  
 The integration of such evidence led Garcia-Marques (1999, 2003, 2009) to 
hypothesize that the match between the characteristics of the situation/stimulus and the 
relevant correspondent information in memory elicits a feeling of familiarity that signals the 
cognitive system to process information on the basis of what is accessible/known. Her 
rationale is as follows. If the information represented in memory matches the information 
currently received, that representation would be highly activated and accessible (Garcia-
Marques, 2003). As a consequence, processing becomes more fluent because individuals 
process information on the basis of what they already know rather than on the idiosyncrasies 
of the situation/stimulus. As such, what regulates the activation of a mode of processing over 
the other is a feeling that signals the match of the received information to the one stored in 
memory (Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2001). If a match is detected, top-down processes are 
activated and subsequent processing is based on prior knowledge. Hence, familiarity 
regulates modes of processing by decreasing the probability of analytic processing. 
 These postulates are grounded in the aforementioned research of Higgins (1991) and 
Johnston and Hawley (1994) but also in other domains demonstrating that repetition 
decreases analytic reasoning. For example, Reder and Ritter (1992) ran an experiment on 
problem-solving. In it, participants were presented a series of arithmetical problems (i.e. 
multiplications, additions) that were repeated over time. For each problem, participants had 
to decide if they were able to give the correct answer or not within an interval of 850 ms. 
The problems were selected such that the answers could not be calculated within that time 
interval (e.g. 64 x 78). If participants answered affirmatively, they had to decide if they 
wanted to retrieve or calculate the answer. The results showed that familiarity with 
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components of the problem (e.g. similar multiplication coefficients) increased the preference 
for the retrieval option that in turn strongly predicted   participants' feeling of knowing the 
answer (most notably in the case of novel problems that were similar to previously seen 
problems). In line with the FARM model, when individuals felt they knew the answer to a 
problem because some features of the problems were repeated, their judgments reflected a 
greater preference for the retrieval of a previously computed and available response from 
memory instead of the computation of a new one.   
 Recent findings congruent with FARM assumptions also suggest that a feeling 
associated with processing may regulate the activation of processing modes. Thompson, 
Turner and Pennycook (2011) demonstrated that the regulation of information-processing 
modes is driven by a “feeling of rightness” that signals the cognitive system that non-
analytic processing is adequate. In a series of studies, the authors manipulated the fluency 
with which information was processed and observed a strong relationship between the 
feeling of rightness related with their answers and decreased analytic processing. Even 
though the subjective feeling conceptually  differs from the one postulated by Garcia-
Marques et al. (2001), Thompson et al.´s findings offer support for the FARM model in the 
sense that it shows that a feeling associated with processing ease is on the basis of a 
mechanism that regulates information-processing modes. 
  Direct evidence for familiarity as a regulation mechanism has been validated widely.  
In an early attempt to demonstrate the existence of this mechanism, Garcia-Marques and 
Mackie (2001) tested the impact of argument repetition on cognitive elaboration. 
Specifically, participants read a persuasive message containing either strong or weak 
arguments in favor of the effectiveness of weight loss centers. Additionally, half of the 
participants listened, via headphones, to an unrelated message that purportedly was only 
required in order to simulate an outside environment and, therefore, should not be their 
focus. After reading the message, participants expressed their opinions on the topic. Next, 
participants read a second persuasion message embedded with strong or weak arguments 
favoring the imposition of governmental controls on industries to minimize the effects of 
acid rain. For half participants (the ones who read the message wearing headphones), this 
was actually the same message that was played over the headphones. For the other half, the 
message was new. After reading the message, participants rated their opinion of the topic. 
Because the repetition of the message was assumed to promote a feeling of familiarity (Begg 
& Armour, 1991; Jacoby, 1991; Schunn, Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Richards & Stroffolino, 
10 
  
  
  
1997; Whittlesea, 1993), the authors hypothesized that in the repetition condition the 
argument-strength would not have a differential impact on attitude-change. The results 
showed that, as predicted, message repetition resulted in an equal persuasive impact of 
strong and weak arguments in attitudes, suggesting less analytic processing in this condition. 
 The same pattern of results was obtained by Claypool et al. (2004) using a similar 
paradigm with the exception that in the first phase all participants listened to an audio 
message (that was subsequently repeated or not) while reading the message. Again, those 
experiencing the second (duplicate) message as familiar (through previous auditory 
exposure) did not process its content as confirmed by the fact that they were equally 
persuaded by strong and weak arguments. Additional regression analysis demonstrated that 
perceived familiarity predicted non-analytic processing (the more perceived familiar, the less 
analytic processing).  
 These findings are extended by evidence demonstrating that repetition of information 
can also decrease the impact of individuating evidence on stereotypical judgments (Garcia-
Marques & Mackie, 2007). In this experiment, participants read individuating information 
about an alleged perpetrator that was either exculpatory or incriminating. Their task was to 
deliberate about the perpetrator´s guilt. Results from two studies demonstrated that when 
individuals experienced a feeling of familiarity, either induced by  subliminal repetition of a 
photo (experiment 1) or by repetition of relevant individuating information about the target 
(experiment 2), analytic processing was decreased as shown by the reduction in impact of 
individuating evidence on judgments and increased sensitivity to category-membership 
information in this condition. 
 Moreover, the hypothesis that familiarity regulates the activation of one information-
processing mode over the other is directly shown in Moons, Mackie and Garcia-Marques 
experiment (2009). Participants were presented a series of strong and weak arguments and 
expressed their agreement towards each one of them. Some were repeated and some were 
not. Using the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991), a procedure that allows the 
independent estimation of controlled (more deliberative) and automatic (more associative) 
components of information-processing, it was verified that the arguments´ repetition 
promoted a dissociation in the processing components, such as, repetition increased the use 
of more automatic components. In other words, participants agreed more with repeated 
arguments due to automatic influences of familiarity (and independently of controlled 
processing).  
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 Taken together, the evidence reviewed here corroborates the FARM hypothesis 
demonstrating that repetition of information is somewhat associated with a greater use of 
processing strategies that privileges the use of prior knowledge that is accessible in memory. 
  Additional evidence supporting the FARM is also found in the literature that 
considers the impact of fluency on processing. Recall that for the FARM model and others 
(e.g. Garcia-Marques, 1999; Jacoby & Kelley, 1990; Smith, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; 
Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), the match between the information received and that 
accessible in memory makes the processing more fluent. This fluency, experienced 
according to the FARM as a subjective feeling of familiarity, causes individuals to process 
information on the basis of what is already activated, decreasing the depth with which 
information will be subsequently processed. Therefore, the experience of fluency (associated 
with the feeling of familiarity or originated by other sources) should also promote decreases 
in analytic processes what has been, effectively, observed in different investigations. For 
example, Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, Eyre and Rebecca´s (2007) demonstrated in a series of 
studies that fluent situations reduce the impact of systematic cues on favorability ratings in 
persuasion. Participants were asked to read a persuasive ad regarding an mp3 song which 
was presented either with a headline in a font easy to read (fluency condition) or in a font 
difficult to read (disfluent condition). Moreover, the ad was embedded with strong or weak 
arguments favoring the quality of the mp3 and a photo of a prototypical expert in the subject 
(vs. non-expert) was presented. The results showed that when the headline´s font was easy to 
read, participants neglected the quality of the arguments anchoring their favorability 
judgments on the heuristic cue presented (the photo of the expert), a strategy that, as we 
stated previously, is typically associated with non-analytic processing.  
 Furthermore, this impact of fluency on processing seems to occur even more subtly 
as Song and Schwarz´s (2008) Moses illusion experiment demonstrates. In this study, 
participants were simply asked about how many animals of each kind Moses took on his ark 
when the flood took place. Half participants read this sentence in a fluent condition (i.e. font 
easy to read) and the other half read it in a disfluent condition (font difficult to read). The 
results demonstrated that the error embedded in this sentence (it was not Moses, but Noah) 
was not detected in the fluency condition, but it was in the disfluent one. This data suggests 
that in the condition where processing became fluent, participants engaged in a non-analytic 
mode of processing which made them disregard the details of the question.  
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 Even though these findings do not necessarily assume that fluency is experienced as a 
feeling of familiarity (for appropriate debates in the literature see for example Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009), they do not necessarily conflict with the FARM predictions. In fact, 
the involvement of fluency in the experience of a feeling of familiarity has been widely 
reported in several investigations (e.g. Dewhurst & Hitch, 1997; Whittlesea, 1993; 
Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003; Whittlesea, & Williams, 2000), as well as their interconnection. 
Evidence of the familiarity-fluency link has been documented in the findings that prior 
exposure to stimuli enhances the ease with which they can be processed (i.e., Winkielman, 
Halberstadt, Fazendeiro & Catty, 2006) and, conversely, increasing the ease with which a 
stimulus is processed (e.g., by enhancing its clarity) can produce the perception that the 
stimulus has been previously seen (e.g., Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990). Because 
fluency and familiarity are linked, authors (e.g. Schwartz, 2004) have suggested that any 
variable that facilitates processing leads to increased perceptions of familiarity, even when 
the facilitation derives from irrelevant characteristics like high figure-ground contrast, long 
exposure times, or preceding visual or semantic primes. As such, both fluency and 
familiarity seem to be part of a same mechanism that is responsible for decreasing the 
probability of analytic processing these studies converge on the conclusion that fluency of 
processing feeds into judgments, “presumably by making the presented information “feel” 
more familiar” (Schwarz, 2004, p. 6). However, this is still an empirical question that the 
literature has not addressed yet.  
 
Summary. 
 The findings described above demonstrate that familiarity, even by subtle repetition 
of information, is sufficient to reduce the probability of analytic processing. This effect has 
been attributed to a subjective feeling that signals the cognitive system to rely on previous 
knowledge that is accessible and available in memory.  
 
The impact of familiarity on motivational states of challenge and threat.  
 Familiarity has also been shown to impact the cognitive evaluation processes 
involved in the activation of motivational states of challenge and threat. In the tradition of 
cognitive appraisal theory (Lazarus & Folman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991), these evaluations are 
activated in potentially stressful or threatening situations in which individuals evaluate 
(sometimes consciously but more often unconsciously) whether their personal resources 
13 
  
  
  
meet the demands of the situation (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Blascovich, 2008). 
Blascovich and colleagues have demonstrated that individuals experience a motivational 
state of challenge when their evaluations of resources meets or somewhat exceeds the 
situational demands; but experience a motivational state of threat if they do not (e.g., 
Blascovich, Mendes, Tomaka, Salomon & Seery, 2003; Blascovich, Seery, Mugridge, Norris 
& Weisbuch, 2004; Mendes, Major, McCoy & Blascovich, 2008; Tomaka, Blascovich, 
Kelsey & Leitten, 1993; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler & Ernst, 1997).  
 Contributing to this resource and demand evaluation process are several intra-
individual (e.g. psychological or physical danger; abilities, skills, knowledge; dispositions; 
uncertainty, novelty and familiarity; required effort etc.) and inter-individual (e.g. social 
support) factors with familiarity being the one of our interest here. It has been postulated and 
empirically demonstrated that familiarity impacts perceptions of available resources which 
facilitates meeting situational demands (Fazio, Blascovich & Driscoll, 1992; Blascovich et 
al., 1993; 1999). By doing so, familiar situations are typically associated with task 
engagement and challenge.  
 
The dualistic activation of motivational Challenge and Threat. How cognitive appraisals 
or evaluations influence behavior has been a topic of much research in social psychology, 
especially in the stress literature (Blascovich & Katkin, 1993; Cox, 1978; Lazarus, 1991; 
Lazarus & Folkman 1984; Obrist, Gaebelein, Teller, Langer, Grignolo & Light, 1978; 
Tomaka, & Blascovich, 1994; Tomaka, & Palacios-Esquivel, 1997; Taylor, Seeman, 
Eisenberger, Kozanian, Moore & Moons, 2010; Tomaka, Palacios, Schneider, Colotla, 
Concha & Herrald, 1999). Research in this domain demonstrates that cognitive and 
emotional processes are dependent on evaluations that individuals make with regard to the 
significance and outcome of a specific encounter.  
Early on, Lazarus and colleagues (Lazarus 1966, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman 1984) 
posited and validated that, in the face of encountering a situation that may be helpful or 
detrimental for one´s well-being, individuals appraise whether their personal resources are 
enough to meet the situational demands. The outcome of this appraisal results a general state 
that defines the subsequent biological, emotional, behavioral and cognitive reactions, such 
as, a threat state is elicited if individuals anticipate that harm may be imminent and a 
challenge state results if the person feels confident about mastering the task (Lazarus, 1991).  
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 Following on Lazarus´ work, but eschewing the label “appraisal” because of its 
strong implication of a conscious process, Blascovich and his colleagues developed the 
Biopsychosocial Model of Challenge and Threat (BPS) that explores the implications of 
cognitive ”evaluations” more deeply, and their interactions with biological, emotional and 
behavioral responses in the activation of motivational states. Congruent with Lazarus´s 
conceptualization, Blascovich and colleagues (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; Blascovich & 
Seery, 2006) have defined challenge as a motivational state activated when the evaluation of 
available resources is sufficient or exceeds the perceptions of demands necessary to deal 
with the situation. Challenge is described by the BPS as an approach-approach type of 
motivation generally with positive affective tone (Blascovich & Mendes, 2000). Conversely, 
a motivational state of threat is activated when individuals evaluate fewer resources than the 
ones needed to deal with the situation. It is described as an approach-avoidance type of 
motivation typically with a less positive or even sometimes negative affective tone.  
According to the now well-established BPS model (Blascovich, et al., 1999, 2003, 
2004; Mendes et al., 2008; Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994; Tomaka, et al, 1993, 1997; for a 
review see Blascovich, 2008; Blascovich & Seery, 2006), challenge or threat occur in 
potentially threatening (and therefore stressful) motivated performance situations (i.e., ones 
that require instrumental cognitive responses) that are self-relevant and, hence, goal-relevant 
to the individual and, consequently, task engaging.  Evaluation of resources and demands 
moderate the activation of the two oppositional motivational states: challenge and threat. 
Hence, such situations require active rather than passive coping (e.g. giving a speech vs. 
watching a video; Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; Tomaka et al., 1993).  
Within motivated performance situations, task-engaged individuals typically exhibit 
significant increases in heart rate (i.e. how fast the heart beats per minute) and ventricular 
contractility (i.e. contractions of the left ventricle of the heart) from resting baseline levels 
(i.e. within the goal-relevant situation; Obrist, 1981; Blascovich, Mendes & Seery, 2002). 
Once individuals are task-engaged, challenge and threat are modulated by the resource and 
demand evaluation process (Blascovich, 2008). If task engagement does not occur, then 
challenge and threat are not differentiated physiologically (as demonstrated by Tomaka et al. 
1993, experiment 3).  
 The engagement in the motivational state of challenge or threat, as a function of a 
resources and demands evaluation ratio, is typically indexed by the activation of a specific 
pattern of cardiovascular (CV) responses. Tomaka et al (1997) first elucidated these findings 
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by demonstrating that physiological responses could be aggregated within two specific 
motivational patterns (i.e., challenge and threat) based on similar ones (physiological 
toughness and weakness) as proposed by Dienstbier’(1989) theory of physiological 
toughness in his work on rodents. 
 Dienstbier´s (1989) observed that animals exhibited two different patterns of 
cardiovascular responses when performing in potentially life threatening situations (e.g. 
avoiding a predator): physiological toughness and physiological weakness. The 
physiological toughness pattern is characterized by stimulation via the sympathetic neural 
and adrenal medullary (SAM) axis. As a consequence, myocardial (i.e., heart muscle) 
contractility, more specifically left ventricle contractility (VC) and heart rate (HR) increase 
via increased sympathetic stimulation of the myocardium.  Further, according to Dienstbier, 
the adrenal medullary release of epinephrine into the bloodstream not only further increases 
HR but dilates the arteries, thereby decreasing total systemic peripheral vascular resistance 
(TPR) and, in combination with increased heart rate and myocardial contractility, increase 
blood flow as indexed by cardiac output (CO). The physiological weakness state, on the 
other hand, also includes activation of the SAM axis, but accompanied by the activation of 
the hypothalamic pituitary adrenal (HPA) axis. The latter results in the release of cortisol 
into the blood stream. This obstructs the SAM-driven decreases in TPR and the SAM-driven 
increases in CO. In turn, the HPA axis activation usually results in little change or even 
increases in TPR and decreases or no changes in CO but an increase in mean arterial blood 
pressure.  
Testing Dienstbier´s (1989) conceptualization in humans, Tomaka et al. (1993) 
posited that, under conditions of potential threat in goal relevant situations, these patterns 
could also be activated via the results of situational resource/demand evaluations in humans. 
During challenge (more resources than demands), individuals exhibit a pattern of 
physiological toughness, whereas in situations of threat (more demands than resources), 
individuals exhibit a pattern similar to physiological weakness. However, this study was 
based on correlations between pre-task demand/resource evaluations and resulting 
cardiovascular responses during task performance. 
To test their theoretical notions experimentally, Tomaka et. al (1997, experiment 1) 
manipulated challenge and threat evaluations prior to task performance and recorded the CV 
responses during performance of a mental arithmetic task. Challenge and threat evaluations 
were manipulated via the type of instructions furnished. In the threat condition, participants 
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were instructed that they should perform as quickly and as accurately as possible because 
their performance was going to be scored for speed and accuracy. In the challenge condition, 
participants were told that they should think of the task as a challenge and they should think 
of themselves as capable of meeting that challenge. In this condition, no instruction 
regarding performance evaluation was given. After the instructions and prior to beginning 
the task, evaluations were assessed by asking participants how threatening they thought the 
mental arithmetic task would be (assessing perception of demands); and how able they 
thought they were to cope with it (assessing perception of resources). Consistent with 
cognitive evaluations of challenge, the results showed that those who received the challenge 
instructions perceived more resources than the ones who receive the threatening ones. 
Importantly, those who appraised the situations as challenging exhibited the pattern of 
responses consistent with Dienstbier´ physiological toughness pattern (i.e. significant 
increases in HR, VC, and CO and decreases in TPR) and those who appraised the situation 
as threatening exhibited a pattern of responses similar to physiological toughness (i.e. 
significant increases in HR and VC but decreases or no changes in CO and increases in 
TPR). 
The causal relationship between the cognitive evaluations and the cardiovascular 
responses is rather unilateral (i.e., cognitive evaluations lead to challenge or threat) as shown 
by Tomaka et al´s (1997, experiment 2 & 3) investigation. The authors induced 
cardiovascular patterns that mimicked the cardiovascular patterns consistent with challenge 
and threat and then observed their impact on cognitive evaluations to test whether the 
manipulated cardiovascular responses could predict the cognitive evaluations. In experiment 
2, participants either pedaled a static bicycle at a moderate workload (50 watts), an activity 
that mimics physiological challenge; or sat stationary on it, which served as control 
condition. In experiment 3, participants either immersed their hands in a warm or ice bath. 
The warm bath mimicked physiological challenge patterns, whereas, the cold pressor 
mimicked physiological threat. In each study, participants reported demands and resources 
for an upcoming serial subtraction task during the manipulation (i.e., while on the bicycle or 
with hand immersed in the bath). The results in both studies demonstrated that the cognitive 
evaluations of resources and demands did not vary as a function of the physical 
manipulations. This suggests that the experience of the different cardiovascular patterns does 
not differentiate demand/resource evaluations, ruling out the hypothesis of reversed 
causality. 
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Research has consistently validated the moderation role of the cognitive evaluations 
in the activation of the CV challenge and threat patterns. For example, research within the 
BPS model has shown that inducing threat via having participants engaging in a 
collaboration task with a stigmatized other (Blascovich et. al, 2001) induces the 
cardiovascular pattern of threat. Similarly, inducing threat by putting participants in 
interaction with a member form a minority group (e.g. Blacks) also increases a 
cardiovascular pattern of threat (Mendes, Blascovich, Lickel & Hunter, 2002, see also, 
Mendes et al., 2001). Further evidence also suggests that violating stereotype-expectancies 
(e.g. Asian students speaking with accents) (Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel & Jost, 
2007); and increasing sexism salience in women is associated to cardiovascular threat 
(Eliezer, Major, & Mendes, 2010; for more examples see Blascovich, 2008; Blascovich, 
Mendes, & Seery, 2002; Blascovich & Seery, 2006).  
The impact of these motivational states on performance has been widely documented 
within and outside the BPS model. Typically, challenge has been associated with better 
performance and threat to poorer performance. For example, compared to a threat state, 
challenge is usually associated with better athletic performances (Blascovich, et al., 2004); 
increased speed in pairwise preferences decisions (Blascovich et al., 1993; Fazio et al., 
1992); increased accuracy for serial subtraction (e.g. Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994; Vick, 
Seery, Blascovich & Weisbuch, 2008) or object and pattern recognition judgments 
(Blascovich et al., 1999); and better performances on the Remote Association Task (Seery, 
Blascovich, Weisbuch & Vick, 2004) (for reviews see Blascovich, 2008).  
Also outside the BPS model, there is evidence that evaluation instructions lead to 
differences in performance outcomes, Drach-Zahavy and Erez (2002) varied the instructional 
set to correspond to either challenge or threat evaluations and found that the evaluation 
instructions led to differences in performance outcomes, such that challenge instructions 
increased accurate predictions of the stock value of a series of companies. Likewise, 
O´Connor, Arnold, and Maurizio (2010) showed, that when individuals are primed with 
challenge evaluations, via subtle instructions informing that the task is easy to accomplish 
(vs. subtle instructions informing that the task is a difficult one), they performed a 
negotiation task shown resulting in more favorable agreements reached while negotiating a 
school project.   
Such an improvement effect of challenge on performance has led Wright and Kirby 
(2003) to question whether this effect is due to the engagement in a specific motivational 
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state, but rather due to a greater effort exerted in these situations. Drawing from research on 
the psychophysiology of effort (Brehm & Self, 1989; Light, 1981; Obrist, 1981; Wright & 
Kirby, 2001), Wright and Kirby (2003) suggested that the amount of effort one puts in a task 
is associated, per se, with increases in sympathetic activation, producing similar CV effects 
to those proposed to be associated with challenge, namely increases in cardiac activity 
indexes (i.e. myocardial contractility, heart rate, and systolic blood pressure). Based on this, 
they argue that it is possible that challenged participants tend to exhibit greater cardiac 
activity than threatened participants simply because they exert more effort. If, in turn, 
challenged participants exert more task effort, then the better performances associated with 
this state, can be due to the greater effort exerted and not necessarily because of the 
engagement in a specific motivational state.  
To make their point clear, Wright and Kirby (2003) presented an effort-based 
alternative interpretation using the Tomaka et al.´s (1993) study where challenge 
improvement effects on performance were found.  In this study, participants were asked to 
perform some moderately difficult mental subtractions. They were asked either to do it 
silently (challenge condition) or verbally, i.e., out loud (threat condition). Results 
demonstrated that those who had to perform the task silently exhibited greater increases in 
cardiovascular reactivity (consistent with challenge) and gave more correct answers, than did 
those who performed the task out loud, who exhibit less cardiac activity and poorer 
performances. A BPS interpretation of this data, suggests that the silent performance may 
have decreased perceptions of required effort, which in turn, decreased the demands-to-
resources ratio, resulting ultimately in challenge. Conversely, the “public” performance may 
have increased required effort which in turn, increased the demands-to-resources ratio 
leading to threat. But, if according to Wright and Kirby´s (2003) point of view, those in the 
“public” condition made higher demand-to-resources ratios (as the BPS model predicts) and, 
as a consequence, predicted a negative outcome (e.g. public humiliation), they may have had 
lower cardiac activity and poorer performances, not necessarily because they engaged in a 
specific motivational state, but because they “may have been more inclined to despair and 
abandon their effort to succeed” (p. 231). In other words, they may have exhibited lower 
cardiac activity and poorer performances simply because they exerted less effort and 
disengaged from a task for which they predicted failure.  
Even though this is an interesting interpretation, for which no direct empirical 
evidence exists so far, Wright and Kirby´s (2003) argument is ruled out by all the evidence 
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that shows that even when effort is controlled across experimental groups, differences in CV 
responses attributed to challenge and threat states emerge. Take for example the experiments 
involving the deliverance of a speech (e.g. Blascovich et al., 2001, 2004; Eliezer et al., 2010; 
Mendes et al., 2002; Weisbuch-Remington et al., 2005). In these paradigms, all individuals, 
randomly assigned to a threat or challenge condition, are asked to deliver a speech. As 
Blascovich et al. (2003) points out, delivering a speech has metabolic requirements 
associated to it which are not expected to differ across groups because speaking was never 
more difficult or required more physiological effort for one group and not for the other. 
What varies in these experiments is the context in which the speech takes place. Consistent 
with a challenge and threat evaluation predictions, CV responses are greater when 
participants give a speech to an in-group member, in comparison with an out-group member 
(e.g. Mendes et al., 2002) or speak about a pleasant topic instead of their own death (e.g. 
Weisbuch-Remington et al., 2005). Thus, maintaining constant the metabolic activity of 
giving a speech, it seems hard to understand how effort by itself is sufficient to explain 
differences verified across the experimental conditions. 
This effort-based interpretation is also ruled out by the studies demonstrating that 
challenge does not always lead to better performance. Take for example, Hunter´s 
investigation (2001). In this study, participants were informed that they would either have to 
read (challenge condition) or sing (threat condition) the U.S. national anthem after 
performing a criterion task. Before they engaged in the criterion task, participants either read 
or sang the first two stanza of the anthem to induce the correspondent state. Immediately 
afterwards, participants performed the criterion task that consisted of watching pairs of 
words and read some of them aloud. By the end of the presentation, participants were 
instructed to recall all the words they saw and identify intrusions among a list of words. 
Results revealed that those who were threatened by the possibility of signing the national 
anthem, exhibited greater decreases in cardiac activity and recalled more words correctly and 
indentified more intrusions correctly, than those who were challenged. If the greater CV 
reactivity was merely tapping greater effort as Wright and Kirby suggest (2001, 2003), then 
we should not expect these effects. We should expect that individuals from whom CV was 
higher to always perform better, which does not seem to be the case.  
Similarly, Feinberg and Aiello (2009, experiment 1) and Alter, Aronson, Darley, 
Rodriguez and Ruble (2010) have found that challenge leads to poorer performance than 
threat. Alter et al. (2010), for example, observed that when a stereotype is made salient (e.g. 
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by making black students aware of their minority group membership) and individuals 
became threatened, the typical stereotype-threat impaired-performance effect (for reviews 
see, Aronson & McGlone, 2009; Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008) is eliminated if the task 
is framed as challenge, i.e., if participants are instructed to think about the task as a great 
opportunity to grow and learn something new and helpful. Even though no CV data were 
furnished in this study, threatened participants had better performances. If effort is translated 
in better performances and if,  according to Wright and Kirby´s rationale threatened 
participants tend to exert less effort on performance,  then we should expect these 
individuals to always perform worse which, again, does not seem to be the case. 
 
Familiarity and Challenge. Several factors directly influence the resources and 
demands evaluations responsible for challenge and threat activation. As stated previously, 
one assumption of the BPS model is that familiarity brought by previous knowledge is 
associated with the activation of a motivational state of challenge.  
Factors like skills, abilities, social support and/or previous knowledge have been 
shown to influence resources evaluations (for review see, Blascovich, 2008; Blascovich & 
Seery, 2006).  For example, if an individual has good skills in spoken-French it is likely that 
he perceives himself has having sufficient resources to engage in a conversation in French. 
Factors like danger, uncertainty, risk, required effort, dispositions and/or social evaluation 
have been shown to influence demands evaluations. For example, an individual with good 
skills in spoken-French can perceive greater situational demands if he is aware that the 
conversation will be evaluated by a French native.  
Some authors (e.g., Feinberg & Aiello, 2009; Maier, Waldstein, & Synowski, 2003; 
Wright & Kirby, 2003) have challenged this broad conceptualization of resources and 
demands stating that it is difficult to understand how an individual can accurately appraise 
the resources and demands required when multiple factors are involved. As a consequence, 
these same authors have questioned the cognitive ratio as a valid approach to challenge and 
threat.   
For the BPS model it is not so much the question of the exact levels of resources and 
demands that lead to challenge or threat, but rather the subjective experience of evaluating 
more, or less sufficient resources to face the expected demands of the task. Blascovich et al. 
(2003) defends that individuals are not cold calculators of the exact resources and demands 
because they are cognitively and affectively influenced by what is happening in the context 
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surrounding them and this influence can generally occurs below the levels of awareness. The 
studies that found challenge and threat effects using subliminal manipulations clearly 
demonstrate this (Mendes, Weisbuch, Seery & Blascovich, 2002; Weisbuch-Remington et 
al., 2005). Weisbuch-Remington, et al. (2005, experiment 1), for example, found that 
participants exposed subliminally to negative religious symbols prior to deliver a speech 
about their own death exhibited a CV pattern consistent with threat, than participants 
exposed subliminally to positive symbols who were more challenged.  
The influence of each factor on resource and demand evaluations is not independent 
(Blascovich & Mendes, 2000). In fact, one factor can simultaneously influence the 
evaluation of resources and the evaluation of demands. For example, abilities can 
simultaneously increase evaluations of resources, based on the available skills to perform, as 
well as, decrease demands because it requires little effort. As such, the impact of each factor 
over the resource and demands evaluations is said to overlap, be synergistic and/or interact 
to some extent, making this process a complex one and occurring deliberatively or 
automatically (Blascovich, 2008). 
In this interactive and iterative process, familiarity is a relevant factor that can 
directly disrupt both of resource and demand evaluations. According to Blascovich et al. 
(1993), familiarity can both increase one´s personal resources, based on the previous 
knowledge it provides, and decrease situational demands, based on little required effort. As 
such, when the situation is familiar, individuals will likely evaluate themselves has having 
enough or more resources to cope with the situation based on the previous knowledge they 
have stored. Conversely, when the situation is unfamiliar or novel and no previous 
knowledge is available, individuals tend to evaluate resources as less than the ones required. 
Because in familiar situations, resources tend to overcome demands, familiarity is typically 
associated with challenge, whereas novelty is more associated with threat.  
 This argument has been validated in a series of investigations (Fazio et al., 1992; 
Blascovich et al., 1993, 1999; Kelsey
, 
Blascovich, Leiten, Schneider, Tomaka & Wiens
, 
2000) that demonstrate that task-practice (through repetition) increases the CV pattern of 
responses associated with a challenge. For example, in Blascovich et al. experiment (1993), 
participants were asked, for an initial task, to observe a set of 30 abstract paintings. Half of 
the participants were instructed to decide whether they liked or disliked each painting by 
saying aloud “like”, “like strongly", "dislike", or "dislike strongly." The other half (those 
assigned to the novel condition) were instructed to say aloud the predominant color of each 
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painting and the percentage of that color contained within the painting. On the subsequent 
task, all participants were informed that they would be shown several pairs of paintings and 
their goal was to indicate which painting in each pair they most preferred. For half the 
participants (those in the familiar condition), the paintings presented were those that they 
have seen previously and for which they have already formed an opinion. For participants in 
the novel condition, the paintings were completely new. As expected, results showed that 
participants in the familiar condition were faster in making their judgments and exhibited the 
cardiovascular pattern of responses consistent with a challenge state. Conversely, 
participants exposed to novel unrehearsed condition were slower in their judgments and 
exhibited a cardiovascular pattern of responses consistent with threat.  
 Consistent with this findings, Kelsey et al. (2000) and Blascovich and colleagues’ 
(1999) experiments in addition to showing that familiarity impacts individuals’ motivational 
states they also show that the impact of familiarity on challenge and threat is moderated by 
the presence of others. In Blascovich et al. (1999) experiment, participants learned a specific 
task (either a number-categorization tasks or a pattern-recognition task) to a predetermined 
criterion. Then, they were randomly assigned to perform the same task (familiar condition) 
or the other one (novel condition) in one of two social conditions: either alone or in the 
presence of two observers, introduced as two students who were going to observe 
participants’ performance. Congruent with previous findings, the results indicated that, 
compared to those performing in the novel situation, those in the familiar condition 
performed better and exhibited a cardiovascular pattern of responses consistent with 
challenge. However, this effect was only valid in the presence of the observers because only 
those in the presence condition were task-engaged (as shown by significant increases in HR 
and VC from baseline values occurring only for this group). Remember that because task 
engagement is a necessary condition to assess challenge and threat, these motivational states 
were not differentiated for the alone group. These findings, thus, demonstrate that the 
presence of others is an important moderator of the effects of familiarity on challenge and 
threat.  
 
Summary. 
 The findings reviewed here clearly demonstrate that, under task-engaging situations, 
two qualitatively different motivational states are activated as a function of a cognitive 
evaluation-based ratio of resources and demands. Task familiarity provides resources to the 
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individual which generally activates a state of challenge, an effect that seems to be 
moderated by the presence of others. The presence of others during a performance of a well-
learned task likely increases task engagement and increases the probability of positive social 
consequences of good performance whereas the presence of others during a performance of a 
novel also increases task engagement but increases the probability of negative social 
consequences of poor performance.  Indeed, in a gain/loss framing study involving challenge 
and threat, Seery, Weisbuch & Blascovich (2009) demonstrated that gain and loss framing of 
a task leads to challenge and threat cardiovascular responses, respectively.    
 
 In this chapter, we have reviewed how familiarity impact cognitive processing, 
focusing on how it moderates cognitive processing style (an assumption from the FARM 
model) and how it moderates motivational states (an assumption from the BPS model).  In 
the next chapter we explore how the two are related, building a bridge between the two 
underlying models. 
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Chapter II: Hypothesizing the relationship between the FARM and the BPS model 
 
In the previous chapter, the impact that familiarity appears to have on cognitive and 
motivational processes was reviewed. Evidence from the FARM model (Garcia-Marques, 
1999; Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2007) has shown that familiarity has a regulatory role on 
the activation of information-processing modes. Evidence from the BPS model (Blascovich, 
2008; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Mendes et al., 2007) suggests that familiarity impacts 
the cognitive evaluation processes that underlie the activation of superordinate motivational 
states. Here, how these two effects may be related and the bridge that can be built between 
the two underlying models is discussed. 
Briefly, the rationale here is based on the notion that the two models bridge the 
relevance and definition of the experience of available resources.  Familiarity is assumed by 
the FARM as a sign of the presence of a category of resources to deal with a task. Challenge 
motivation is assumed by the BPS model to be associated with the evaluation of available 
resources to deal with task demands in a motivated performance situation.  Thus, familiarity 
may be evaluated as a resource, and all other things being equal, lead to the motivational 
state of challenge. This hypothesis and its implications are explored in this chapter. 
 
Familiarity and Challenge.    
 Familiarity is assumed by the FARM model to develop as a consequence of  top 
down processes facilitation resulting from a match between the characteristics of the 
situation/stimulus and the relevant correspondent information in memory. This match in 
memory is associated with more fluent processing (Garcia-Marques, 2009). Because this 
association signals the availability of a resource, it marks the situation as one with which one 
is more likely to cope (at least as well as in the past) with all other evaluations being equal. 
According to the BPS model, such familiarity increases the ratio of evaluated resources 
relative to demands.   
As reviewed in Chapter 1, challenge is a motivational state that is marked by the 
stimulation of the sympathetic neural and adrenal medullary (SAM) axis resulting in a 
specific “challenge” pattern of cardiovascular responses: increased heart rate (HR) and 
ventricular contractility (VC) accompanied by decreases in systemic peripheral vascular 
resistance (TPR) and increases in cardiac output (CO); i.e., blood flow.  
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As Blascovich et al. (2003) suggest, although motivational states may sometimes be 
validly indexed via self-report, they are more objectively indexed via concomitant 
physiological measures. Furthermore, any process, such as one involving increasing 
familiarity with a task that increases the ratio of task performance situational resources to 
demands should result in more of a challenge motivational state as indexed by the challenge 
cardiovascular pattern. Recall that Blascovich et al.´s (1993; 1999) data already demonstrate 
that familiarity with an upcoming task, through previous practice, increases the activation of 
a motivational state of challenge. What is not known, however, is whether there are other 
factors linking familiarity to increased resources. Additionally, it is not known if activation 
of familiarity within motivated performance situations impacts information processing as it 
has been shown by the FARM model. 
Several aspects of both models can be considered in these arguments. The first is that 
in the FARM model familiarity is assumed to be independent of the degree of individuals´ 
task engagement. According to the BPS, however, challenge requires task engagement.  
Second, whereas familiarity is assumed to be automatically activated as result of 
individuals attending to a stimulus/task, challenge results from a ratio of two different 
components: evaluated resources and evaluated demands,  which can occur deliberately (i.e., 
consciously), automatically (i.e., unconsciously), or both (Blascovich, 2008). This evaluation 
process is highly complex because multiple factors enter into the resource/demand 
evaluations (e.g. psychological and physical danger/safety, uncertainty/certainty, 
novelty/familiarity, required effort, skills and knowledge, the presence of others, affective 
cues, attitudes and beliefs, etc.). As such, the resources/demands ratio is only partially 
influenced by familiarity.  Furthermore, these factors are not completely independent of each 
other (Blascovich, 2008; Blascovich & Mendes; 2000). Consequently, it is not likely that 
there is a perfect match between the activation of familiarity and the complete evaluation of 
a motivated performance situation as “challenge.”  Familiarity is just one of its components 
and can interact with others in different ways. Moreover, as Blascovich (2008) claimed, 
familiarity being a factor that impacts the evaluation process, it may have implications for 
both resource and demand evaluation. Hence, familiarity may not only inform the 
presumably cognitive evaluation system of the availability of task resources, but also 
decrease task demands. 
In order to test whether familiarity with a situation (manipulated by ways other than 
task-mastery) is more likely to generate challenge evaluations via its expected role on how 
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information is processed (i.e., evaluated), it is necessary to create a performance situation in 
which it is possible to assess the activation of familiarity and its impact on processing. 
Recall that the FARM assumes that when individuals experience familiarity they process 
information on the basis of what they already know about the stimulus (Garcia-Marques & 
Mackie, 2001) and not its specificities. Cognitive strategies that privilege mere activation of 
previous knowledge are defined by the FARM as only one of two ways that information can 
be processed; namely, non-propositional, non-integrative, non-analytic processing.  
By testing the impact of familiarity on information-processing, one can validate the 
experience and assess its impact on the typical physiological response pattern associated 
with challenge.  In addition, one can determine whether this physiological pattern is in some 
way (possible mediation) related to participants´ engagement in a non-analytic processing 
mode, thus testing whether the decrease in analytic processing promoted by familiarity will 
be mediated by the challenge motivational state as measured by its physiological correlates. 
Assuming equal task demands in both familiar and non familiar conditions, it is 
hypothesized that the resource/demand evaluations resulting in challenge will stem in part 
from the evaluation of increase resources due to familiarity.  
However, goal-relevance is necessary for task engagement and, only in that 
condition, is challenge expected to be differentiated from threat as a function of the 
resources and demands evaluation ratio. Task engagement is a necessary condition that 
influences cognitive processing directly. Evidence on dual process models has demonstrated 
that individuals who are task-engaged, whether because the issue is important (Petty, 
Cacioppo & Goldman, 1981) or because they want to be accurate in the outcome of their 
judgment (Chen, Shechter & Chaiken, 1998) tend to process information more analytically, 
than individuals who are not task-engaged. Task engagement is, therefore, conceived as a 
motivational variable that increases the likelihood of analytic processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). More relevant is the fact that such motivation seems to moderate the impact of 
familiarity in information processing. Low motivated performers are less likely to engage in 
more analytic processing and highly motivated individuals are much more likely to, 
independently of the level of familiarity (see Claypool et al., 2004). Thus, a moderated level 
of motivation would likely be a necessary condition to detect the regulatory role of 
familiarity. Such a moderated level should be sufficient to allow task  engagement reported 
as necessary by Blascovich and colleagues. 
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However, it should be noted that the definition of task engagement conveyed by the 
BPS model does not necessarily equate with motivation to process information analytically. 
According to Blascovich (2008), a situation is task-engaging if individuals perceive self- or 
goal-relevance; if it requires instrumental cognitive responses; and is active rather than 
passive. Even though self-relevance can increase analytic processing (Petty et al., 1991) 
perhaps it should not be confounded with the type of task engagement proposed by the BPS 
model. Consider the following example: when an individual has to deliver a speech in front 
of a video-camera (one of the most common ways to increase task engagement by BPS 
researchers), he/she can infer self or goal-relevance because his/her performance will be 
observed and performing well becomes important. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that his/her goal is to attend more carefully to the details of the information. The goal could 
be to better manage his/her self-image in other ways. So this motivation is not necessarily 
translated in a speech whose content is based on careful analytic processing, especially if an 
available response is offered and resources can be allocated to other features of the speech 
(e.g. body posture, tone, etc). So, in order to test the hypotheses here, it is necessary to use 
paradigm that increases the level of task engagement (in the BPS terms) sufficiently but 
without directly potentiating analytic processing. Furthermore, it is critical here to attend to 
the engagement factor. 
 
Overview of Experiments. 
 Experiment 1. The general hypothesis was tested in Experiment 1. Specifically, it is 
hypothesize that those exposed to the familiar situation will process information non-
analytically and will exhibit the pattern of cardiovascular responses consistent with 
challenge. 
The chosen paradigm involved: 1) testing the impact of familiarity on modes of 
processing; 2) measuring the relevant cardiovascular responses; 3) increasing task 
engagement (without increasing analytic processing).  To do so, the paradigm used by 
Garcia-Marques and Mackie (2001, experiment 1) and Claypool et al. (2004) was adapted to 
suit these purposes. To that paradigm, a procedure used in other investigations of the BPS 
model (speech deliverance, Seery et al, 2004; Eliezer et al, 2010) was added that allowed 
task engagement while cardiovascular responses were being recorded. It was expected that 
the effects predicted by the FARM would be replicated and matched with the cardiovascular 
responses associated with a motivational state of challenge.  
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Experiment 2. Experiment 2 tested a subsidiary hypothesis. Specifically, it is 
hypothesized that those for whom challenge motivation is increased will process information 
non-analytically.  
Recall that the general hypothesis presupposes that the experience of familiarity is 
related to the experience of challenge, since both states are associated with the availability of 
resources to counter task demands. However, if challenge also informs the cognitive system 
of available task resources, then the hypothesis that challenged individuals’ process 
information non-analytically arises. In other words, if the subjective experience signaling the 
availability of a response comes not only from familiarity but also from the engagement in a 
motivational state of challenge, then both experiences should produce similar effects on 
information-processing.  
To test the independent effect of challenge on information-processing, the occurrence 
of familiarity within the experimental protocol was changed.  Specifically, challenge and 
threat were induced prior to the exposition to the persuasive message. Congruent with the 
assumptions of the BPS model, evaluations of challenge and threat were manipulated by 
increasing or decreasing task-demands associated with an experimental task. It was expected 
that the manipulation of task-demands to exert the correspondent effect on the motivational 
states such that the non-demanding condition induced more challenge than the demanding 
condition. If challenge, as hypothesized, is able to affect information-processing in a way 
similar to familiarity, then one should expect a non-demanding condition to be associated 
with less analytic processing.  
 Note that “previous knowledge” like “repetition” has also (e.g. Cacioppo & Petty, 
1989) been associated with more analytic processing. However, Claypool and collaborators 
(2004) have shown that this effect is moderated by the level with which individuals engage 
in the task. Increases in analytic processing associated with repetition appear to be caused by 
additional opportunities to elaborate on message content (Cacioppo & Petty, 1989; Cacioppo 
& Petty, 1979) and previous knowledge with the ability of doing so (Wood, Kallgren & 
Priesler, 1985). But either this opportunity or ability seems to be employed only when 
individual are motivated to deal carefully with the message. Because to promote the 
motivational states of challenge and threat individuals must be engaged in the task, it may be 
that both challenge and threat are clearly associated with analytic processing.  However if 
task engagement has moderate levels and, as the FARM assumes, the evaluation of resources 
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to deal with the task reduces the likelihood of analytic processing, it is hypothesized that 
challenge will be associated with non-analytic processing.  
Because the assumption that the motivational state of challenge requires task 
engagement represents one of the differences between the FARM and the BPS models, it is 
crucial to focus on it directly. Note that the FARM model suggests familiarity to be activated 
and to influence individuals´ processing with some, but not a special, engagement in the 
task. Moreover, if individuals are highly motivated to perform the task, such motivation can 
disrupt or even invert the role of familiarity. On the contrary, challenge appears to be 
activated under high task engagement conditions. As claimed above, task engagement should 
not be clearly identified as the general motivation associated with increased analytic 
processing. If it were, by increasing task engagement any impact of familiarity would be 
disrupted, though the effects of challenge and threat on information processing would be 
increased. If task engagement does not increase individuals´ need for deep processing by 
itself, then it should not disrupt the familiarity effects on information processing. The reverse 
is not as clear because it is unlikely that individuals would be motivated to process deeply in 
a low engagement condition. 
Although the previous hypotheses make task engagement point to the relevance of 
task engage in the studies here, this factor may further understanding of the relationship 
between challenge and a motivated performance situation in which familiarity is activated.  
If familiarity and challenge manipulations do not exert parallel effects under the same levels 
of engagement (as the differences between the two models seem to suggest), one can 
conclude that, although familiarity is incorporated into the motivational state of challenge, 
one is not reduced to the other.  Thus, the approach in the subsequent experiments is to 
examine “task engagement“ moderation effects. 
Blascovich et al. (1999) have clearly demonstrated that the impact of familiarity on 
challenge is moderated by a factor that increases individuals´ task engagement: the presence 
of others. When participants were observed by two confederates, they were more likely to be 
task-engaged. However, when participants were alone, task engagement was less likely and a 
clear differentiation between challenge and threat was not observed. So, as expected by the 
BPS model, examining the effect of familiarity on challenge is dependent upon task 
engagement, which may be achieved by the presence of others.  
Because the presence of others increases task engagement, it should too moderate the 
challenge effects observed in Experiment 2 (challenge decrease analytic processing). Since 
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challenge and threat motivational states are not differentiated with low engagement, it is 
predicted that these two states will not have differential impact in information processing in 
a lone (i.e., without observers) performance condition (where low engagement is expected). 
However, how information will be processed cannot be predicted. If low engagement means 
low motivation to process task information, then one would expect individuals to process 
information in a non analytic way. But if low engagement means moderated motivation, it is 
hypothesized that individuals would information analytically without observers.  
If task engagement is necessary for the effects of familiarity on information-
processing, then one should not find familiarity effects in an alone condition. However, this 
is not what is assumed by the FARM. Familiarity is expected to occur even without task 
engagement. Thus, unless the low engagement condition associates with a very low 
motivational state (which will engage participants by default in a non-analytic mode of 
processing), one would expect the observed familiarity effects on information-processing to 
be independent of the presence or absence of others. To test all these assumptions we 
conducted experiment 3 and 4. 
 
Summary of Experiments 3 and 4. Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that the 
impact of challenge on information-processing only occurs when task engagement is 
increased.  This experiment was a simple  replication of experiment 2 to which we added a 
manipulation of the presence vs. absence of others. Because the presence of others increases 
task engagement, we expected challenge to decrease analytic processing. But because task 
engagement is necessary to activate the motivational state, this effect on information-
processing is not expected in the alone condition.  
Experiment 4 tested the hypothesis that the impact of familiarity on information-
processing will occur independently of task engagement.  This experiment was a mere 
replication of experiment 1 to which we add a manipulation of presence vs. absence of 
others. If this variable does not influence the motivation for deep processing, allowing, 
therefore, a moderated level of motivation, we expect it will not moderate the effects of 
familiarity in how information is processed.  
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 Experiment 1 
 
This experiment was designed to test the general hypothesis that the impact of 
familiarity on information-processing hypothesized by Garcia-Marques et al’s (2000; 2001; 
Claypool et al, 2004; Moons et al, 2009) theory and research is associated with Blascovich’s 
(2008) motivational state of challenge. The experimental design was based on the 
assumptions of both the FARM and the BPS models.  It was modeled on Garcia-Marques 
and Mackie´s (2001) and Claypool et al.´s (2004) investigation of persuasion.  
This design allowed tests of the impact of familiarity on the activation of 
information-processing modes. More specifically, it permitted assessment of depth of 
processing by asking individuals to process either strong or weak persuasive messages, 
under either familiar and unfamiliar conditions, and rate their opinions of the messages and 
subsequently observing attitude-change. According to Petty and Cacioppo (1986), strong 
messages contain arguments such that when individuals are instructed to think about the 
message, their generated thoughts are predominantly favorable. Positive attitude-change 
occurs when individuals generate favorable thoughts towards the position defended in the 
message. According to Petty and Cacioppo, weak messages contain arguments such that 
when individuals are instructed to think about the message, they generate predominantly 
unfavorable thoughts.  
 Congruent with well-established persuasion models (e.g. Elaboration Likelihood 
Model, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Heuristic-Systematic Model, Chaiken, 1987), when an 
individual is elaborating message content, strong and weak arguments have differential 
impacts on attitude-change. In these situations, individuals generate thoughts that are 
congruent with the quality of the message, such that, strong messages typically lead to more 
favorable thoughts, and weak messages to more unfavorable ones. In contrast, when 
individuals are not elaborating, strong and weak arguments have a similar impact on 
attitude-change and the thoughts they generate (usually fewer in comparison to elaboration) 
are independent of message quality.  
 Because the cardiovascular indexes of challenge and threat have only been validated 
during motivated performance situations, i.e., situations that are task-engaging, task 
engagement needed to be induced without simultaneously maximizing analytic processing. 
Consequently, a task was developed that simultaneously would induce task engagement and 
be informative about depth of information-processing. Following earlier investigations of the 
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BPS model (e.g. Seery et al, 2004; Eliezer et al, 2010), task engagement was induced by 
requiring participants to give a speech recorded via a video camera and microphone while 
their cardiovascular responses were recorded. They were instructed to give a speech based 
on the thoughts elicited by a persuasion message that was previously presented to them. This 
task allows, via the content of the speeches, coding of participants thoughts as they read the 
persuasion message informing us about depth of processing (Greenwald, 1968; Tormala, 
Briñol & Petty, 2006).   
 This paradigm developed in three different phases. The first phase served the purpose 
of inducing familiarity based on the manipulation of familiarity used by Claypool et al. 
(2004). Participants read either a strong or weak persuasive message on a computer screen 
while they listened to an audio message that would be subsequently repeated or not. The 
second phase served the purpose of testing the impact of familiarity on information-
processing. Participants read either a strong or weak version of a persuasive message, which 
for half of the participants was the same message they heard in the first phase. The third 
phase, because it increased task engagement, allowed the assessment of the association 
between familiarity activated by different familiarity conditions with the cardiovascular 
markers of motivational states of challenge usually associated with those states. Task 
engagement was induced by asking participants to give a speech to a video-camera (Seery et 
al, 2004; Eliezer et al., 2010) about the thoughts they were having while they were reading 
the persuasive message previously. Physiological recordings were made throughout the three 
tasks. 
Because the FARM model postulates that repetition of information decreases the 
probability of analytic processing, replication of the previous results by Claypool et al. 
(2004) was expected on phase 2. Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants’ attitudes 
in the familiarity condition would be independent of the quality of the arguments whereas 
attitudes of those not in the familiarity condition would reflect the quality of the arguments. 
In addition, it was hypothesized that the favorability of the thoughts (towards the issue 
presented in the message) generated by participants in phase 3 would be moderated by 
familiarity conditions. More specifically, it was hypothesized that in the familiarity condition 
that favorability would be independent of message quality and would anchor the quality of 
the message for those not previously familiar with the message. More specifically it was 
hypothesized that those in the familiar condition would report the same number of thoughts, 
independently of the message quality, reflecting superficial processing. In contrast, for those 
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in the unfamiliar condition, the number of thoughts was expected to differ as a function of 
message quality. 
The main test of the general hypothesis centered on the impact of familiarity on 
challenge state. Recall that it was hypothesized that because familiarity increases the 
likelihood of challenge, both states are associated with the availability of resources to deal 
with task demands.  Hence, it was hypothesized that during phase 3 those in the familiarity 
condition would exhibit a pattern of cardiovascular responses consistent with challenge – 
increases in cardiac activity (HR and VC) and increases in CO and decreases in TPR. In 
addition, because this pattern of results may suggest a close relationship between familiarity 
activated in the repetition condition and the challenge motivational state as indexed by these 
physiological markers, we will address them (the physiological markers) as a mediation 
variable of the effect of familiarity on information processing mode 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants and Design 
48 undergraduate students from the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB; 
34 females; Mean age = 20; SD = 1.94) received course credit for their participation. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions in the 2 (strong vs. weak 
message) x 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition) between subjects factorial design. 
 
Material 
The experimental material consisted of two persuasive messages adapted from 
Garcia-Marques and Mackie (2001). One argued for the effectiveness of weight loss centers; 
and the other argued against imposing restrictions on industry to minimize the effects of acid 
rain on the north eastern states of the USA. Each message had a strong and weak version 
comprised of strong and weak arguments, respectively. The strong weight loss center 
message consisted of arguments such as “Weight loss centers are monitored full time by 
qualified medical professionals.”, whereas the weak version consisted of arguments such as 
“Attending a weight loss centre program weekly meeting is a really good and healthy way to 
spend time and meet new people.” The strong version of the acid rain message included 
arguments such as “Solving demographic and geographic problems would have a more 
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beneficial effect than imposing controls on industry to minimize the effects of acid rain”; 
whereas the weak version included arguments such as “Everyone is always blaming 
American industry for everything, and using them as an excuse to increase bureaucracy.” 
(see appendix A to see full messages).   
 Original pretests performed by Worth and Mackie (1987) revealed that these 
messages were likely to be counterattitudinal to the majority of UCSB students; and that 
both strong versions of the messages were more persuasive than the weak versions. An 
additional message was used as a control for the manipulation of familiarity. This message 
argued against increases in road taxes with a strong version (e.g. “An increase in tax rates 
(…) would be used to repair potholes in our freeways which play a part in 38% of all 
highway traffic deaths every year in America.) and a weak version (e.g. “Tax rate increases 
would help in the beautification of our freeways and also make them more interesting.”) (see 
appendix A). 
 The materials for this experiment also included equipment (i.e., sensors, and 
transducers) necessary to record participants’ physiological responses and obtain the 
physiological recordings (see Blascovich Mendes, Vanman, & Dickerson, 2011, chapter 2, 
for details).    
 
Procedure 
Participants arrived singly at the laboratory where they were greeted by an 
experimenter and read an “informed consent” for explaining the nature of the experiment.  
After obtaining their informed consent participants completed an initial questionnaire that 
included demographic questions (gender, class, age, deafness or difficulty in hearing or 
speaking) as well questions regarding their opinions and feelings towards statements 
reflecting different attitudinal issues (see appendix B for the complete questionnaire). 
Examples of these attitudinal issues were recycling (“The government should be stricter with 
people who don’t recycle”), pollution (“Smog checks on automobile have been effective in 
reducing air pollution”) or smoking (“Anti-smoking programs have been effective in 
preventing cigarette addiction”). In addition to these, individuals´ attitudes towards weight 
loss centers (“Weight loss centers are places where people can safely and effectively lose 
weight”) and acid rain (“The government should impose controls on industry to help 
minimize the effect of acid rain in the US”) were also assessed. These were key statements 
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because they provided pre-attitudinal measures of the topics that were subsequently subject 
to persuasive counter arguments during tasks 1 and 2.  
 Participants responded via a “feeling thermometer” (see appendix B). As in Garcia-
Marques and Mackie´s experiment (2001), participants were instructed to read each 
statement and use the thermometer to express how "cold" or "hot" they felt about the topic. 
The thermometer´s scale ranged from 0 to 100. Participants were informed that if they 
disagreed with the statement, they could give it a "cold" rating, choosing a temperature 
somewhere between 0 and 49; but if they agreed with it then they could give it a "hot" rating 
somewhere between 51 and 100.  If they were neutral then they could give it a 50.   
 Next, the appropriate physiological sensors were applied to participants´ torsos and 
necks in accordance with the guidelines provided by the Society for Psychophysiological 
Research (e.g., Sherwood, Allen, Fahrenberg, Kelsey, Lovallo, & van Dooren, 1990) and in 
accordance with hospital and commercial safety standards. 
 Physiological signals were recorded using a Biopac impedance cardiograph (Model 
NICO100C), a NIBP100A blood pressure monitor and a Biopac electrocardiograph amplifier 
(Model ECG100C). Electrocardiographic (ECG) and impedance cardiographic (ZKG) 
recordings provided continuous measures of cardiac performance. Employing a tetrapolar 
aluminum/mylar tape electrode system, impedance cardiography provides basal transthoracic 
impedance (Z0) and the first derivative of basal impedance (dZ/dt). Two pairs of ZKG tape 
electrodes were fastened around the participants´ necks and torsos. A 400µA AC 50kHz 
current is passed through the top and bottom electrodes and basal impedance is measured via 
the inside electrodes. ECG recordings were attained using a modified lead II configuration 
(lower left torso and upper right torso with impedance cardiography providing an internal 
ground). Continuous, noninvasive blood pressure measurements were obtained using a 
NIBP100A blood pressure monitor that uses a pressure sensor placed on the wrist over the 
radial artery. This device uses a "sweep technique," which applies a varying force on the 
radial artery. The counter-pressure in the artery produces a signal which is digitized and used 
to calculate blood pressure parameters. Finally, data were integrated with an MP150 and 
displayed and stored with Acknowledge software (Biopac, Goleta, CA). We used Mindware 
software to edit artifacts and ensemble and score the data.  
 After applying the physiological sensors, participants were left alone for 5 minutes so 
that baseline recordings of their cardiovascular responses could be collected.  Next, the 
experimenter returned and stopped the recording of the physiological data. She instructed 
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participants that the goal of the experiment was to understand how people perform multiple 
tasks on a computer while they are attached to physiological equipment. They were further 
informed that all the instructions necessary to perform each task would be presented at the 
appropriate time via the computer. They were instructed that all they had to do was read the 
instructions carefully and carry out the different tasks in order. Following these general 
instructions, the experimenter started the Medialab-based software on a PC computer that 
randomly assigned participants to one of the four experimental conditions. Next, she 
restarted the physiological recordings, gave instructions to begin the experiment, and sat 
quietly out of view on the opposite side of the room. Physiological readings were recorded 
throughout the rest of the experiment.  
 Initially, participants read a brief review of the goal of the experiment followed by 
instructions for performing the first task. As in Claypool et al.´s study (2004, experiment 2), 
all participants were informed that the upcoming task involved performing simultaneous 
activities. Before the task began, all participants were instructed to put on provided 
headphones and press the space bar to initiate. After they complied, they were instructed that 
they should read a message on the computer screen while listening to a separate background 
message designed to create a regular environment like studying at a coffee shop while 
listening to background music. The instructions stressed that their main and most important 
goal was to read the message on the screen carefully and to ignore the background message.  
 All participants read the randomly assigned strong or weak message arguing for the 
effectiveness of the weight loss centers. Those assigned to the no–repetition condition heard 
a message arguing for an increase in road taxes. Those assigned to the repetition condition 
heard a message arguing against imposing restrictions on industry to minimize the effects of 
acid rain. The strength of the written message was matched to the strength of the audio 
message so that participants who read a strong message about the weight loss centers also 
listened to a strong message about road taxes/acid rain and vice-versa. The average time to 
read the message matched the length of the audio message so that participants would not 
concentrate on the audio message after the reading the screen message. 
 After the message presentations, participants expressed their agreement with three 
items related to the effectiveness of weight loss centers (“Weight loss centers are places 
where people can safely lose weight”; “Weight loss centers offer good support to those who 
want to lose weight”; and “Weight loss centers do not offer ways of efficiently losing 
weight”). The items were presented successively and each item was accompanied by a 7-
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point rating scale (where 1 = total disagreement; and 7 = total agreement). To give their 
responses, participants pressed the computer key with the number that best corresponded to 
their opinion. 
 For the second task, participants read another set of instructions. They were informed 
that the new task required only reading a message and, therefore, they could remove the 
headphones. Again, participants were instructed to read the message carefully. Participants 
read a randomly assigned strong or weak message arguing against imposing restrictions on 
industry to control the effects of acid rain. For those in the repetition condition, this message 
was the same acid rain message played over the headphones in the previous task. For 
participants in the no–repetition condition, this was their first exposure to this message. After 
reading it, participants expressed their agreement towards the position defended in the 
message in three successively presented statements (“The government should impose 
controls on industry to help minimize the effect of acid rain in the US; “Increases in 
problems with acid rain in the US should not be blamed on the activities of industries 
operating in affected areas”; “The government should require the installation of sulfur 
dioxide emissions control devices in factories operating in the US”), anchored in a 7-point 
rating scale (where 1 = total disagreement; and 7 = total agreement). 
 Next, new instructions informed all participants to think about the thoughts they had 
while reading the acid rain message because they were about to give a speech based on those 
thoughts. They were further told that the speech would be recorded via video-camera. 
Participants were given one minute to prepare the speech and three minutes to deliver it. 
Before they start the task, the experimenter set up the video-camera. Then, she instructed 
them to start the preparation minute by pressing the space bar and went back to her seat. 
After the minute was over, instructions on the screen informed participants to start delivering 
the speech.  
 After three minutes, instructions appeared on the screen informing participants that 
the experiment was over. Subsequently, the experimenter turned off the physiological 
recording equipments and removed the sensors from the participant´s body. Finally, 
participants received a final questionnaire designed to assess relevant control measures, like 
the effectiveness of the familiarity manipulation, participants’ mood, challenge and threat 
evaluations or motivation to perform the task (see appendix C for complete questionnaire). 
In the end, participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
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Dependent Measures 
Attitude-Change Measures. Attitude-change regarding weight loss centres and acid 
rain were assessed as described above via three items anchored on 7-point rating scales.  
Factor analysis on the three items regarding weight loss centers revealed a single-factor 
solution (explaining more than 50% of the total variance).  A calculation of reliability 
revealed a Cronbach´s α= .41. Similarly, a factor analysis to the three items regarding acid 
rain revealed a single-factor solution (explaining more than 73% of the total variance) and a 
Cronbach´s α= .82. Based on the factor analysis, the ratings on each message were averaged 
and a composite measure was created as the post attitude-change measure. Finally, this value 
was subtracted from the thermometer-based pre-attitude (rescaled to a 0 to 7) such that 
ratings from 1 to 14 on the thermometer were scaled as 1; ratings from 14 to 28 were scaled 
as 2; ratings from 28 to 42 as 3; ratings from 42 to 58 as 4; ratings from 58 to 72 as 5; ratings 
from 72 and 86 as 6; and ratings from 86 to 100 as 7) which provide us with an attitude-
change index for both messages. 
 
 Thought Measures. The number of thoughts generated by each participant and their 
favourability towards the position promoted by the message served as a measure of 
information-processing depth during the motivated performance situation. 
   
Challenge and Threat Indexes. Reactivity scores (i.e., changes from baseline 
levels) for Heart Rate (HR), Ventricular Contractility (VC), Cardiac Output (CO) and Total 
Peripheral Resistance (TPR) were calculated and served as indexes of challenge and threat 
states. The EKG and ZKG signals were scored using an interactive software program 
(MindWare) that produces ensemble averaged values for the cardiac inotropic measures 
(e.g., preejection period; PEP) and cardiac chronotropic measures (e.g.,HR). This served as 
the minute-based data for all the indexes. The ensemble averaging technique effectively 
eliminates respiratory and movement artifacts from continuously recorded signals (Kelsey & 
Guethlein, 1990). 
 Data was ensemble by first finding cycle peaks within intervals of 60 seconds. Then, 
an average peak was selected. We highlighted to the trough before peak to find delta T=PEP. 
Then, we highlighted from the highest slope value to middle of trough on dzdt to find 
deltaT=LVET. Finally, we highlighted the top of dz peak to find dzmin. HR was scored by 
ensemble averaging the number of times the heart beat within intervals of 60 seconds.  VC 
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was calculated by multiplying pre-ejection period (PEP) by –1, where PEP represents the 
time in milliseconds in the cardiac cycle from initiation of ventricular depolarization to 
opening of the aortic valve and ejection of blood. Pre-ejection period was scored manually 
from ensemble-averaged EKG and ICG waveforms. CO was calculated by multiplying HR 
by Stroke volume, i.e., the volume of blood, in milliliters, pumped out of the heart with each 
beat. Finally, TPR was calculated by dividing mean arterial pressure (MAP) by cardiac 
output and multiplying the total by 80 (Sherwood, Allen, Fahrenberg, Kelsey, Lovallo, & 
van Dooren, 1990).  
 Mean values of HR, VC, CO and TPR were calculated for every minute of the 
baseline and the speech task. Then, reactivity scores for each CV response were calculated 
by subtracting the 5
th
 minute of the baseline, where physiological rest is higher, by the 1
st
 
minute of the speech task, where physiological activity is higher (Mendes et al, 2008). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Attitude-Change Data.   
Effectiveness of the familiarity manipulation. The manipulation of familiarity was 
corroborated by and ANOVA procedure.  Specifically, participants' ratings on the item “The 
presentation of the audio message on phase 1 made the second written message more 
familiar”, entered in a 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition condition) x 2 (strong vs. weak 
message) ANOVA, revealed a main effect of repetition, F (1, 44) = 11.85; p = .001; .20. 
Participants in the repetition condition considered the presentation of the message more 
familiar (M = 5.25; SD = 0.33), than those in the no-repetition condition (M = 3.67; SD = 
0.33). The message quality had neither a direct impact on the measure, F (1,44) = 1.61; p = 
.21, nor did it moderated the impact of repetition, F<1 (see appendix D). 
 
Attitude-Change towards the Weight loss center message. Because instructions 
stressed careful processing of the message content to all participants, it was expected that 
message quality would affect participants such that they would be persuaded more by the 
strong than by the weak message independently of the experimental condition regarding 
repetition of the message. The attitude-change index on this the subject (i.e., weight loss 
centers) for each participant were analyzed via a 2 (repetition vs. non-repetition condition) x 
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2 (strong vs. weak message) ANOVA. As hypothesized, a marginal main effect of message 
quality on attitude-change was revealed, F (1, 44) = 3.71; p = .06; .08. Participants 
agreed with the claim more following exposure to the strong version of the message (M = 
1.47; SD= 0.22), than exposure to the weak version (M = 0.86; SD = 0.22). No other main 
effect or interactions were found, F´s <1. The lack of interaction between repetition and 
argument quality suggests that all participants engaged (as expected) in more deep, analytic 
processing (see appendix D). 
 
Attitude-Change towards the Acid Rain Message. In order to test the impact of 
familiarity in reducing the likelihood of analytic processing, the difference between 
participants’ reactions to strong and weak versions of the message were analyzed. This acid 
rain attitude-change index was used as a dependent measure in a 2 (strong vs. weak message) 
x 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition condition) ANOVA.  
Previous results were replicated showing the presence of the hypothesized two-way 
interaction, F (1,44) = 5.23; p = .03;  .11. As expected, the interaction was driven by a 
familiarity moderation of the impact of strong and weak arguments on attitude-change, 
which is present in the no-repetition condition but not in the repetition condition (see Figure 
1). Contrast analysis revealed that whereas those who read the message for the first time 
were significantly more persuaded by the strong than by the weak message, t(23) = 2.61; p = 
.01; = .23, those in the repetition condition reacted equally to strong or weak arguments 
t<1. No main effects were found either for argument quality, F (1, 44) = 1.97; p = .17, or for 
the familiarity factor, F<1. These results replicate the previous findings in the FARM model 
(e.g. Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2001) by demonstrating that repetition decreased analytic 
processing (see appendix D). 
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Figure 1. Attitude-change index towards the target issue as a function of message repetition and argument 
quality. 
 
Thoughts Data.  
Using number of thoughts as a measure of elaboration (i.e. more thoughts if 
participants engage in analytic processing, e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), it was hypothesized 
that repetition would impact this measure in such way that those in the repetition condition 
would generate fewer thoughts than those in the no-repetition condition. To test this 
hypothesis, the number of thoughts generated by each participant was entered in a 2 (strong 
vs. weak message) x 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition condition) ANOVA. Results revealed the 
expected main effect of repetition, F (1,44) = 4.59; p=.04; =.09. Congruent with results 
presented above, those in the repetition condition generated fewer thoughts (M = 1.64; SD = 
0.14) than those in the repetition condition (M = 2.07; SD = 0.14). No other effect was 
significant, F´s < 1.  
Additionally, it was hypothesized that attention to the quality of the message would 
impact the favorability of thoughts, such that strong messages would be associated with 
more favorable thoughts and the weak message with more unfavorable thoughts. Because 
only those in the no-repetition condition were expected to attend carefully to the quality of 
the message, familiarity was hypothesized to qualify this effect. To test this hypothesis, three 
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independent judges were asked to code each thought as favorable, unfavorable or neutral 
towards the position defended by the message (Cohen´s Kappa = .83). Subsequently, the 
proportion of favorable and unfavorable thoughts as repeated measures were analyzed via a 
2 (favorable vs. unfavorable thoughts) x 2 (strong vs. weak arguments) x 2 (repetition vs. no-
repetition) ANOVA. 
Results revealed that, in general, favorable thoughts were generated more (M = 0.42; 
SD = 0.05) than unfavorable ones (M = 0.27; SD = 0.03), F (1,44) = 4.77; p = .03, =.10) 
and that the type of thoughts differed as a function of the message quality, F(1,44) = 15.91; p 
<.001; .27, such that, more favorable thoughts were generated after the strong message 
(M = 0.42; SD = .04 vs. Munfavorable = .29; SD = .07) and more unfavorable thoughts were 
generated after the weak (M = 0.54; SD = .07 vs. Mfavorable = .12; SD = .04). 
As predicted, this interaction was moderated by familiarity, F(1,44) = 4.34; p = .04, 
=.09. As shown in table 1, the number of favorable thoughts differed as a function of 
message quality in the no-repetition condition, t(44) = 4.29; p < .001; = .29, but not in the 
repetition condition, t(44) = -1.34; p = .18; =.04. This effect was primarily due to a 
familiarity x type of thoughts interaction, F (1,44) = 17.47; p < .001; .28. Whereas the 
thoughts of participants in the repetition condition were independent of the message quality, 
the thoughts of participants in the no-repetition condition were more favorable when the 
message was strong but unfavorable when the message was weak (see appendix D). 
 
  No-Repetition Repetition 
 Type of 
Thought 
Strong  Weak Strong Weak 
Favorable .69(0.05) .18(0.06) .14(0.06) .06 (0.05) 
Unfavorable .14(0.10) .46(0.10) .44(0.10) .63(0.10) 
 
Table 1. Proportion of favorable and unfavorable thoughts as a function of message repetition and message 
quality. 
 
Given that favorability of thoughts was associated with both strong and weak 
messages reflecting the degree of elaboration and thus of analytic processing, it was 
hypothesized that favorability would mediate the impact of familiarity on processing. 
Because individuals in the no-repetition condition generated thoughts that were dependent 
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on the quality of the message and, in turn, the favorability of the thoughts they were having 
while processing the persuasion message was hypothesized to mediate the effects of 
argument quality on attitude-change (Greenwald, 1968). To test this hypothesis, an index of 
thought favorability was created for each participant by subtracting the number of 
unfavorable thoughts from the number of favorable thoughts and dividing the difference by 
the total number of thoughts (Tormala, Briñol & Petty, 2006). Next, this value was entered 
as predictor in a regression analysis model, in which the acid-rain attitude change-index 
served as the dependent variable and the message quality as predictor. Results revealed that 
the thought favorability index totally mediated the impact of message quality in the no-
repetition condition, given that the impact of message quality on attitude-change (b=.58, 
t(22) = 3.30, p = .003) was eliminated when the thought favorability index (b=.26, t(22) = 
1.21, p = .24) was controlled. For the repetition condition, the thought favorability index 
neither predicted attitude-change, nor mediated the effects of message quality on attitude-
change, t´s <1 (see appendix D).  
 
Challenge and Threat Data.   
The main hypothesis focused on different motivational states associated with 
familiarity and non familiarity conditions. In order to assess these states, the physiological 
markers of the motivational state were analyzed based on previous analytic strategies (e.g. 
Mendes et al, 2008; Weisbuch-Remington et al, 2005). First, baseline differences were 
tested; next task engagement was assessed; and lastly the challenge and threat indexes were 
analyzed as a function of the experimental manipulations.  
 
Baseline Differences
1
. No baseline differences were found by experimental 
condition for the 5
th
 minute of HR, VC, CO and TPR values as dependent measures in a 2 
(strong vs. weak message quality) x 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition condition) MANOVA and 
no main effects or interactions emerged, F´s <1  (see appendix D). 
 
Task engagement. It was assumed that individuals would be task engaged in the 
speech task as revealed by increases from baseline in HR and VC values. This hypothesis 
was confirmed.  Both HR and VC reactivity indexes differed significantly from zero using 
                                                 
1 We tested possible differences between the 4th and the 5th minute of the baseline values in all our studies and observed no 
differences. This indicates that in all the studies participants had reached baseline resting values. As such, we used the 5th 
minute of the baseline as our baseline measure in all the studies. 
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independent t-tests, HR: t(47) = 2.48; p = .02; .12 (M = 15.09; SD = 42.16); VC: t(47) = 
4.93; p < .001; .34 (M = 10.59; SD = 14.89)
2
 (see appendix D). 
 
Challenge and Threat indexes. In order to test the hypothesis that familiarity would 
increase the pattern of responses associated with challenge, CO and TPR reactivity indexes 
were entered as dependent measures in two separate 2 (strong vs. weak message) x 2 
(repetition vs. no-repetition condition) ANOVAs. Results corroborate the presence of a main 
effect of familiarity on both TPR, F(1, 44) = 4.02, p = .05; .08, and CO, F(1, 44) = 5.51, 
p = .02; .11. As hypothesized, the challenge pattern emerged for the repetition condition 
such that participants in this condition exhibited a decrease in TPR and an increase in CO 
(see Figure 2). These results corroborate and extend previous work on the BPS model (e.g. 
Blascovich et al., 1993) by demonstrating that familiarity by itself, without necessarily 
promoting mastery, is associated with a motivational state of challenge. Message quality did 
not interact or have any other effect on these indexes (F´s <1) (see appendix D). 
 
 
                                                 
2
 We also tested if participants were task-engaged while they were reading the acid-rain message and no significant effects 
emerged. Both HR and VC were not different from 0, t´s <1. This comes as no surprise since the BPS model postulates that 
task engagement is not likely to occur under passive tasks, like reading a text or watching a video.  
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Figure 2. TPR and CO values during the speech task as a function of message repetition. 
 
These results confirm the general hypothesis that familiarity impacts the type of 
processing in which participants engage and, is also associated with the motivational state of 
challenge. Those in the repetition condition who had processed information superficially 
also were challenged. A straightforward interpretation of these results suggests that the 
cognitive system is informed about resource availability, which was evaluated by 
participants in a repetition condition.    
Congruently, it was hypothesized that the impact of familiarity on information-
processing could be in some way (possible mediation) related with participants´ engagement 
in a challenge motivational state. This was tested by determining if the decrease in analytic 
processing promoted by familiarity was mediated by the challenge state, using the 
physiological correlates. Specifically, the hypothesis that the cardiovascular markers mediate 
the FARM effects was tested.  
In order to do so, a unitary index of challenge and threat was created by converting 
each participant´s CO and TPR values into z-scores and summing ZCO with ZTPR (cf. 
Blascovich et al., 2004). More positive scores in this index indicate challenge and less 
positive or negative scores indicate threat. However, the introduction of the unitary index as 
a covariate in the 2 (strong vs. weak) x 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition) ANOVA model with 
the acid-rain attitude change index as the dependent measure did not confirm the mediation 
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hypothesis. This hypothesis is ruled out by data demonstrating that the covariate has no 
impact on the dependent measure F<1
3
 (see appendix D). 
One possible explanation has to do with the fact that assessment of attitude and 
physiological measures occurred made in different phases of our study. Hence, the 
information-processing data of the speech task (where task engagement was triggered and 
challenge and threat were differentiated) was analyzed to determine if engagement in 
motivational state mediated the effects of familiarity on the number of thoughts, our measure 
of elaboration. Consequently, the unitary challenge and threat index was entered as a 
covariate in the 2 (strong vs. weak) x 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition) ANOVA model using 
the number of thoughts (our measure of elaboration) as dependent measure. Again, results 
did not found evidence for a main effect of the covariate F<1 which rules out the possibility 
of mediation
4
 (see appendix D).  
Given engagement in a state of challenge or threat is moderated by one´s evaluations 
of resources and demands (being challenge activated when participants evaluate more 
resources than demands), the possibility of mediation via these evaluations was tested by 
entering participants´ responses on the item “In general, I think I had sufficient capacity to 
deal with what was demanded by the task” as covariate in the 2 (strong vs. weak) x 2 
(repetition vs. no-repetition) ANOVA model with the acid-rain attitude change index as the 
dependent measure. Once more, the possibility of mediation is ruled out by the absence of a 
significant impact of the covariate on the dependent measure, F<1. Similarly, when the 
number of thoughts was analyzed as a dependent measure, the main effect of the covariate 
was not significant, F<1. Hence, these results also ruled out the possibility of mediation by 
reported evaluation of availability of resources (see appendix D). 
Because challenge is generally (but not always) defined as a positive hedonic state 
(Blascovich & Mendes, 2000), the possibility of mediation via mood assessment was tested. 
The three items assessing mood (How do you feel right now? 1 – Sad; 7 – Happy; How do 
you feel right now? 1 – Discontent; 7 – Content; How would you describe your mood at this 
time right now? 1 – Bad; 7 – Good) were averaged in a single measure (explaining more 
                                                 
3 We also tested the possibility of mediation using the TPR and CO raw values as covariates in the ANOVA model. The 
results also rule out the possibility of mediation since the main effect of both TPR and CO on the dependent measures were 
not significant, F´s <1. 
.4 Neither TPR, nor CO had a main effect on this dependent measure when they were introduced in the ANOVA model, F´s 
<1. 
4 Neither TPR, nor CO had a main effect on this dependent measure when they were introduced in the ANOVA model, F´s 
<1. 
 
51 
  
  
  
than 85% of the total variance and a Cronbach´s α= .91) that was subsequently entered as 
covariate in the 2 (strong vs. weak) x 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition) ANOVA model with 
acid-rain attitude change index as the dependent measure. The results revealed that the mood 
had no direct impact on the dependent measure, F (1, 43) = 1.20; p = .28. Similarly, with the 
number of thoughts as dependent measure, mood had no direct impact, F (1, 43) = 2.12; p = 
.15 (see appendix D). These results rule out the possibility of mood mediation. 
 
From these data, it can be concluded that the impact of familiarity on information-
processing occurs in a situation in which cardiovascular responses reveal a motivational state 
of challenge. However, the effect does not seem to be dependent upon it, at least in any 
straightforward way. Familiar conditions are theoretically associated with a physiological 
response typically associated with challenge but the FARM effects seem to be independent 
of that state as neither the cardiovascular markers, nor the covert cognitive evaluations of 
challenge or mood mediated the effects.  
These data suggest that although a feeling of familiarity promotes less analytic 
processing, and familiar conditions promote physiological responses usually associated with 
challenge, the two “measures” are independent. They do not appear anchored in the same 
process, that is, the information of resource availability for performing a task. This 
conclusion is however problematic because those “measures” were relied upon as highly 
valid measures of resource availability. But, recall that both effects of familiarity on 
processing and on physiological measures are not pure measures of the variable that promote 
both effects.  
For some reason, they may assess different features of the same antecedent and 
although they may have the same source variable, they may not be correlated. Additionally, 
the signal of resource availability given by a non-necessarily evaluated feeling of familiarity 
may not be totally incorporated into the evaluation process. Moreover, it is relevant to 
remember that physiological measures were assessed at a different time than the attitudes 
and so both could have been influenced by other sources of variability during those times. 
Even if this source of influence did not prevent the detection of an influence of familiarity, 
they could have something less than a pure relation with other source.  In addition, recall that 
the physiological measures are only markers of the motivational states and as such do not 
necessarily and fully index them. They are, for example, able to be activated by other 
sources. Tomaka et al. (1993) have demonstrated that the exhibition of the different 
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cardiovascular patterns is not causally linked to the cognitive evaluations of resources and 
demands which determine the activation of challenge and threat. For example, they found 
that asking individuals to immerse their hands in a warm bath mimics the challenge 
cardiovascular responses but that effect is independent of the cognitive resources and 
demands evaluations.  
Another possible explanation for our data that does not allow a direct dismissal of the 
resource evaluation hypothesis associated with familiarity, is associated with the fact that 
challenge is a compound ratio index of resources and demands. Two possibilities should be 
considered. First assuming that familiarity impacts evaluation of “resource availability” it is 
not highly likely to find a perfect map between the activation of familiarity and the complete 
evaluation of a situation as “challenge”, because it is just one of its many possible 
components.  But it is also possible that familiarity promotes a physiological response 
pattern associated with challenge towards also other evaluation components. It may simply 
suggest at the same time that the task was “easier” and thus, may have impacted the demand 
features of the task.  For these reasons, examinations of the relationship between familiarity 
and challenge were continued albeit using different approaches in order to further test the 
mediation hypothesis. 
 
 
Experiment  2 
 
Assuming that challenge, like a feeling of familiarity, informs the cognitive system of 
resources available to deal with task demands, it was hypothesized that challenged 
individuals would process information more superficially. The goal of this experiment was 
to test the hypothesis that the activation of a motivational state of challenge impacts 
information-processing in the same way as a manipulation of familiarity does it. As observed 
in experiment 1, repetition reduced analytic processing. Thus, in this experiment it was 
hypothesized that challenge would have the same effect.  
Challenge and threat were manipulated via perceptions of task demands. Congruent 
with the BPS model (e.g. Tomaka & Blascovich, 1996; Blascovich, 2008), evaluations of 
task demands interfere with the cognitive evaluations of resources and therefore motivational 
state. If a task is demanding, individuals usually evaluate fewer resources than the ones 
required by the situation. In this case, motivational threat is most likely activated. If a task is 
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not demanding, individuals usually perceive enough or more resources to cope with the task 
demands and will likely engage in motivational challenge. Congruent with this, participants 
were engaged in motivational challenge or threat by requiring them to perform a demanding 
or non-demanding task prior to an information-processing task.  
Our task was designed to simultaneously induce challenge and threat without 
compromising participants’ capacity to process information during the subsequent task. 
Supporters of dual process models of information-processing (e.g. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 1998) have demonstrated that the depletion of 
cognitive resources, for example, due to cognitive distractions or cognitive fatigue reduce 
the probability of cognitive elaboration. Based on this reasoning, a task was created that was 
not extremely demanding to perform – a visual ability game in which participants performed 
either a difficult or easy version long enough to promote task engagement and induce the 
correspondent challenge and threat states. 
To observe the impact of challenge on information-processing, a strong or weak 
persuasion message was presented immediately after the motivational patterns were induced. 
It was expected that task engagement would carry on to the persuasion task and that 
challenged participants would not differentiate strong from weak arguments in attitude-
change, suggesting less processing in this condition. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Fifty-two UCSB undergraduates (31 males; Mean age = 19.2; SD = 1.22) received 
course credit for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (demanding 
vs. non-demanding game) x 2 (strong vs. weak arguments) between subjects factorial design. 
 
Materials 
The material for this experiment consisted of a collection of 30 abstract geometrical 
shapes including triangles, squares, circles and rectangles created using the Microsoft 
Powerpoint program (see appendix E for material); a strong and weak persuasive message 
arguing against imposing restrictions on industry to minimize the effects of acid rain on the 
North Eastern states of the USA (the same message used in experiment 1); and mylar tape, 
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electrodes and ZKG tape necessary to attach participants to the electronic equipment and 
obtain the physiological recordings.  
  
Procedure 
Participants arrived alone at the laboratory. First, they were greeted and given a 
consent form explaining the goals and procedures involved in the study. After they signed 
the consent form, the experimenter gave them an initial questionnaire (similar to the one 
used in experiment 1 that included demographic questions (gender, class, age) and atitudinal 
issues among which was our key statement (“The government should impose controls on 
industry to help minimize the effect of acid rain in the US”) (see appendix B for complete 
questionnaire) that served as the pre-attitude measure. As in experiment 1, participants used 
the feeling thermometer to express how "cold" or "hot" they felt about the topic. Cold 
temperatures (from 0 to 49) reflected greater disagreement whereas hot temperatures 
reflected greater agreement (from 51 to 100). 
 After participants completed the questionnaire, the experimenter attached appropriate 
physiological sensors on participants´ torsos and necks. Then, she asked them to sit in a 
comfortable chair and rest quietly so that baseline recordings could be collected. Participants 
were left alone in the room for a 5-minute period. Physiological recording were obtained 
using the same procedures and equipments of the previous experiment. 
 After the 5 minutes, the experimenter returned, stopped recording the physiological 
data, and gave the general instructions. Participants were informed that the goal of the study 
was to investigate individuals´ visual abilities on different tasks while monitored 
physiologically. Participants were told that they would perform a visual-game task and a 
reading task. Furthermore, they were informed that all the instructions necessary to perform 
each task would be presented at the appropriate time via the computer. They were told to 
read the instructions carefully before starting each task. Next, the experimenter initiated the 
Medialab software on a PC-type computer that randomly assigned participants to the 
experimental condition and restarted the recording of the physiological responses. The 
experimenter was seated in the opposite side of the room for the entire session. Physiological 
recordings were made throughout the experiment.  
 For the first task, the instructions informed all participants that they were going to 
perform a visual ability game. The goal was to observe, on the computer screen, several 
pairs of geometrical shapes of different sizes, compare their length and then decide which 
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one of the two was bigger. To increase task engagement, participants were informed that 
they only had 3 seconds to make each of their decisions and that most people could respond 
correctly within that interval. In addition, instructions informed participants that there were 
different types of trials and that the computer would prompt them with the type of the 
upcoming trial. Instructions were as follows: “After each trial and before the beginning of a 
new one, the computer will rapidly prompt you with the word "next". When you see the word 
"next", please focus and get ready because a new standard trial will start soon”. 
Furthermore, participants in the non-demanding condition read the following on the 
computer monitor: “Note that, sometimes, the computer will randomly and rapidly prompt 
you with the word "non-demanding". This means that following this word you will see a 
different trial that maybe easier than the standard trial (i.e. when you see the prompt 
"next"). Thus, you have to pay attention to which word will pop up on the screen and be 
prepared to overcome every trial. Participants in the non-demanding condition read: “Note 
that, sometimes, the computer will randomly and rapidly prompt you with the word 
"demanding". This means that following this word you will see a different trial that may be 
harder than the standard trial (i.e. when you see the prompt "next”) Thus, you have to pay 
attention to which word will pop up on the screen and be prepared to overcome every trial. 
Standard trials were added so that the demanding version would not be extremely difficult 
and the non-demanding would not be extremely easy. 
 To respond, participants used the computer mouse. They were informed that if they 
thought the shape presented on the left was bigger, then they should click on a box with an L 
(L for Left) that would appear on the screen (below the geometrical shapes). If they thought 
the shape on the right was bigger, then they should click on the box with an R (R for Right).  
 Each participant performed 30 trials presented successively on different screens in 
random order. Those in the non-demanding condition performed 15 standard trials, where 
the difference between the two shapes was relatively easy to discriminate (1 cm) and 15 non-
demanding trials, where the difference was quite obvious and even easier to discriminate 
(1.5 cm). Those in the demanding condition performed 15 standard trials and 15 demanding 
trials, where the difference was not obvious and difficult to discriminate (0.5 cm).  
 After participants completed the task, new instructions informed them that they were 
going to continue the game later phase but in the interim they would perform the reading 
task. The reading instructions appeared on the screen for 20 seconds (the pre-tested time to 
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read the instructions).
5
 Next, a strong or weak version of the acid rain message was 
presented, followed by the presentation of three different items (same used in experiment 1, 
see appendix A) anchored in a 7-point rating scale to assess participants´ attitude towards the 
position defended in the message.  
 New instructions informed participants to continue the game. All participants 
performed 15 more standard trials. By the end of these trails, they received a bogus feedback 
of their performance. They were told that their performance was between 80% and 100% 
accuracy. Furthermore, they were told that the experiment was over.  
 The experimenter, then, turned off the physiological recordings and removed the 
electrodes and tapes from participant´s body. Finally, participants were handed a final 
questionnaire to assess relevant control measures like the effectiveness of the challenge and 
threat manipulation, challenge and threat evaluations, participants’ mood and motivation 
(see appendix F for complete questionnaire) and, in the end, they were fully debriefed and 
thanked for their participation.  
 
Dependent Measures.  
 Attitude-Change Measure. Attitude-changes regarding acid rain were assessed via 
three items anchored in a 7-point rating scale. The three items revealed a single-factor 
solution (explaining more than 64% of the total variance) and a Cronbach´s α= .72. Based on 
the factor analysis, a composite measure of post attitude-change was created from which the 
pre-attitude measure was subtracted. This provided the attitude-change index. 
 
 Challenge and Threat Indexes. Following the same procedures in experiment 1, the 
mean values of HR, VC, CO and TPR were calculated for every minute of the baseline and 
every minute of both tasks. Subsequently, reactivity scores were calculated by subtracting 
CV responses on the 5
th
 minute of the baseline from the 1
st
 minute of the game task; the first 
minute of the persuasion task; and the minute in which participants rated their opinions. This 
provided three different reactivity indexes. 
  
 
                                                 
5 We did this because we wanted to assure that individuals would still be task-engaged in the second task and, consequently, 
challenge and threat states would carry on to the information-processing task.  
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Results and Discussion 
 
Challenge and Threat Data.  
Effectiveness of the Task-Demands Manipulation. The effectiveness of the 
manipulation of task-demands on the challenge and threat evaluations was confirmed when 
participant data from the item “In general, I think I had sufficient capacity to deal with what 
was demanded by the game” in a one-way ANOVA and a main effect of task-demands 
emerged (even though marginal), F (1,48) = 3.79; p = .06;  .08. Congruent with a 
cognitive evaluation of challenge, participants in the non-demanding condition reported 
more capacity to deal with the task-demands (M = 5.64; SD = 1.62) than participants in the 
demanding condition (M =4.76; SD = 1.56) (see appendix G). 
 
Baseline Differences. When the 5
th
 minute of HR, VC, CO and TPR baseline values 
were entered as dependent measures in a 2 (demanding vs. non-demanding game) x 2 (strong 
vs. weak message) MANOVA, no differences were found regarding the impact of the 
demanding version of the game, F (4, 39) = 1.60; p = .19 or the message quality, F <1. 
Similarly, the interaction was not significant, F (4, 39) = 2.02; p = .11. These results suggest 
that baseline values were similar across our experimental conditions (see appendix G).  
 
Task engagement. Game task. The hypothesis that participants were task-engaged 
during the performance of the game was confirmed via independent t-tests on both HR and 
VC reactivity indexes for this phase and significant effects emerged, showing that HR and 
VC were significantly different than 0, HR, t(51) = 3.23; p = .002; . 17 (M = 12.77; SD = 
28.52); VC, t(51) = 2.56; p = .01; . 11 (M = 1.87; SD = 5.28) (see appendix G). 
 
Task engagement. Persuasion task. Because the time between the game task and 
the persuasion task was short, it was expected that participants would remain task-engaged 
(and, consequently, engaged in the correspondent motivational state) in the persuasion task. 
This hypothesis was confirmed by the fact that HR and VC reactivity indexes for this phase 
significantly differed from 0, HR, t(51) = 3.82; p < .001;  .22  (M = 12.86; SD = 24.25); 
VC, t(51) = 1.98; p = .05;  .07 (M = 1.19; SD = 4.36) (see appendix G).  
 
58 
  
  
  
Challenge and Threat indexes. Game task. The hypothesis that the non-demanding 
version of the game increased the challenge pattern of responses (corroborating the 
effectiveness of our manipulation) was tested by entering the CO and TPR reactivity indexes 
in two separate one-way ANOVA´s with the game version as fixed factor. The main effect 
of game version emerged on both measures, CO F (1, 50) = 4.29; p = .04; . 10; TPR F 
(1,50) = 5.47; p = .02;  .12. As expected, participants in the non-demanding game 
condition, in comparison with those in the demanding condition, exhibited a challenge 
pattern mapped by increases in CO (Mnon-demanding = .62, SD =.48 vs. Mdemanding = -
.79, SD = .49) and decreases in TPR (Mnon-demanding = -107.71, SD = 51.14 vs. 
Mdemanding = 61.46, SD = 25. 60) (see appendix G). 
 
Challenge and Threat indexes. Persuasion Task. Because participants remained 
task-engaged during the persuasion task, it was expected that those who performed the non-
demanding version of the game would still be challenged during the persuasion task. This 
hypothesis was confirmed when TPR and CO reactivity indexes were entered in a 2 
(demanding vs. non-demanding game) x 2 (strong vs. weak message) ANOVA.  A main 
effect of game version emerged for both measures, CO, F(1,48) = 4.36; p= .04; .10; and 
TPR, F(1,48) = 3.93; p = .05; .09. Congruent with the previously observed pattern, those 
who performed the non-demanding version were still more challenged while processing the 
persuasive message, than those who performed the demanding game (CO, Mnon-demanding 
= 1.22; SD = 0.88 vs. CO, Mdemanding = -1.48; SD= 0.92; TPR, Mnon-demanding = -
92.30, SD = 65.75 vs. Mdemanding  = 92.01, SD = 61.48)
6
 (see appendix G). 
 
Attitude-Change Data.  
The general hypothesis associated with the impact of challenge and threat on depth of 
processing was that the engagement in a motivational state of challenge would decrease the 
probability of analytic processing. As such, it was predicted that those who were challenged 
(i.e. those who performed the non-demanding game before) would exhibit attitude-changes 
that did not reflect differentiation between strong and weak arguments. This hypothesis was 
                                                 
6 Even though the message quality did not have any effects on CO (F´s < 1), it qualified the effect of the game version on 
TPR, F (1, 48) = 4.91; p = .03; . 17. Whereas for those in the demanding condition the strong message, in comparison 
with the weak one, increased TPR values (M =  184.27; SD = 89.33  vs. M weak = -.25; SD = 96.49),  for those in the non-
demanding condition it decrease them  (M =  -206.15; SD = 96.49  vs. M weak = 21.54 ; SD = 89.33). The main effect of 
game version on TPR was not significant, F < 1. 
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supported when the acid-rain attitude-change index as was entered as a dependent measure 
in a 2 (demanding vs. non-demanding game) x 2 (strong vs. weak message) ANOVA.  The 
predicted interaction emerged, F (1,48) = 4.11; p= .05;  .08. As hypothesized, this 
interaction was driven by the differential impact of strong and weak arguments on attitude-
change manifested in the demanding (threat) condition, but not in the non-demanding 
(challenge) condition (see figure 3). Contrast analysis demonstrated that whereas those who 
were threatened seemed to be more persuaded by strong than by the weak message, t(48) = 
1.81; p =.07;  .04, those who were challenged reacted equally to strong and weak 
arguments, t(48) = -1.06; p = .29;  .02. No main effect of the version of the game or 
message quality were found (F´s <1) (see appendix G). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Attitude-change index towards the target issue as a function of demands and message quality. 
 
These results provide the first evidence that conditions of increased challenge 
promote superficial processing. Congruent with the idea that familiarity and challenge are 
closely related, engagement in a motivational state of challenge reduces the differentiation 
between strong and weak arguments in attitude-change. As such, challenge seems to mimic 
effect of familiarity on information-processing depth. Additional relevant information 
offered by this study is that the type of engagement necessary to promote a motivational 
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state of challenge or threat does not necessarily lead all individual to process information 
analytically. This may be either because it represented a moderate level of motivation or 
because the two constructs do not overlap.   
These results were further explored by testing whether the cardiovascular markers, 
which map the motivational state, mediated the effect of challenge on information-
processing. To do so, the unitary index of challenge and threat was calculated (using the CO 
and TPR reactivity indexes during the persuasion task) and entered as covariate in the 
previous 2 (demanding vs. non-demanding game) x 2 (strong vs. weak message) ANOVA 
model with the acid-rain attitude-change index as dependent measure. The possibility of 
mediation was ruled out when it was observed that the covariate had no impact on the 
dependent measure, F<1
7
 (see appendix G). 
Because evidence that participants in the non-demanding condition were also 
challenged is also supported by participants´ cognitive evaluations of resources and 
demands, the possibility of mediation via these cognitive evaluations was also tested. 
However, when participants´ responses on the item “In general, I think I had sufficient 
capacity to deal with what was demanded by the game” was entered as a covariate in the 
previous ANOVA model, the possibility of mediation was rejected as the covariate had no 
impact on the dependent measure, F<1 (see appendix G). 
Additionally, because challenge is generally positive state, the possibility of  mood 
mediation was also tested by averaging the three items assessing mood (How do you feel 
right now? 1 – Sad; 7 – Happy; How do you feel right now? 1 – Discontent; 7 – Content; 
How would you describe your mood at this time right now? 1 – Bad; 7 – Good) and entering 
the single measure (explaining more than 84% of the total variance; Cronbach´s α= .89) as 
covariate in the ANOVA model. Results showed that mood did not have a main effect on the 
measure rejecting therefore the possibility mediation, F<1 (see appendix G). 
 
From these data, it can be concluded that the manipulation of the motivational state 
replicated the manipulation of familiarity shown in experiment 1. Challenge reduced the 
differentiation between strong and weak arguments in attitude-change, like familiarity does, 
which is an indicator of more superficial processing. Evidence that participants in the 
challenge condition were indeed engaged in a motivational state of challenge is supported by 
                                                 
7 Additional analysis also revealed that the impact of challenge and threat on information-processing is not mediated by 
TRP and CO raw values since both covariates had no impact on the dependent measure F´s <1. 
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the cardiovascular indexes and by the cognitive evaluations of challenge. However, 
surprisingly, as in Experiment 1 none of these measures mediated the challenge effects on 
how information was processed. 
The reason why the responses that map the motivational state did not mediate the 
effects of challenge on processing is unclear. Unlike experiment 1, one cannot argue that our 
participants were not task-engaged during the time that measures were assessed. Challenge 
and threat patterns were assessed prior to the information-processing and were demonstrated 
that these patterns were continued after the game task to the moment in which participants 
were actually processing persuasive arguments. Also, unlike experiment 1, it cannot be 
argued that the manipulation of task-demands did not engage participants in the 
correspondent motivational state at the moment of message processing because it both 
promoted the cardiovascular responses and the cognitive evaluations consistent with the state 
at that moment.  
Because it was shown that familiarity and challenge manipulation have parallel 
effects, the hypothesis that there is a common factor underlying them seems plausible. The 
suspicion here is that the common factor is a signal of resource availability. But one must 
ask why this common factor did not emerge in either experiment 1 or 2. Clearly, both effects 
are only proxies and incomplete measures of the variable that is assumed to promote them. It 
is possible that the state of challenge may signal the availability of resources that impact 
processing because one has resources available or because the demands are low.  
Together experiments 1 and 2 allow one to say that: a) familiarity is associated with a 
state of challenge; and b) a state of challenge promotes parallel effects of familiarity. 
Together, these effects along with possible criticisms of the “measurement” indexes make 
still possible the proposition that familiarity effects on processing are associated with that 
impact because they engage individuals in a challenge state. So a question that needs to be 
addressed further is whether the FARM effects imply that individuals are engaged in a 
challenge motivational state in familiar contexts.  
From research on the BPS model, one can conclude that challenge effects are 
dependent upon task engagement. From the FARM assumptions, the impact of familiarity is 
most noticed under moderated motivation. The results of Experiment 2 made clear that 
individuals may be engaged in a motivational state of challenge and threat without 
necessarily make them more prone to process the content of a persuasive message 
analytically. So familiarity effects are expected to be noticed under task engagement 
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conditions. The question is if no task engagement, which disrupts motivational states, also 
disrupts the familiarity effects. If that is the case, familiarity effects could be dependent upon 
the activation of a challenge state.  
A factor known to influence task engagement is the presence (vs. absence) of others 
(Blascovich et al., 1999). It was expected that such manipulation of task engagement to 
promote dissociation in the familiarity and challenge effects. Because task engagement is 
necessary for the challenge effects, the impact of challenge on processing should be more 
strongly observed in the presence of an observer than in an alone condition. In opposition, 
because task engagement is not necessary for the familiarity effects, it should be expected 
that the effects of familiarity on processing are observed both in the presence and in the 
absence of an observer. Our next set of experiments tested this dissociation hypothesis by 
replicating experiment 1 and 2 with or without a presence of other manipulation.  
The FARM and the BSP models assume familiarity or/and challenge as subjective 
experiences that inform our cognitive system that there is an available and accessible 
response in memory to perform the task.  If the presence of other has indeed this dissociative 
effect on familiarity and on challenge effects it suggests that the mechanisms through which 
they occur are independent.  
 
 
Experiment 3 
 
The role of the presence of others on the effects of challenge and threat and 
familiarity on information-processing.  
 
In this experiment, the hypothesis that the effect of challenge on information-
processing is only exhibited when task engagement is activated as Blascovich et al. (e.g., 
Blascovich, 2008) maintain was tested. To do so, the presence or absence of an observer was 
manipulated, a variable should at least increase the intensity of task engagement. Because 
task engagement is necessary for the effects of challenge, it was expected that when task 
engagement is intensified (i.e. in the presence of the observer) challenge will decrease 
analytic processing but this effect should not occur when task engagement is not intensified 
(i.e. in an alone situation).  
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To test these hypotheses, the same paradigm was used as in experiment 2 with the 
added manipulation of presence vs. absence of an observer. As in experiment 2, challenge 
and threat were induced via perception of task-demands. Specifically challenge and threat 
were induced by participants being accompanied or not by an observer while performing 
either a non-demanding or a demanding version of the visual ability task. Immediately after 
inducing the motivational states a strong or weak persuasive message was presented in order 
to allow us to test the predicted effects.  
 
Method 
 
Participants and design 
Ninety-eight UCSB undergraduate students (55 females; Mage = 19.18; SD =1.32) 
received course credit for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 
(demanding vs. non-demanding game) x 2 (strong vs. weak message) x 2 (alone vs. presence 
of observer) between subjects factorial design. 
 
Material  
The materials included the collection of abstract geometrical shapes used in 
experiment 2 (see appendix E); the strong and weak version of the acid rain message and the 
physiological sensors and equipment used in the previous experiments (see appendix A). 
 
Procedure  
This experiment was a close replication of experiment 2. First, participants arrived, 
were greeted and signed the consent form. Then, they were handed the initial questionnaire 
with demographic questions and used the feeling thermometer to express their attitudes 
towards several atitudinal issues, including one about acid rain which served as the pre-
attitude measure. 
 Next, the appropriate sensors and transducers were attached to participants´ and a 5 
minute baseline of CV responses commenced. At the end of this period, the experimenter 
returned and stopped the recording of the physiological data. For those in the alone 
condition, the experimenter returned alone. For those in the presence condition, the 
experimenter returned accompanied by a male or female confederate (matching participant´s 
gender) who sat in the room for the entire experiment. Similar to Blascovich et. al.´s 
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investigation (1999), the confederate was introduced as follows: “This is a volunteer from 
our laboratory who is interested in how people perform tasks on a computer while being 
connected to physiological equipment. For this reason, he/she will be staying in the room 
throughout the experiment to observe your performance. 
 Then, participants were informed about the general goals of the experiment and were 
told that all instructions to perform each task would be presented on the computer screen. 
Before they started, the experimenter reinitiated the physiological recordings and then left 
the room. 
 For their first task, participants performed the visual ability game. As in experiment 
2, instructions informed participants that they had 3 seconds to compare the sizes of two 
shapes and decide which one was bigger by clicking the mouse on the correct response box. 
Furthermore, instructions stressed the importance to be as fast and accurate as possible. All 
participants performed 30 trials presented in random order.  They were informed that there 
were different types of trials. Before the presentation of each trial, the computer prompted 
participants with a word that hinted the type of trial they were about to encounter. The 
prompts were the word “next” (signalling the standard trials, i.e., those in which the 
difference between the shape was relatively obvious: 1cm); “non-demanding” (signalling the 
easy trials, i.e., those in which the difference between the shape was obvious: 1,5 cm); or 
“demanding” (signalling the difficult trials, i.e., those in which the difference between the 
shape was not obvious: 0,5 cm). Participants assigned to the challenge condition solved 15 
standard trials and 15 non-demanding trials, whereas, those assigned to the threat condition 
solved 15 standard trials plus 15 demanding trials.  
 After the game was completed, the instruction informed participants that a new task 
was going to start right. For this task, participants were told to read the message that would 
appear on their computer screen carefully. The message was a randomly assigned strong or 
weak version of the acid-rain message. After reading it, participants rated their opinion 
towards the topic in three items anchored in a 7-point rating scale. 
 Next, the game was reinitiated for more 15 standard trials. Participants received 
bogus feedback on their performance; and were told that their participation was over. The 
sensors were then removed from participants.  They were then asked to fill out the control 
measures questionnaire (see appendix F). Upon completion, participants were thoroughly 
debriefed and thanked for their participation.    
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Dependent Measures 
Attitude-Change Measure. Post-attitude measure of the acid rain revealed a single-
factor solution (explaining more than 80% of the total variance) and a Cronbach´s α= .87. 
This composite measure was then decreased by the pre-attitude measure providing an 
attitude-change index.  
 
 Challenge and Threat Indexes. Mean values of HR, VC, CO and TPR were 
calculated for every minute of the baseline; every minute of the game task and the 
persuasion task. Then, reactivity scores for each CV response were calculated by subtracting 
the 5
th
 minute of the baseline by the 1
st
 minute of the game task; and by the first minute of 
the persuasion task.  
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Challenge and Threat Data.  
Effectiveness of the Task-Demands Manipulation. The effectiveness of the 
manipulation of task-demands on the challenge and threat evaluations was corroborated 
when by entering the item “In general, I think I had sufficient capacity to deal with what was 
demanded by the game” in a 2 (demanding vs. non-demanding game) x 2 (alone vs. presence 
of observer) ANOVA and a main effect of task-demands emerged, F (1,91) = 16.12; p = .00; 
.21. Consistent with cognitive evaluations of challenge, participants in the non-
demanding condition reported more capacity to deal with the task-demands (M = 6.13; SD = 
.21), than participants in the demanding condition (M =4.97; SD = .20). No other main 
effects or interaction were found, F´s < 1 (see appendix H).  
 
Baseline Differences. The introduction of the 5
th
 minute of HR, VC, CO and TPR 
baseline values in a 2 (demanding vs. non-demanding game) x 2 (strong vs. weak message) x 
2 (alone vs. presence of observer) MANOVA revealed no differences across our 
experimental conditions in HR, VC and TPR, F´s<1. However, the results of the univariate 
analysis revealed that CO was significantly different in the presence condition, F(1, 90) = 
66 
  
  
  
4.55; p= .04;  .10, because alone participants exhibited greater levels of CO (M = 5.65; 
SD = .29) than accompanied participants (M = 4.78; SD = .29) even though there were no 
difference at that point in time in experimental protocol. In order to control for these 
differences, CO baseline values were entered as a covariate in the subsequent analyses (see 
appendix H). 
 
Task engagement. Game task. To test the hypothesis that the presence of the 
observer increases the intensity of task engagement, it was expected that HR and VC 
reactivity scores for the game task to be different from 0 only in the presence condition. 
Results corroborate this hypothesis by showing that HR and VC were significantly different 
from 0 in the presence condition, HR, t(49) = 3.16; p = .003; .17  (M = 10.24; SD = 
22.89); VC t(49) = 2.17; p = .06; . 09 (M = 6.52; SD = 23.87), but not in the alone 
condition, HR, t(47) = 1.93; p = .06; . 08 (M = 5.06; SD = 18.15); VC t<1 Because task 
engagement is a necessary condition for the activation of challenge and threat, challenge and 
threat indexes could not be computed for the alone condition (see appendix H). 
 
Task engagement. Persuasion task. Since the time between the two tasks was so 
short, it was expected that participants in the presence condition would be task-engaged 
during the persuasion task. This hypothesis was confirmed by the fact that HR and VC 
reactivity indexes for this phase were significantly different from 0, HR, t(49) = 2.35; p = 
.02; . 12 (M = 5.92; SD = 17.87); VC, t(49) = 1.93; p = .04; . 04 (M = 7.33; SD = 
24.15)
 8
.Again, because task engagement is a necessary condition for the activation of 
challenge and threat, these indexes could not be computed for the alone (see appendix H). 
   
Challenge and Threat indexes. Game task. In support of the hypothesis that the 
non-demanding version of the game induced a pattern of challenge, a main effect of the 
game version was found on both CO and TPR when both measures were entered as 
dependent measures in separate one-way ANOVAs, CO, F(1,47) = 3.65; p = .06; . 07; 
TPR, F(1,47) = 5.03; p = .03; . 10. Consistent with a challenge pattern, the non-
demanding version, compared with the demanding version, promoted greater increases in 
CO (Mnon-demanding = .92, SD = 0.44 vs Mdemanding = -.26, SD = 0.42) and decreases in 
                                                 
8 We also analyzed the HR and VC values for the alone condition to test if these individuals were engaged in this task but 
the results rule out this hypothesis,  HR, t(47) = 1.95; p = .06; . 08 (M = 4.94; SD = 17.54); VC, t <1. 
67 
  
  
  
TPR (Mnon-demanding = -331.194, SD = 165.47 vs. Mdemanding = 193.45, SD = 158.72)
9
. 
These results corroborated the ones found in experiment 2 and demonstrated the success of 
our manipulation in inducing the challenge and threat states (see appendix H). 
 
Challenge and Threat indexes. Persuasion Task. Because task engagement was 
active during the persuasion task, it was expected that those who performed the non-
demanding version of the game would remain challenged during this task. This hypothesis 
was confirmed when CO and TPR reactivity indexes were entered in separate 2 (demanding 
vs. non-demanding game) x 2 (strong vs. weak message) ANOVAs and a main effect of the 
game version emerged for both measures, CO, F(1,46) = 3.87; p = .06; . 08; TPR, F 
(1,46) = 4.41; p = .04; . 09
10
. Congruent with a challenge pattern, those in the non-
demanding condition, compared with those in the demanding version, exhibited greater 
increases in CO (Mnon-demanding = 1.62, SD = .53 vs. Mdemanding = .13, SD = .51) and 
decreases in TPR (Mnon-demanding = -90.29, SD = 195.22 vs. Mdemanding = 489.08, SD = 
185.52). 
The quality of the message did not have a direct impact on CO, F(1,46) = 1.48; p = 
.23, and it did not interact with the demands factor, F (1,46) = 1.06; p = .31. Similarly, no 
main effect, F (1,46) = 1.66; p = .20 no interaction, F <1 with this factor was found for TPR 
(see appendix H). 
Corroborating the findings in experiment 2, the manipulation of challenge and threat 
carried over from the game task to the moment participants began processing the persuasive 
message.  
 
Attitude-Change Data.  
Because task engagement is necessary for the effects of challenge, it was 
hypothesized that challenge would decrease analytic processing in the presence condition 
(where task engagement was active), but not in the alone condition. In other words, it was 
expected that the challenge effects observed in experiment 2 would only be evident in the 
presence condition.  
This hypothesis was confirmed when the acid-rain attitude-change index was entered 
in a 2 (demanding vs. non-demanding game) x 2 (strong vs. weak message) x 2 (alone vs. 
                                                 
9 The covariate (CO baseline) did not have a direct impact on CO or TPR, F < 1. 
10 The covariate (CO baseline) did not have a direct impact on CO or TPR, F <1. 
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presence of observer) ANOVA resulting in a marginally significant demands x presence 
interaction, F(1,90) = 3.19; p = .08;  .06, moderated by the presence factor, F(1,90) = 
4.87; p = .03;  .05. When the data were analyzed separately by the presence condition, it 
was observed that the demands x message quality interaction occurred in the presence of 
others condition, F(1,46) = 6.51; p = .01;  .22, but not in the alone condition, F<1. As 
predicted, in the presence of other condition, the differential impact of strong and weak 
arguments on attitude-change was manifested in the demanding (threat) condition but not in 
the non-demanding (challenge) condition (see figure 4). Contrast analysis demonstrated that 
whereas threatened participants were more persuaded by strong than by the weak arguments, 
t(26) = 2.04; p =.04;  .10, those who were challenged did not differentiate the argument 
quality in attitude-change, t(24) = 1.58; p = .12; . 03. 
No main effects of message quality or game demands were found in the alone 
condition, F´s <1 (see appendix H). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Attitude-change index towards the target issue as a function of motivational state and argument 
strength for the presence condition. 
 
 The fact that no effect was observed in the alone condition is relevant to our 
argument. Although no effect of the motivational state was expected in the alone condition 
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because of the lack of task engagement, it could be that participants reacted differently to 
strong and weak arguments. The fact that they did not suggests that they were not 
elaborating the message content. In some way, the lack of task engagement produces 
superficial processing, suggesting a low level of motivation. 
These results replicate the effect observed in experiment 2 supporting the hypothesis 
that challenge decreases the probability of analytic processing. In addition, they make clear 
that the effect is prone to the activation of the motivational state, being present only when 
task engagement is increased. The effect seems to be dependent upon establishing the 
motivational states and not of any other cues offered by the manipulation procedures. These 
data suggest that without full task engagement and specific activation of different 
motivational states, the challenge effect on information-processing would not occur.  
However, as in previous studies, the effect does not seem to be mediated by the 
cardiovascular responses. When the challenge and threat index was entered as a covariate, 
relative to the persuasion task minutes (ZTPR + ZCO) in the 2 (demanding vs. non-
demanding game) x 2 (strong vs. weak message) x 2 (alone vs. presence of observer) 
ANOVA, covariate was not significant, F<1 (see appendix H). 
Contrary to previous studies, however, some evidence of a moderation effect on the 
measures of cognitive evaluations of challenge and threat was obtained. When the item “In 
general, I think I had sufficient capacity to deal with what was demanded by the game” was 
entered as a covariate in the model, results revealed that it has a significant impact on the 
dependent measure, F(1, 86) = 3.99; p = .05. However, even though it seems to explain some 
of the variance in the results, the previously found three-way interaction remained significant 
(even though marginal), F(1,89) = 3.01; p = .09 (see appendix H). 
The detection of this effect of the covariate may in some way be related to the 
increased engagement promoted by the evaluation apprehension (e.g. Bond, 1982; Cottrel, 
Wack, Sekerak & Ritlle, Guerin, 1983) that comes from being observed by others. Contrary 
to experiment 2 in experiment 3, a confederate was explicitly presented as someone who was 
going to “observe participants´ performance”. 
Mood does not seem to be mediating the effects as the introduction of the composite 
measure of the three items assessing it (59% of total variance explained; Cronbach´s α= .46) 
as a covariate in the ANOVA model revealed no main effect of this variable on the 
dependent measure, F>1 (see appendix H). 
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So, based on these, it can be stated that challenge decreases the probability of 
analytic processing but only when task engagement is intensified. As expected, without task 
engagement this motivational state has no impact on information-processing.  
No mediation effects of physiological indexes were found in this experiment.  
 
Experiment 4 
 
According to the FARM model, task engagement is not necessary to observe the 
familiarity effects. So, if familiarity is independent of task engagement, an equal impact of 
familiarity both in a condition of intensified task engagement (i.e. in a presence of an 
observer condition) and in a condition of decreased task engagement (i.e. in an alone 
condition) should be observed. 
To test this hypothesis, experiment 1 was with the added condition of presence vs. 
absence of an observer. As in the previous experiment, the paradigm comprised a task that 
served the purpose of inducing familiarity.  It was another persuasion task that tested the 
impact of familiarity on information-processing; specifically, a speech task in which the 
impact of familiarity on information-processing and motivational challenge and threat were 
examined.  
It was expected that the previous finding that familiarity reduces the differentiation between 
strong and weak arguments in attitude-change would be replicated; that is, this effect should 
be manifested in both a presence and an isolation condition. However, because participants 
in the alone condition of experiment 3 did not react differently to strong and weak 
arguments, it is possible that an interaction emerges, suggesting that the effect is observed 
only in presence of others because of motivation to processing information deeply. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Eighty-three UCSB undergraduate students (41 females; Mage = 18.9; SD = 1.29) 
received course credit for participation. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (strong 
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vs. weak message) x 2 (repetition vs. non-repetition situation) x 2 (alone vs. presence of a 
confederate) between subjects factorial design. 
 
Material.  
The same persuasive messages as in the previous experiments were utilized. There 
was a strong and weak version of a message arguing for the effectiveness of weight loss 
centers; a strong and weak version of a message arguing against restrictions on industry to 
minimize the effects of acid rain; and a strong and weak version of a message arguing for 
increases in road taxes (see appendix A). Moreover, the same equipment and procedures to 
collect the physiological data were employed.   
 
Procedure.  
The procedure used in experiment 1 was followed closely. Participants were greeted 
at their arrival at the laboratory and asked to read and sign the consent form. Next, they were 
handed the initial demographic questionnaire with additional attitudinal questions and 
regarding key statements about weight loss centers and acid rain (pre-attitude measures). 
Participants used the feeling thermometer (in the same way as in the previous experiments) 
to give their responses.  
 As before, the experimenter applied the physiological sensors and baseline recordings 
of the participants´ CV responses were collected for 5 minutes. Next, the experimenter 
returned to the room and stopped recording the physiological data. For those in the alone 
condition, the experimenter came alone. For those in the presence condition, the 
experimenter came accompanied by a male or female confederate (matching participant´s 
gender) who sat in the room for the entire experiment. The confederate was introduced the 
same way as in experiment 3 (a volunteer interested in how participants perform computer 
tasks while hooked-up to physiological equipment).   
 After introducing the confederate, the experimenter gave the general instructions 
about the experiment´s goal (same used in experiment 1), set up the computer program, 
restarted the recording of the physiological data and sat away from both the confederate and 
the participant. Physiological recordings were taken throughout the experiment. 
 On the first computer screen, participants received instructions for the first task. They 
were told that the upcoming task involved doing simultaneous activities: reading a message 
on the computer screen, while listening to an unrelated background message. Instructions 
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stressed that the first and most important task was the reading one and as such they should 
ignore the audio message. Then, participants put on the provided headphones and began 
reading a randomly assigned strong or weak message arguing for the effectiveness of the 
weight loss centers. For those in the no-repetition condition, the audio message was one 
arguing for an increase in road taxes. For those in the repetition condition, the audio message 
argued against imposing restrictions on industry to minimize the effects of acid rain. Both 
the written and audio messages were matched in their strength. Then, participants rated their 
opinions towards weight loss centers in three items (same used in experiment 1) anchored in 
a 7-point rating scale. 
 Next, new instructions informed participants that the ensuing task required them only 
to read carefully a message on the computer screen. Participants took off the headphones and 
started reading a randomly assigned strong or weak message arguing against imposing 
restrictions on industry to control the effects of acid rain. For those in the repetition 
condition, this was the same message played over the headphones in the previous task. For 
those in the no–repetition condition, this was their first exposure to this message. Then, 
participants rated their opinions towards the acid rain message in three items anchored in a 
7-point rating scale. 
 For their last task, participants were instructed to recall the thoughts they had while 
reading the acid rain message. Next, they were asked to prepare a speech based on these 
thoughts and then deliver it to a video-camera. Participants had one minute to prepare the 
speech and three minutes to deliver it.  
 By the end of the speech task, the experiment was over. The experimenter turned off 
the physiological recording equipment and removed the electrodes and tapes from 
participant´s body. Finally, participants filled out the control measures questionnaire (see 
appendix C); were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
 
Dependent Measures.  
 Attitude-Change Measure. Post-attitude measures of the weight loss centre revealed 
a single-factor solution for the three items used (explaining more than 72% of the total 
variance; Cronbach´s α= .81). Similarly, post-attitude measures of the acid rain revealed a 
single-factor solution (explaining more than 56% of the total variance) and a Cronbach´s α= 
.60). Both post-attitude composite measures were subtracted by their correspondent pre-
attitude measure to provide an attitude-change index for each message.  
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 Thought Measure. The number of thoughts generated by each participant and their 
favourability served as the measure of cognitive elaboration during the motivational task-
performance. 
 
 Challenge and Threat Indexes. Mean values of HR, VC, CO and TPR were 
calculated for each minute of the baseline and the speech task. Then, reactivity scores for 
each CV response were calculated by subtracting the 5
th
 minute of the baseline by the 1
st
 
minute of the speech task.  
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Attitude-Change Data.   
Effectiveness of the Manipulation of familiarity. The success of the familiarity 
manipulation was corroborated by a main effect of repetition that emerged when the item 
“The presentation of the audio message on phase 1 made the second written message more 
familiar”, was entered in a 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition condition) x 2 (strong vs. weak 
message) x 2 (presence vs. absence of observer) ANOVA, F (1,75) = 12.33; p = .001; 
.20. As expected, participants in the repetition condition, considered the presentation of 
the message more familiar (M = 4.75; SD = 0.27), than those in the no-repetition condition 
(M = 3.39; SD = 0.28). Results also found a marginally significant main effect of the 
presence condition, F(1,75) = 3.20; p = .08;  .06, suggesting that those who were 
observed considered the message as more familiar (M = 4.42; SD = 0.28), than those who 
were alone (M = 3.72; SD = 0.27) (see appendix I). 
The interaction between the presence and the familiarity factor was not significant, F 
<1. Similarly, the quality of the message did not have a direct effect on the item, nor did it 
moderated the familiarity effect or the presence effect on the item, F´s <1. Similarly, the 
three way interaction was not significant, F (1,75) = 2.35; p = .13.  
 
Attitude-Change towards the weight loss center message. Because the instructions 
stressed the importance of attending carefully to message content, it was expected that 
message quality effects such that participants would be more persuaded by the strong than 
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by the weak message. The attitude-change index relative to this issue was entered in a 2 
(strong vs. weak message) x 2 (repetition vs. non-repetition condition) x 2 (alone vs. 
presence of observer) ANOV
11
. Results suggested that as expected, participants agreed with 
the claim more after exposure to the strong version of the message (M = 1.49; SD = 0.25), 
than exposure to the weak version (M = 0.97; SD = 0.23), even though this effect did not 
reach significance, F (1, 56) = 2.25; p= .14; .03.  
Neither a main effect of repetition, F <1 nor presence emerged, F (1, 56) = 2.51; p = 
.12. Similarly, the effect of argument quality was not moderated by repetition, F<1 or by the 
presence of others, F(1,56) = 1.17; p = .28. The three-way interaction was not significant, F 
< 1 (see appendix I). 
The lack of interaction between repetition and argument quality suggests that all 
participants engaged (as expected) in more deep, analytic processing and the lack of a three-
way interaction suggested that this was independent of the presence condition.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Attitude-Change towards the Acid-rain Message. In order to test the hypothesis 
that familiarity reduces the differentiation between strong and weak arguments in attitude-
change independently of the presence condition, the attitude-change index was entered 
relative to this issue as a dependent measure in a 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition condition) x 2 
(strong vs. weak message) x 2 (alone vs. presence of observer) ANOVA. In support of this 
hypothesis, a significant repetition x message quality interaction emerged (although 
marginal), F (1,75) = 3.04; p = .09; .05. As expected, this interaction was driven by a 
familiarity moderation of the differential impact of strong and weak arguments on attitude-
change, manifested in the no-repetition condition, but not in the repetition condition. 
Contrast analysis suggested that whereas those who read the message for the first time were 
significantly more persuaded by the strong than by the weak message, t(41) = 2.60; p = .01; 
= .23, those in the repetition condition reacted equally to strong or weak arguments t<1 
(see Figure 5). Also, as predicted this effect was not moderated by the presence factor, F<1. 
Thus, contrary to experiment 3, participants in the alone condition who did not feel the 
situation as familiar engaged in more deep processing. 
 
                                                 
11 Due to a computer failure in saving participants´ responses, we lost 17 responses on the three items measuring attitudes 
towards the weight loss center message. Thus our total sample for phase 1 was N = 64. 
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Figure 5. Attitude-change index towards the target issue as a function of message repetition and argument 
quality. 
 
Results also revealed a main effect of message quality, F(1, 75) = 3.88; p = .05; 
.09, showing that the strong message promoted more attitude-changes than the weak 
(Mstrong= .96; SD = .19 vs. Mweak= .45; SD = .18); and a significant presence x repetition 
interaction, F  (1, 75) = 10.51; p < .01; .13, suggesting that whereas alone participants 
were more convinced by the new message (M = 1.19; SD = .25),  than by the “old” (M = .25; 
SD = .26), the observed participants were more convinced by the “old” message (M= 1.06; 
SD = .26), than by the new (M= .31; SD = .27).  
The presence factor did not interact with the message quality factor, F(1, 75) = 1.35; 
p = .25. No other effects were found, F´s <1 (see appendix I). 
These results replicate evidence from the FARM model and from experiment 1 and 
support the view that the presence of others does not moderate the impact of familiarity on 
information-processing. 
 
Thoughts Data. 
Following the analyses performed in experiment 1, the number of thoughts as a 
measure of elaboration was used. It was expected that repetition would decrease the number 
of thoughts generated, this effect being independent of the presence condition. The number 
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of thoughts generated by each participant in a 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition condition) x 2 
(strong vs. weak message) x 2 (alone vs. presence of observer) was analyzed.  
As expected, the main effect of repetition emerged, F (1, 64) = 4.95; p=.03; =.11, 
showing that those in the repetition condition generated less thoughts (M = 1.99; SD = 0.18), 
than those in the no-repetition condition (M = 2.57; SD = 0.19). This effect was moderated 
by the presence factor, F (1, 64) = 7.73; p < .01; =.22. This interaction seems to be 
explained by the fact that observed and alone participants generated different numbers of 
thoughts in the no-repetition condition (Mobserved= 3.08; SD = .28 vs. Malone = 2.06; SD= 
.25, t(41) = 2.21; p = .03 =.12), but not in the repetition condition as predicted (Mobserved 
= 1.78; SD = .25 vs. Malone = 2.20; SD= .26, t<1)
12
 (see appendix I). 
Because only those in the no-repetition condition were expected to attend to the 
quality of the message, familiarity should qualify the impact of message quality on the 
favorability of thoughts. Three independent judges coded each thought into favorable, 
unfavorable or neutral categories in reference to the position defended by the message 
(Cohen´s Kappa =.83) and then the proportion of favorable and unfavorable thoughts were 
analyzed as repeated measures in a 2 (favorable vs. unfavorable thoughts) x 2 (strong vs. 
weak arguments) x 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition) x 2 (alone vs. presence of observer) 
ANOVA. As predicted, the results suggested a significant type of thoughts x message quality 
interaction, F(1,68) = 5.76; p = .02;  .12 moderated by familiarity (although marginally), 
F(1,68) = 2.65; p = .11; .02. As shown in table 2, the number of favorable thoughts 
differed as a function of message quality in the no-repetition condition, t(38) = 2.83; p < .01; 
= .24, but not in the repetition condition, t<1. These effects were independent of the 
presence condition, F < 1. No other main effects or interactions emerged, F´s < 1 (see 
appendix I). 
 No-Repetition Repetition 
 Type of 
Thought 
Strong  Weak Strong Weak 
Favorable .47 (.08) ,15 (.09) .24 (.08) .30 (.08) 
Unfavorable .17 (.09) .43 (.10) .24 (.09) .42 (.09) 
Table 2. Proportion of favorable and unfavorable thoughts as a function of message repetition and message quality. 
                                                 
12 Our general model also revealed a main effect of message quality, F(1,62) = 4.95; p = .03; = .11, suggesting that the 
strong message induced more thoughts (M = 2.57; SD = .18)  than the weak (M = 1.99; SD= .19).  No other effect was 
significant, p´s > 13 (see appendix I). 
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As in experiment 1, whether the thoughts favorability associated with strong and 
weak messages mediated the impact of familiarity on processing was tested. Because 
individuals in the no-repetition condition were attending to the quality of the message (and 
had thoughts that reflected the quality of it), it was expected that the favorability of the 
thoughts would mediate the effects of argument quality on attitude-change (Greenwald, 
1968). Congruent with the results above, it was expected that this effect would occur in both 
presence groups.  
To test this mediation hypothesis, an index of thought favorability was created for 
each participant (Proportion Favorable – Proportion Unfavorable / N thoughts, Tormala, 
Briñol & Petty, 2006). Next, it was entered as a predictor in a regression analysis model in 
which the acid-rain attitude change-index was the dependent variable and the message 
quality the predictor.  
Results revealed that the thought favorability index did not mediate the impact of 
message quality in the no-repetition condition given that the impact of message quality on 
attitude-change (b=.42, t(39) = 2.90, p = .006) was still significant when the thought 
favorability index was controlled (b=.54; t(26) = 2.31, p = .03). This reduction not 
significant (Sobel = .82; p = .41). This is most likely explained by the fact that, even though 
participants were having thoughts congruent with the message quality, the thought 
favorability index did not have a direct impact on attitude-change t<1 (see appendix I). The 
thought favorability index did not predict attitude-change in the repetition condition, nor did 
it mediate the effects of message quality on attitude-change in either of the presence groups 
(t´s <1).  
 
Taken together these results corroborate the previous findings that familiarity 
decreases the probability of analytic processing (as shown by the equal impact of strong and 
weak arguments on attitude-change and the fewer thoughts generated in this condition). In 
addition, these effects make clear that, as the FARM assumed, the familiarity effects are 
independent of level of task engagement here manipulated as the presence of others.  
 
Challenge and Threat Data.   
Baseline Differences. No baseline differences across conditions were found when 
the 5
th
 minute of HR, VC, CO and TPR baseline values were entered as dependent measures 
in a 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition condition) x 2 (strong vs. weak message quality) x 2 (alone 
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vs. presence of observer) MANOVA and no main effects or interactions emerged, p´s < .19 
(see appendix I). 
 
Task engagement. Results of t-tests supported the hypothesis that the presence of 
the observer increased task engagement the HR and VC reactivity indexes for the speech 
task were tested against 0
13
. As expected, whereas those in the presence condition were task-
engaged, HR, t(49) = 3.16; p = .003; .17 (M = 10.24; SD = 22.89); VC t(49) = 2.17; p = 
.04; . 09 (M = 4.95; SD = 16.09), those in the alone condition were not, HR, t(42) = 1.99; 
p=.06; .09 (M = 8.35; SD = 27.48); VC, t(42) = 1.27; p=.21; .04 (M = 4.59; SD = 
23.76). Recall that because task engagement is a necessary condition for the activation of 
challenge and threat, the challenge and threat indexes for the alone condition could not be 
calculated (see appendix I). 
 
Challenge and Threat indexes. To test if familiarity increased the pattern of 
responses associated with challenge, as in experiment 1, CO and TPR reactivity indexes 
were entered for the speech task as dependent measures in two separate 2 (repetition vs. no-
repetition condition) x 2 (strong vs. weak message) ANOVAs. These analyses were run only 
for the presence condition because in the alone condition a different pattern of challenge and 
threat could not be detected, i.e., task engagement was not reached. Following the previous 
findings here, results revealed a main effect of familiarity for both CO, F(1,36) = 4.81; p = 
.04;  .10 and TPR, F(1,36) = 5.38; p = .03;  .11. Consistent with a challenge pattern, 
those in the repetition condition, compared with those in the no-repetition condition, 
exhibited greater increases in CO (Mrepetition = 1.97, SD = 1.19 vs. Mno-repetition = -1.81, 
SD = 1.25) and decreases in TPR (Mrepetition = -261.25, SD = 147.89 vs. Mno-repetition = 
236.97, SD = 155.52) (see appendix I). 
To address the question of whether or not the familiarity effects on information-
processing are related with individuals engaging in a challenge motivational state in familiar 
contexts, we tested if the cardiovascular markers that map the motivational state could 
possibly mediate the familiarity effects. A unitary index of challenge and threat was 
calculated for the speech task and entered into a 2 (strong vs. weak) x 2 (repetition vs. no-
repetition) ANOVA with the acid-rain attitude-change index as dependent measure. The 
                                                 
13 We also tested if participants were task-engaged during the persuasion task, but the results did support this hypothesis, 
HR and VC t´s < 1. 
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cardiovascular index did not seem to be moderating the effects of familiarity, as it does not 
have a significant main effect on the dependent measure, F<1. Also, whether there was a 
possible mediation via cognitive evaluations of resources and demands was tested (by 
entering the item “In general, I think I had sufficient capacity to deal with what was 
demanded by the task” as covariate in the previous model). The results revealed that even 
though the covariate had a marginally significant impact on the measure, F(1,75) = 3.99; p = 
.06, the possibility of mediation is ruled out as the previously found repetition x message 
quality interaction remained unaffected, F (1,75) = 3.04; p = .09; .05 (see appendix I). 
The possibility of mediation of challenge by the effects of familiarity was also tested 
by entering the unitary index in a 2 (strong vs. weak) x 2 (repetition vs. no-repetition) 
ANOVA with the number of thoughts (measure of elaboration) as dependent measure. . 
Results rule out this hypothesis since the covariate was not significant, F <1. Similarly, 
when the cognitive evaluations were entered as covariate in the model results showed no 
main effect of this variable on the dependent measure, F <1 (see appendix I). 
As in previous studies, mood does not seem to mediate these effects. The 
introduction of a composite measure of three items assessing mood (74% of total explained 
variance; Cronbach´s α= .82) as covariate in the 2 (strong vs. weak) x 2 (repetition vs. no-
repetition) ANOVA model, with acid-rain attitude change index as dependent measure, 
revealed that it has no effect on the dependent measure, F<1. Similarly, when the number of 
thoughts was used as a dependent measure, mood had no impact as covariate on the 
dependent measure, F<1 (see appendix I). 
 
From these data, it can be concluded that the effects assumed by the FARM occurred 
independently of task engagement since both observed and alone participants (who were not 
task-engaged) processed the repeated message less analytically than the non-repeated 
message. As in Experiment 1, it was observed that the familiarity condition activated a 
cardiovascular pattern of challenge.  Finally, replicating all other studies, the effects of 
information processing are not explained by the cardiovascular response pattern activated by 
the situation. 
Even if the meditational data justifying the claim that familiarity effects are 
independent of the activation of a motivational state of challenge, the independence is 
corroborated here by the occurrence of the effect independent of the level of engagement 
necessary for its establishment. Thus, although there is no doubt that familiarity is related to 
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challenge, it is likely that it occurs because of the information the state and the feeling carry 
for the cognitive system, one is not reducible to the other. 
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General Discussion 
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In this thesis, support for the general hypothesis that familiarity reduces the 
probability of analytic processing and activates a motivational state of challenge was found. 
The first experiment clearly demonstrates that those exposed to a familiar situation 
compared to those in a novel situation did not engage in deep processing of the content of a 
persuasive message (corroborating past research on the FARM model, Garcia-Marques, 
1999; Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2001, 2007). The same individuals exhibited a 
cardiovascular pattern of responses consistent with motivational challenge (corroborating 
past research on the BPS model, Blascovich et al., 1993, 1999). Even though these effects 
occur simultaneously, they do not appear integrated in a common process as shown by the 
absence of mediation of the markers of the motivational state (i.e. cardiovascular responses, 
cognitive evaluations and participants´ ratings of mood) on the cognitive effect. Thus, even 
though familiarity leads to both predicted effects, we find no evidence that the two effects 
are related directly. 
However engagement in motivational challenge, by itself, mimics the effects of 
familiarity on information-processing. Data from the second experiment show that when 
challenge and threat states are induced prior to the information-processing task, the 
engagement in motivational challenge resulted in less analytic processing, compared with 
the engagement in threat motivation. But again, like in experiment one, the markers of the 
motivational state (i.e. the cardiovascular responses, cognitive evaluations and ratings of 
mood) did not mediate the cognitive effect.  
Our subsequent studies show these two effects, familiarity and challenge impact on 
processing as dependent upon individuals´ level of task engagement. By replicating 
experiment two in an isolated environment and so reducing task engagement, challenge 
effects were not observed. As the third experiment demonstrated, whereas the manipulation 
of challenge led to the correspondent cardiovascular pattern and decreased analytic 
processing, in the condition of increased task engagement (i.e. in the presence of an 
observer) and in the condition of low task engagement (i.e. in a lone condition) the 
manipulation of challenge had no impact on the cardiovascular responses. At the same time 
that the body fails to react to the situation it also fails to impact information-processing. Our 
fourth experiment offers clear evidence of a dissociation of familiarity effects from 
challenge effects. When we replicated experiment one with the same manipulation of task 
engagement, the pattern of results differed from the one that manipulated challenge. The 
manipulation of familiarity increased the cardiovascular pattern of challenge as expected 
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only for those who were task-engaged (i.e. those in the presence of an observer). However, 
the familiarity impact on information-processing occurred regardless of the level of task 
engagement (i.e. if participants were in the presence of an observer or alone).   
The evidence provided from these experiments clearly suggests that, as expected, 
familiarity is related to the motivational state of challenge. In addition, it is clear that both 
familiarity and challenge reduce analytic processing and increase the cardiovascular markers 
associated with that motivational state. However, our data also suggest that they may not be 
part of the same process at least directly. The familiarity impact on how we process 
information is independent of degree of task engagement. However task engagement is a 
necessary condition for familiarity to be associated with a challenge motivational state, 
which in this case is also related to less engagement in deep processing.  
Although these results corroborate our general hypothesis that challenge and 
familiarity are closely related, they suggest that the association of familiarity with 
motivational challenge may not occur via the experience of personal resources availability as 
we previously considered. Our original idea was that both cues would signal the availability 
of resources to deal with the task influencing in the same way subsequent processing. Since 
data suggest that this may not be the case, one possibility may be that even considering that 
resources availability issues are relevant to both experiences, they do not map the same 
information. In fact, as we referred to in the beginning of this dissertation, familiarity is 
expected to provide individuals with resources to deal with a task, whereas the motivational 
state of challenge is activated by evaluation of those resources. Whereas familiarity may 
signal task-mastery directly, challenge encompasses an evaluation process that can occur 
consciously or without individuals’ awareness but regardless needs task engagement. Future 
studies should address this hypothesis by manipulating resources availability directly and the 
engagement on the evaluation process in order to clarify the relevance of these factors. 
In addition to the dissociation promoted by task engagement on the effects promoted 
by manipulation of familiarity and challenge on information processing, we found, no 
mediation of the effects by the physiological measures of challenge in the last two 
experiments. This might have occurred because familiarity and challenge simply do not 
relate with one another. Thus, the absence of mediation in experiment one seems to suggest 
that the effects of familiarity are not dependent on the activation of challenge. However, it is 
odd that no mediation is observed in experiment two. Challenge manipulation has an impact 
on information processing, and promoted congruent physiological reactions. However, the 
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latter does not mediate the first effect. This suggests that what we are manipulating and what 
we are measuring are not the same thing. Although the two are related they do not overlap 
much in terms of variance, and they differ on the effect on information processing. 
Assuming that challenge incorporates an evaluation of two components – internal resources 
and situational demands, we hypothesize that it is just one of the components that is driving 
the effect. Thus, one possible reason for the absence of mediation in the first two 
experiments may be due to the different sensitivity of the effect and measure to the 
evaluation components.  
Other possible reasons why no mediation is found in experiment 2 are 
methodological. Attitude-changes and challenge measures are never accessed 
simultaneously, but rather sequentially (separate phases) and in different phases of the 
process. So even if both are impacted by the manipulations, other variables can be 
influencing challenge motivation in such a way that it looses its link to what impacted 
attitude-changes. Another methodological reason may be the fact that the measure we use to 
test mediation is not the most appropriate one. On this note, recall that our unitary index 
used to test the mediation is a composite measure of CO and TPR. But since, HR and VC are 
also involved in the SAM and HPA axis activation, responsible for challenge and threat 
activation, maybe this index is somehow incomplete by leaving these two important 
measures out of the index.  
It is also possible that the mediation could be in a different direction than the one we 
predicted. Recall that we hypothesized that the markers of the motivational state of challenge 
could explain to some degree the engagement in non-analytic processing. However, it is also 
possible that the engagement in non-analytic processing is somehow explained by the 
markers of the motivational state. Even though this is an interesting and relevant question, 
our data cannot address it because of the paradigm we used. We used a between-subject 
paradigm to observe the impact of our independent measures on information-processing, 
looking specifically to how individuals reacted to different strong and weak persuasive 
messages. To investigate the possibility of this mediation, future studies should use of 
different paradigm that allows the measurement of information processing within-subject.  
But even if these are questions to clarify in future studies, it is still true that our 
experiments suggest clearly that familiarity and challenge effects are  dissociated by task 
engagement – so the effect of familiarity in low involvement (low task engagement) cannot 
be in any way explained by the activation of a motivational state of challenge. Being both 
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familiarity and challenge associated with a psychological state that signals superficial 
processing to be an adequate way to deal with a task, one only occurs when the task is 
engaging.  
Why might this be so? As we suggested previously, the explanatory variable may be 
the need for an evaluation of resources and demands. Even though familiarity and challenge 
have the same impact on the modes of processing and both experiences have characteristics 
in common, familiarity impact is not assumed to be explained by a mechanism that 
encompasses engagement on such an evaluation process. The effect of familiarity on 
processing occurs because encoding of information matches retrieval promoting fluency of 
processing, experienced as a feeling of previous encountering of familiarity. This feeling 
signals no need to engage in deep processing. There is no need to attend to the specificities 
of situation (other than being merely exposed to a stimulus). So familiarity is activated by 
simple perception, not encompassing any type of evaluative process, specially the one that is 
associated with comparison between one´s resources and demands. That would necessitate a 
different type of relationship with the situation – one that motivates the individual to engage 
in those evaluations. So if we increase task engagement, we should expect this comparison 
to be potentiated and challenge to be activated. And even though the BPS model posits that 
this process may occur unconsciously, being affected for instance by affect (Weisbuch-
Remington et al., 2005), it is always assumed that an evaluation occurs and that it 
encompasses resources and demands. Evaluation is necessary and moderates challenge and 
threat activation. Note, however, that when challenge is promoted, the accessibility to 
resources is also promoted and this may promote the feeling of familiarity (as presupposed 
by the FARM model) that is known to be associated with less analytic processing.  If this is 
so, instead of expecting familiarity effects to be mediated by challenge indexes, we should 
expect challenge effects on information processing to be mediated by feeling of familiarity.  
Thus, a corollary of this hypothesis is that the internal experience defined as a feeling of 
familiarity – being automatically activated by the detection of the situation as familiar –may 
be incorporated in the state of challenge. Familiarity may be integrated in the experience of 
challenge in the sense that they both share a similar internal state defined by the detection of 
greater resources available, being challenge activated by a subsequent evaluation of the 
demands as fewer.   
This hypothesis suggests that the relationship between familiarity and challenge is 
not a perfect match – familiarity only requires the internal experience to signal superficial 
86 
  
  
  
processing and challenge adds to it the consideration of the external situation.   In order to 
directly address this hypothesis, future studies should orthogonally manipulate the level of 
demands of a task and level of familiarity. Whereas the impact of familiarity is translated by 
a main effect of this variable, challenge effects should be associated with a specific 
interaction.  By doing that we contrast the hypothesis that the internal detection of resources 
always leads to decreased processing (independently of evaluation of the external situation) 
with the hypothesis that this internal detection of resources only leads to decreased 
processing when the external task-demands are low. Although not expected, by the 
hypothesis here defined, it would be interesting to determine if a disruption of familiarity 
effects is caused by increase of task-demands. This would mean that individuals neglect the 
internal signal and still process information analytically because their evaluation of higher 
task-demands (more likely to result in a threat condition) disrupts the familiarity signal. 
Recall that in our experiments, more analytic processing was observed in the threat 
condition. To fully test the hypothesis we have been raising, it would be insightful to add a 
manipulation of a variable assumed to reduce the level of evaluation (e.g. level of 
distraction; low self monitoring etc.). In these conditions threat is not assumed to be able to 
disrupt familiarity effects.  
Alternative explanations may however be raised. The relationship between 
familiarity and challenge and their impact on processing may be explained by a third 
variable, such as mood. The literature supports this possibility by demonstrating that the 
three types of relationships, able to explain the mediation (see Baron & Kenny, 1986), are 
present. As demonstrated by Garcia-Marques (1999, 2009), familiarity is defined as feeling 
with positive valence. Similarly, challenge is associated with a positive affective state 
(Blascovich & Mendes, 2000). A positive mood state has been shown to decreases by itself 
analytic processing (Bohner, Crow, Erb & Schwarz, 1992; Mackie & Worth, 1989). Thus, it 
is possible that mood mediates the effects of familiarity and challenge on processing by 
being the link between the two. Unfortunately this is not corroborated by our data which 
revealed an absence of mediation of participants´ ratings of mood on the effects of both 
challenge and familiarity in information processing. Of course this might be due to a 
methodological problem, since participants´ ratings of mood were assessed at the very end of 
the experiment after participants were detached from all the physiological equipment. 
Because there is some level of unpleasantness (e.g. itchiness) associated with removing this 
equipment from participants´ body, it is possible that participants’ ratings were biased by our 
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procedure. This may be a reason worthwhile to persecute the in future studies. But an 
additional feature of our data also puts the explanation into question.  How would mood 
explain the dissociative effects of task engagement in both variables? In addition, mood 
effects are assumed to disappear whenever task engagement is increased (e.g. Smith & 
Shaffer, 1991). 
 
Contributions for the models. 
BPS model.  
 The research we present in this dissertation offers a cognitive insight on the BPS 
model by being the very first attempt to relate challenge and threat motivational states with 
dual process models of information-processing. Contrary to the usual but not universal 
finding that challenge leads to better performances, our data suggests that this is not always 
the case – challenge participants performed poorly on an information processing task. Of 
course, within an information-processing perspective, it is necessary to reframe the notion of 
“better” and “worse” performance because analytic processing is not better or worse than 
superficial processing, their difference being qualitative rather than quantitative. When we 
take such a perspective to interpret the common findings in the BPS literature, some results 
are actually consistent with ours. For example, evidence showing that challenge increases 
speed for judgments of preference tasks (Blascovich et al, 1993) may indicate that non-
analytic processing, typically associated with shorter reaction times, is being used. In line 
with this, Hunter´s (2001) investigation clearly suggest that when more controlled processes 
are required, challenge results in worse performances as demonstrated by a small amount of 
correctly recalled words from a previously seen list. However, in some circumstances, where 
for example individuals have to deliver a speech after a downward social comparison 
cooperative task (Mendes et al., 2002), challenge generally improves performance. These 
discrepancies suggest that the type of task possibly moderates the effects, a hypothesis 
worthwhile to explore in future studies. 
 Additional contributions regarding the BPS model involve the evidence that even 
though challenge is associated with increased task resources relative to task demands and 
cognitive resources are needed to process information more systematically, the relatively 
greater amount of resources during challenge motivation is not translated into deeper 
processing. Congruent with our findings, some literature in cognitive psychology has shown 
that having more resources does not necessarily lead to analytic processing. For example, 
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Lavie and colleagues (1995; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert & Viding, 2004) have shown that some 
level of cognitive load is necessary for selective attention to increase cognitive performance. 
Others like Baron (1986) have suggested that some level of distraction is necessary to focus 
individuals on what is the relevant information to perform a task correctly. Our data is the 
preliminary evidence that questions if the definition of “personal resources” conveyed in the 
BPS model maps or not the “cognitive resources” needed to process information. 
  
FARM model. 
 The research conducted here not only offers further support for the FARM model but 
also offers some insights about the role of motivational processes. As it has been 
demonstrated in the literature, motivation is an important variable because it moderates 
FARM effects. Independently of the levels of familiarity with the task, less  motivated 
performers are less likely to engage in analytic processing, whereas, highly motivated 
individuals are much more likely to (e.g. Claypool et al., 2004). Familiarity effects are made 
clear whenever motivation levels do not disrupt or potentiate analytic processing. However, 
our findings, suggest that not all kinds of motivation (e.g. involvement with the issue) 
moderate the effect.  At least  the type of task engagement brought by the presence of an 
observer, does not impact the FARM effects – information was always processed similarly 
whether participants were or not in  the presence of others. 
 Additional contribution to the FARM is the evidence demonstrating that the effects 
of familiarity on information-processing have physiological correlates associated with it. 
Other researchers have already demonstrated this by showing that the presentation of famous 
familiar faces evoke larger skin conductance responses (Tranel, Fowles & Damasio, 1985); 
mere exposure to familiar faces compared to unfamiliar faces increases electrodermal 
reactions (Channouf & Rouibah, 1997); or that processing of repeated stimuli is associated 
with decreases in neural activity (Ishai, Bikle & Ungerleider, 2006). However, as far as we 
know, no past evidence for physiological correlates was associated with familiarity with a 
persuasive message. The correlates we found in our experiments suggest that familiarity of a 
message is associated with the sympathetic neural and adrenal medullary (SAM) axis 
activation (marked by increases in cardiac output and decreases or no changes in total 
peripheral resistance), being this manifestations circumscribed to motivated task 
performance situations. In order to provide more evidence on this relationship, it would be 
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interesting to approach physiological correlates (and what are they) outside motivated task-
situations.  
 
Additional contributions to the Social Facilitation literature. 
  The idea that the presence of others increases task engagement is not new in the 
social facilitation literature. Authors have thoroughly demonstrated that the presence of 
others is motivating and increases the levels of effort allocated in the task (Bond, 1982; 
Blascovich et al., 1999; Zajonc, 1965, 1980, for reviews see, Aiello & Douhit, 2001; Guerin, 
1993). However, our findings demonstrate that this increased effort is not necessarily 
translated into motivation to process deeply information. This could mean that the type of 
task engagement promoted by the presence of others is different than the type of engagement 
necessary to elaborate information deeply. In fact, it is possible that the type of task 
engagement outlined in the social facilitation literature is merely motivational and not 
cognitive, as its dissociative effect in our experiments seems to suggest.  
 A hypothesis worth pursuing in future studies is one associated with our 
interpretation of the dissociation effect. As we suggested above, one possible explanation for 
the dissociative effect may be a greater tendency to attend to the context when others are 
present. Congruent with this hypothesis, in challenge situations the individuals in the alone 
condition may be prevented from evaluating the demands of the situation. Thus, the presence 
of others may moderate the activation of a challenge state because individuals are prone to 
attend to those social features of the situation. In the presence of others, individuals, assumed 
to attribute importance to the task, may be only more prone to attend the demands of the 
situation in order to evaluate it as challenge or threat. As such, it is possible that the presence 
of others, instead of engaging individuals in a task, makes them more sensitive to the 
context. In line with this hypothesis, Fonseca and Garcia-Marques (2010) have demonstrated 
that, compared to an alone situation, the presence of others increases the amount of context-
related free-associations (experiment 1) and the accuracy for estimation judgments that 
require the integration of contextual information (experiment 3). This context-sensitivity 
hypothesis can also be found in social facilitation evidence that shows that accompanied 
individuals have better recall for contextual aspects of the task-situation, (Sanders, Baron & 
Moore, 1978) and make greater use of contextual cues when forming an impression of a 
target (Thomas et al., 2002). Even though this is an interesting hypothesis, future research 
should clarify why in situations where this evaluative process associated with motivational 
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state is not enhanced, the impact of variable such as familiarity on processing remains the 
same. 
 
 The set of 4 studies we present in this thesis is the very first attempt to empirically 
test the relationships between two different and distant models. The results we obtained here, 
even though they do not offer a fully and final response to our goals, suggest future avenues, 
worthwhile to pursue, for exploring the interconnection between motivational and cognitive 
impact of social human behavior.   
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Appendix A: Persuasive Messages 
 
Weight Loss Centers: Strong Version 
  
 “I am strongly in favor of Weight Loss Centers as places where people can safely and 
effectively lose weight. There are at least a couple of reasons for advocating such a position. First of 
all, it is important to understand that the goal of the most commercial diet programs is not, and will 
never be, simply to help people to lose weight. Their special concern is in teaching people how to 
maintain a good and healthy lifestyle. Second, most Weight Loss Centers have the advantage of 
having qualified personnel on hand. Weight Loss Center counselors are specially trained to deal with 
their often vulnerable clients. These instructors not only have to have prior relevant knowledge but 
must also undergo intense training sessions sponsored by the Center. 
 One important aspect of this training is that weight loss counselors at most centers are 
instructed in the use of behavior modification techniques. These are techniques that teach participants 
how to reward behavior that promotes their goals and to reduce behaviors that interfere with losing 
weight and becoming healthier. These techniques also effectively increase client’s self-esteem and 
feeling of control. This work is usually supervised by psychologists or behavior therapists.  
     In addition to weight loss counselors, most diet centers employ licensed fitness trainers. 
These fitness trainers develop complete programs of exercises adapted to each case. These fitness 
programs are designed and adapted for the general overweight population, preventing any dangerous 
use of exercise for these people. We have to remember that not all forms of exercise are good in all 
phases of the process of losing weight.  Commercial weight loss centers thus have fully developed 
programs of exercise that are safe and efficient in attaining the proper goals. 
 Weight loss Centers are also monitored full time by qualified medical professionals.  In these 
ways these programs ensure people that all aspects related with weight loss are paid careful attention:  
nutrition, exercise, psychological support, and education related to better and healthier lifestyles. 
Perhaps this is the reason that over the years a great number of these centers have demonstrated that 
they produce the kind of lifestyle changes necessary for clients not only to safely lose weight but 
more importantly to keep the weight off.  
 For all these reasons I believe that not only people can safely and effectively lose weight 
with these programs, but also that this is one of the best ways of doing it.” 
 
  
Weight Loss Centers: Weak Version 
  
 “I am strongly in favor of weight loss centers as places where people can safely and 
effectively lose weight. There are at least a couple of reasons for advocating such a position. First of 
all, it is important to understand that if so many people use commercial weight loss programs these 
programs must be an effective way to lose weight.  Second, we have to understand that attending the 
program’s weekly meeting is a really good and healthy way to spend time and meet new people.  A 
lot of overweight people might not do this if it wasn’t for these centers. 
 One of the important aspects of these weight loss centers is that most of the clients who use 
commercial diet centers report little or no feeling of hunger or deprivation while participating in the 
program. Although there might be some complaints about some things that go on people seem to be 
pretty satisfied with what they are allowed to eat and drink on these programs. 
 I know that some commercial weight loss programs have recently been said to cause 
different kinds of health problems, but I believe that most of the claims of health problems arising 
from the general use of diet centers are unfounded and simply reflect exploitation by unscrupulous 
attorneys. We must remember that people who join a weight Loss center program usually expect the 
center to perform miracles without their having to put any time and effort into it. The people who 
join are also pretty vulnerable psychologically.  These are just the characteristics that make the users 
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of weight loss centers really easy targets for the kind of arguments used by unscrupulous attorneys 
who want to cause trouble for the centers while filling their own pockets.   
 In addition, when we compare the programs offered in weight loss centers and what people 
do when they try to lose weight at home alone, it turns out that the food products manufactured for 
specific weight loss programs are usually less expensive than comparable non-programs foods.   
People don’t think about that when they complain about the centers.  So it seems self evident the 
benefits of using these programs in terms of overall quality of life far outweigh the monetary cost.  
 For all these reasons I believe that  not only people can safely and effectively lose weight 
with these programs,  but also that this is one of the more enjoyable ways of doing it. 
 
 
Acid Rain: Strong Version 
 
 “I'm strongly opposed to imposing governmental controls to minimize the effects of acid rain 
on the North Eastern states.   
 Recently completed studies have shown that most of the increase in the acidity of our lakes 
and atmosphere is due to increased urbanization in the northern states. Geographic changes, such as 
widespread deforestation, have also contributed.  The deacidifying effect of large scale forest burn-
offs now no longer occurs, with the result that atmospheric acidity levels have steadily climbed.” 
 Solving these demographic and geographic problems would have a more beneficial effect 
than imposing controls on industry.  As the installation of sulfur dioxide emissions control devices is 
extremely expensive such a move would be economically detrimental.  American industry would be 
faced with a large financial burden at a time when it must focus all its financial energies on increased 
production to compete with ever-growing foreign competition.   
 A Hudson study calculates that it would cost $100 billion to achieve a major reduction in 
sulfur dioxide emissions.  This cost would not only be to industry, but also to the American taxpayer.  
As the evidence indicates that the contribution of industrial emissions to acid rain is minimal, there is 
no justification for engaging in a program of this expense.”  
 
 
Acid Rain: Weak Version 
  
 ”I'm strongly opposed to imposing governmental controls to minimize the effects of acid rain 
on the North Eastern states. 
 People who think that acid rain is caused by Midwestern factories and is raining down on 
Eastern forests and lakes don't recognise that the material they say is in the air has probably always 
been there. It just happens that in the last six years they started to measure the presence of acid rain 
and so now it is noticeable.  
 Most people who live in the East have not noticed any big differences in their air or water 
quality which is better that in most big cities in America. If the problem were really so bad you’d 
think that people would be demonstrating their discontent by moving out of the area. There is no 
problem with the acidity in the air or water in the Midwest region, and it seems unfair to make people 
in the area responsible for the problems in other regions. States independence has always been an 
important American virtue and it should be encouraged rather than undermined. Everyone is always 
blaming American industry for everything, and using them as an excuse to increase bureaucracy. 
Factories in other countries do not have to be burdened with regulations and neither should American 
companies.”  
 
 
Road Taxes Message  
 
 "Tax rates should be increased to help repair our freeways. There are several reasons for why 
this action should be taken.  
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 First, a tax rate increase would help in the beautification of our freeways and also make them 
more interesting. Considering that many of our current freeways are somewhat unsightly and boring, 
this tax rate increase could repair some of our highways’ unattractiveness. Increasing tax rates would 
additionally reduce the number of hitchhikers by making our highways more attractive. That is, 
hitchhikers would stand out against this more attractive freeway background, and as such, be easier 
for police to ticket these individuals. Second, the construction crews working on the repair of our 
freeways should increase the safety of untamed animals living in close proximity to highways. That 
is, the noise and commotion cause by these construction workers would deter deer and other animals 
from lurking near the freeways and potentially getting injured.  
 Finally, the government should be trusted and supported in issued related to the maintenance 
of our highways. The government has often done good things in the past to increase the efficiency 
and safety of our highways and should be trusted to do the same here." 
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Appendix B: Pre-attitudinal Questionnaire. 
 
 
Initial Questionnaire 
 
1. What is your gender?  M____  F_____ 
 
2. How old are you? _____ year old. 
 
3. What class are you? Freshman ___; Sophomore ___; Junior ___;  Senior ___ 
4. Do you have any problems related to deafness or difficult in hearing? 
 Yes ____  which type? _________________________________________ 
  No  ____ 
 
To help you answer the next questions we would like you to use a feeling 
thermometer. Like a regular thermometer, a feeling thermometer measures all the way from cold 
to hot.  You can use the feeling thermometer to show how “cold” or “hot” you feel about various 
things. If you disagree or dislike something, you can give it a “cold” rating, choosing a 
temperature somewhere between 0 and 49. On the other hand, if you like or agree with 
something you can give it a hot rating somewhere between 51 and 100.   
For instance, when you see a statement like: 
 
“The government should be stricter with people who do not recycle”  
You can select a temperature that best represents your feelings toward the issue.  If you agree 
that the government should be stricter with people who do not recycle, you can answer with a 
number that represents a warm or hot feeling.  The more you agree with the statement, the higher 
the temperature rating you can give it. If you disagree with the statement you should give it a 
number associated with a cold feeling.  The more you disagree with the statement, the colder the 
rating you should give it. If you are totally indifferent to the issue you should choose a 
number near 50. See the example below and start answering on the next page.  
 
 
 
Choose a number between 0 and 100: 
    50 
“The government should be stricter with 
people who don’t recycle” 
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Now please answer the following:  
How much do you agree (warm rating) or disagree (cold rating) with the statement? 
 
 
 
 
 
“The government should prevent further 
widespread deforestation in the northern US” 
Choose a number between 0 and 100: 
    _____ 
“Anti-smoking programs have been effective 
in preventing cigarette addiction”. 
 
Choose a number between 0 and 100: 
    _____ 
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Choose a number between 0 and 100: 
    _____ 
“Government should impose controls on 
industry to help minimize the effect of acid 
rain in US”. 
”Oil drilling off the US coast should be 
increased so that we are not so dependent of 
foreign oil”. 
 
Choose a number between 0 and 100: 
    _____ 
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“Weight Loss Centers are places where 
people can safely and effectively lose weight”. 
 
Choose a number between 0 and 100: 
    _____ 
“Smog checks on automobiles have been 
effective in reducing air pollution”. 
 
Choose a number between 0 and 100: 
    _____ 
   t    : 
     
107 
  
  
  
 
 
“I am used to reading newspaper articles in 
crowded and noisy environments”. 
 
Choose a number between 0 and 100: 
    _____ 
“Government should reduce road taxes”. 
 
Choose a number between 0 and 100: 
    _____ 
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“I am used to studying in crowded and noisy 
environments”. 
 
Choose a number between 0 and 100: 
    _____ 
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Appendix C: Self-report Questionnaire – Experiment 1 and 3 
 
Please indicate your answers to the following questions/statements by circling the 
appropriate number: 
 
How do you feel right now?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sad      Happy 
 
How do you feel right now?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Discontent      Content 
 
How would you describe your mood at this time right now?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Bad      Good 
 
In general, I think I had sufficient capacity to deal with what was demand by the task. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
I found this task easy to do.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
During my performance I was thinking in other things.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
I felt involved in this study.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
I tried to answer the questions as more accurate as possible.   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
I think my answers were those that the experimenter wanted.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
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I tried to give adequate answers.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
The presentation of the audio message made me feel the second written message as familiar.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
It was easier to answer the questions related to the second written message.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
Thank you! 
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Appendix D: Statistics of Experiment 1 
 
Effectiveness of the familiarity manipulation. 
 
Table 1 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 36,250a 3 12,083 4,761 ,006 
Intercept 954,083 1 954,083 375,937 ,000 
Repetition 30,083 1 30,083 11,854 ,001 
Argument Quality 4,083 1 4,083 1,609 ,211 
Rep. * Arg. Qual 2,083 1 2,083 ,821 ,370 
Error 111,667 44 2,538   
Total 1102,000 48    
Corrected Total 147,917 47    
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the main effect of the Repetition 
 
Condition M SD 
No-Repetition 3,667 ,325 
Repetition 5,250 ,325 
 
 
Atitude-Change Data: Weight Loss Centre Message 
 
Table 3 
Factor Analysis and Reliability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loadings 
Loading % of Variance Cumulative % α 
1 1,510 50,349 50,349 ,41 
2 ,908 30,281 80,630  
3 ,581 19,370 100,000  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
1 components extracted. 
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Table 4 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 5,112a 3 1,704 1,411 ,252 
Intercept 65,326 1 65,326 54,108 ,000 
Repetition ,037 1 ,037 ,031 ,862 
Argument Quality 4,484 1 4,484 3,714 ,060 
Rep. * Arg. Qual ,592 1 ,592 ,490 ,488 
Error 53,122 44 1,207   
Total 123,560 48    
Corrected Total 58,234 47    
 
 
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics of the main effects of Argument Quality 
 
Condition M SD 
Weak ,861 ,224 
Strong 1,472 ,224 
 
Atitude-Change Data: Acid Rain Message 
 
Table 6 
Factor Analysis and Reliability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 19,232a 3 6,411 2,452 ,076 
Intercept 4,822 1 4,822 1,844 ,181 
Repetition ,432 1 ,432 ,165 ,686 
Argument Quality 5,140 1 5,140 1,966 ,168 
Rep. * Arg. Qual 13,661 1 13,661 5,225 ,027 
 
 
Loadings 
Loading % of Variance Cumulative % α 
1 2,212 73,732 73,732 ,82 
2 ,466 15,530 89,261  
3 ,322 10,739 100,000  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
1 components extracted. 
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Error 115,034 44 2,614   
Total 139,088 48    
Corrected Total 134,266 47    
 
 
Table 8 
Descriptive statistics of the Argument Quality x Repetition Interaction 
 
  No-repetition   Repetition 
Condition M SD   M SD 
Weak 
-,639 ,467 
 
,618 ,467 
Strong 
1,083 ,467 
 
,206 ,467 
 
Atitude-Change Data: Number of Thoughts 
 
Table 9 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 2,556a 3 ,852 1,823 ,157 
Intercept 164,930 1 164,930 352,857 ,000 
Repetition 2,145 1 2,145 4,589 ,038 
Argument Qual ,000 1 ,000 ,001 ,975 
Fam * Qual ,411 1 ,411 ,878 ,354 
Error 20,566 44 ,467   
Total 188,052 48    
Corrected Total 23,122 47    
 
Table 10 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Repetition 
 
Condition M SD 
No-Repetition 2,065 ,140 
Repetition 1,642 ,140 
 
 
Atitude-Change Data: Type of Thoughts 
 
Table 11 
Mixed Anova (2 x 2 x 2), Type of Thoughts as Repeated Measure. 
 
  
SS df MS F Sig. 
TypeThought ,543 1 ,543 4,770 ,034 
TypeThought * Rep 1,989 1 1,989 17,471 ,000 
TypeThought * Arg. Qual 
1,810 1 1,810 15,905 ,000 
TypeThought * Rep * Arg.  Qual 
,494 1 ,494 4,340 ,043 
Error(TypeofThought) 5,008 44 ,114   
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Table 12 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Type of Thoughts  
 
Condition M SD 
Favorable ,266 ,027 
Unfavorable ,417 ,052 
 
Table 13 
Descriptive statistics of the TypeThought x Repetition Interaction 
 
  No-repetition   Repetition 
Condition M SD   M SD 
Favorable 
,436 ,039 
 
,096 ,039 
Unfavorable 
,299 ,073 
 
,535 ,073 
 
Table 14 
Descriptive statistics of the TypeThought x Argument Quality Interaction 
 
  Strong   Weak 
Condition M SD   M SD 
Favorable 
,416 ,039 
 
,117 ,039 
Unfavorable 
,292 ,073 
 
,542 ,073 
 
 
Atitude-Change Data: Mediation analyses  
 
Table 15 
Regression analyses in the no-repetition condition  
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t 
 
Sig. 
 
Predictor* B SD  
  
 
Arg. Quality 1,721 ,522 ,575 3,300 ,003 
 
Arg. Quality ** ,740 ,611 ,256 1,212 ,241 
 
Thought Index ,949 ,373 ,537 2,544 ,020 
* Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain as Dependent Measure 
** Thought Index constant 
 
Table 16 
Regression analyses in the repetition condition  
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t 
 
Sig. 
 
Predictor* B SD  
  
 
Arg. Quality -,412 ,774 -,113 -,533 ,600 
 
Arg. Quality ** ,048 ,944 ,013 ,051 ,960 
 
Thought Index -,377 ,595 -,168 -,633 ,534 
* Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain as Dependent Measure 
** Thought Index constant 
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Challenge and Threat Data: Baseline Differences  
 
Table 17 
Between-Subjects Manova (2 x 2) 
 
  Value* F Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. 
Intercept ,001 13643,398a 4,000 39,000 ,000 
Repetition ,928 ,751a 4,000 39,000 ,563 
Arg. Quality ,939 ,637a 4,000 39,000 ,640 
Rep. * Arg. Qual. ,953 ,486a 4,000 39,000 ,746 
*Wilks´ Lambda. 
 
Challenge and Threat Data: Task-Engagement  
 
Table 18 
T-tests for hr and vc against zero. 
 
        CI 95% 
Condition M SD  Mean 
Difference 
t(47) p LL UL 
hr_reactivity 15,088 42,160 15,088 2,480 ,017 2,846 27,331 
vc_reactivity 10,599 14,896 10,599 4,930 ,000 6,274 14,925 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
Challenge and Threat Indexes  
 
Table 19 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2), CO as dependent measure 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 90,636a 3 30,212 2,132 ,110 
Intercept 3,123 1 3,123 ,220 ,641 
Repetition 78,056 1 78,056 5,508 ,023 
Argument Qual 10,876 1 10,876 ,768 ,386 
Fam * Qual 1,703 1 1,703 ,120 ,730 
Error 623,520 44 14,171   
Total 717,278 48    
Corrected Total 714,156 47    
 
Table 20 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Repetition 
 
Condition M SD 
No-Repetition -1,020 ,768 
Repetition 1,530 ,768 
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Table 21 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2), TPR as dependent measure 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 830928,663a 3 276976,221 1,577 ,209 
Intercept 1138986,228 1 1138986,228 6,483 ,014 
Repetition 706930,860 1 706930,860 4,024 ,051 
Argument Qual 12193,036 1 12193,036 ,069 ,793 
Fam * Qual 111804,767 1 111804,767 ,636 ,429 
Error 7730199,007 44 175686,341   
Total 9700113,898 48    
Corrected Total 8561127,670 47    
 
Table 22 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Repetition 
 
Condition M SD 
No-Repetition 275,400 85,559 
Repetition 32,684 85,559 
 
Mediation of Unitary Index on Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain 
 
Table 23 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 19,764a 4 4,941 1,856 ,136 
Intercept 4,822 1 4,822 1,811 ,185 
Index_CT ,532 1 ,532 ,200 ,657 
Repetition ,487 1 ,487 ,183 ,671 
Arg. Quality 5,451 1 5,451 2,047 ,160 
Rep. * Arg. Qual. 14,188 1 14,188 5,328 ,026 
Error 114,502 43 2,663   
Total 139,088 48    
Corrected Total 134,266 47    
 
Mediation of Unitary Index on Number of Thoughts 
 
Table 24 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 2,827a 4 ,707 1,497 ,220 
Intercept 164,930 1 164,930 349,441 ,000 
Index_CT ,271 1 ,271 ,574 ,453 
Repetition 2,226 1 2,226 4,715 ,035 
Arg. Quality ,006 1 ,006 ,013 ,908 
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Rep. * Arg. Qual. ,267 1 ,267 ,565 ,456 
Error 20,295 43 ,472   
Total 188,052 48    
Corrected Total 23,122 47    
 
 
Mediation of Cognitive evaluations on Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain 
 
Table 25 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 21,246a 4 5,312 2,021 ,108 
Intercept 3,412 1 3,412 1,298 ,261 
Cog Evaluation 2,014 1 2,014 ,766 ,386 
Repetition ,653 1 ,653 ,248 ,621 
Arg. Quality 5,370 1 5,370 2,043 ,160 
Rep. * Arg. Qual. 14,917 1 14,917 5,676 ,022 
Error 113,020 43 2,628   
Total 139,088 48    
Corrected Total 134,266 47    
 
Mediation of Mood on Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain 
 
Table 26 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 22,355a 4 5,589 2,147 ,091 
Intercept 4,645 1 4,645 1,785 ,189 
Mood 3,123 1 3,123 1,200 ,279 
Repetition ,545 1 ,545 ,209 ,650 
Arg. Quality 5,402 1 5,402 2,076 ,157 
Rep. * Arg. Qual. 12,849 1 12,849 4,937 ,032 
Error 111,911 43 2,603   
Total 139,088 48    
Corrected Total 134,266 47    
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Appendix E: Material by Condition (Experiment 2) 
 
 
Examples of non-demanding/challenge trials (difference between shapes 1,5 cm). 
 
 
 
 
Examples of demanding/threat trials (difference between shapes 0,5 cm). 
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Examples of neutral trials trials (difference between shapes 1 cm). 
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Appendix F: Self Report questionnaire - Experiment 2 and 3 
 
Please indicate your answers to the following questions/statements by circling the 
appropriate number: 
 
How do you feel right now?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sad      Happy 
 
How do you feel right now?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Discontent      Content 
 
How would you describe your mood at this time right now?  
1 2 3  
4 
5 6 7 
Very 
Negative 
     Very 
Positive 
 
I think that Phase 1 was demanding.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
In general, I think I had sufficient capacity to deal with what was demanded by the game  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
On Phase 1, it was difficult to perceive which one of the two shapes was bigger.  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
During my performance on Phase 1 I was thinking in other things. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
I felt involved in Phase 1.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
I felt involved in Phase 2.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
I tried to answer the questions on Phase 2 as more accurate as possible.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
It was easier to answer the questions related to Phase 2, than perform the game on phase 1 
and 3.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
I think my answers on Phase 2 were those that the experimenter wanted.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
I tried to give adequate answers.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
During my performance on Phase 2 I was thinking in other things.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
     strongly 
agree 
 
Thank you! 
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Appendix G: Statistics of Experiment 2 
 
 
Challenge and Threat Data. Effectiveness of the task-demands manipulation. 
 
Table 1 
Anova one-way. 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 9,680a 1 9,680 3,799 ,057 
Intercept 1352,000 1 1352,000 530,543 ,000 
Demands 9,680 1 9,680 3,799 ,057 
Error 122,320 48 2,548   
Total 1484,000 50    
Corrected Total 132,000 49    
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the main effect of the Demands 
 
Condition M SD 
Non-Demanding 5,640 1,629 
Demanding 4,760 1,562 
 
 
Challenge and Threat Data: Baseline Differences  
 
Table 3 
Between-Subjects Manova (2 x 2) 
 
  Value
* 
F Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. 
Intercept ,006 1644,924a 4,000 39,000 ,000 
Argument Quality ,947 ,549a 4,000 39,000 ,701 
Demands ,859 1,600a 4,000 39,000 ,194 
Arg. Qual x Demands ,829 2,016a 4,000 39,000 ,111 
*Wilks´ Lambda. 
 
Challenge and Threat Data: Task-Engagement 
 
Table 4 
T-tests for hr and vc against zero 
 
        CI 95% 
Condition M SD  Mean 
Difference 
t(51) p LL UL 
hr_reactivity* 12,768 28,515 12,768 3,229 ,002 4,829 20,707 
vc_reactivity* 1,874 5,277 1,87424 2,561 ,013 ,404 3,343 
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hr_reactivity** 12,858 24,256 12,858 3,823 ,000 6,105 19,611 
vc_reactivity** 1,195 4,358 1,195 1,978 ,053 -,017 2,409 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
*Values relative to the game task 
**Values relative to the persuasion task 
 
 
Challenge and Threat Indexes  
 
Table 5 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2), CO as dependent measure, relative to  the game task. 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 25,985a 1 25,985 4,296 ,043 
Intercept ,383 1 ,383 ,063 ,802 
Demands 25,985 1 25,985 4,296 ,043 
Error 302,400 50 6,048   
Total 328,768 52    
Corrected Total 328,385 51    
 
Table 6 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of demands 
 
Condition M SD 
Demanding -,792 .49 
Non-Demanding ,621 .48 
 
Table 7 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2), TPR as dependent measure, relative to  the game task. 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 372074,584a 1 372074,584 5,472 ,023 
Intercept 27806,694 1 27806,694 ,409 ,525 
Demands 372074,584 1 372074,584 5,472 ,023 
Error 3399571,319 50 67991,426   
Total 3799452,597 52    
Corrected Total 3771645,903 51    
 
Table 8 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Demands 
 
Condition M SD 
Demanding 61,464 25,60 
Non-Demanding -107,713 51,14 
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Table 9 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2), CO as dependent measure, relative to  the persuasion  task. 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 99,902a 3 33,301 1,626 ,196 
Intercept ,073 1 ,073 ,004 ,952 
Argument Qual 1,399 1 1,399 ,068 ,795 
Demands 89,219 1 89,219 4,358 ,042 
Qual * Demands 10,474 1 10,474 ,512 ,478 
Error 982,775 48 20,474   
Total 1082,677 52    
Corrected Total 1082,677 51    
 
 
Table 10 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Demands 
 
Condition M SD 
Demanding -1.48 ,92 
Non-Demanding 1.22 ,88 
 
Table 11 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2), TPR as dependent measure, relative to the persuasion  task. 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 988690,915a 3 329563,638 2,950 ,042 
Intercept 1,101 1 1,101 ,000 ,998 
Argument Qual 6020,011 1 6020,011 ,054 ,817 
Demands 439016,067 1 439016,067 3,929 ,053 
Qual * Demands 548961,961 1 548961,961 4,913 ,031 
Error 5362989,743 48 111728,953   
Total 6354829,080 52    
Corrected Total 6351680,658 51    
 
Table 12 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Demands 
 
Condition M SD 
Demanding 92,011 65,748 
Non-Demanding -92,303 63,224 
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Attitude-Change Data.  
 
Table 13 
Factor Analysis and Reliability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14 
Anova (2 x 2)  
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 9,346a 3 3,115 1,665 ,187 
Intercept 10,118 1 10,118 5,409 ,024 
Demands ,857 1 ,857 ,458 ,502 
Argument Qual ,682 1 ,682 ,364 ,549 
Demands * Qual 7,680 1 7,680 4,105 ,048 
Error 89,796 48 1,871   
Total 110,729 52    
Corrected Total 99,141 51    
 
 
Table 15 
Descriptive statistics of the Demands x Argument quality Interaction 
 
  Non-Demanding   Demanding 
Condition M SD   M SD 
Strong  
,043 ,395 
 
1,071 ,366 
Weak 
,584 ,366 
 
,071 ,395 
 
 
Table 16 
Contrasts revealing the impact of the version of the game/motivational state on the differentiation between 
strong and weak arguments in attitude-change. 
 
 Strong Arguments  Weak Arguments   CI 95% 
Condition M SD  M SD t(48) p LL UL 
Demanding 1.08 1.01  .08 .51 1.81 .07 - .08 2.08 
Non-Demanding .02 1.42  .52 .56 1.06 .29 -1.62 0.54 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
 
 
Loadings 
Loading % of Variance Cumulative % α 
1 1,944 64,811 64,811 ,72 
2 ,724 24,126 88,937  
3 ,332 11,063 100,000  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
1 components extracted. 
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Mediation of the Unitary Index on Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain 
 
Table 17 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 10,472a 4 2,618 1,388 ,253 
Intercept 10,000 1 10,000 5,301 ,026 
Index_CT 1,127 1 1,127 ,597 ,443 
Demands 1,438 1 1,438 ,762 ,387 
Arg. Quality ,616 1 ,616 ,327 ,570 
Demands * Qual. 8,617 1 8,617 4,568 ,038 
Error 88,669 47 1,887   
Total 110,729 52    
Corrected Total 99,141 51    
 
Mediation of Cognitive evaluations on Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain 
 
Table 18 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 10,746a 4 2,687 1,407 ,247 
Intercept ,314 1 ,314 ,165 ,687 
Cog. Evaluations ,053 1 ,053 ,028 ,869 
Demands ,546 1 ,546 ,286 ,595 
Argument Quality 1,428 1 1,428 ,748 ,392 
Demands * Arg. Qual 8,105 1 8,105 4,246 ,045 
Error 85,902 45 1,909   
Total 105,905 50    
Corrected Total 96,648 49    
 
 
Mediation of Mood on Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain 
 
Table 19 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 10,926a 4 2,732 1,434 ,238 
Intercept ,865 1 ,865 ,454 ,504 
Mood ,233 1 ,233 ,122 ,728 
Arg. Quality 1,499 1 1,499 ,787 ,380 
Demands ,478 1 ,478 ,251 ,619 
Qual. * Demands 8,377 1 8,377 4,398 ,042 
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Error 85,722 45 1,905   
Total 105,905 50    
Corrected Total 96,648 49    
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Appendix H: Statistics of Experiment 3 
 
 
Challenge and Threat Data. Effectiveness of the task-demands manipulation. 
 
Table 1 
Anova (2 x 2). 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 33,107a 3 11,036 5,563 ,002 
Intercept 2914,588 1 2914,588 1469,294 ,000 
Presence ,766 1 ,766 ,386 ,536 
Demands 31,972 1 31,972 16,118 ,000 
Presence * Demands ,866 1 ,866 ,436 ,510 
Error 180,514 91 1,984   
Total 3126,000 95    
Corrected Total 213,621 94    
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the main effect of the Demands 
 
Condition M SD 
Non-Demanding 6,131 ,208 
Demanding 4,968 ,202 
 
 
Challenge and Threat Data: Baseline Differences  
 
Table 3 
Between-Subjects Manova (2 x 2 x 2) 
 
  Value* F Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. 
Intercept ,010 2177,496 4,000 86,000 ,000 
Presence ,933 1,537 4,000 86,000 ,199 
Demands ,986 ,310 4,000 86,000 ,871 
Argument Quality ,919 1,889 4,000 86,000 ,120 
Presence * Demands ,943 1,309 4,000 86,000 ,273 
Presence * Arg. Quality ,968 ,710 4,000 86,000 ,587 
Demands * Arg. Qual  ,972 ,616 4,000 86,000 ,653 
Pres. * Demand * Arg. Qual ,994 ,139 4,000 86,000 ,967 
*Wilks´ Lambda. 
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Challenge and Threat Data: Task-Engagement 
 
Table 4 
T-tests for hr and vc against zero, for the presence condition 
 
 
        CI 95% 
Condition M SD  Mean 
Difference 
t(49) p LL UL 
hr_reactivity* 10,238 22,886 10,238 3,163 ,003 3,733 16,742 
vc_reactivity* 6,520 23,870 6,520 1,931 ,059 -,264 13,304 
hr_reactivity** 5,928 17,879 5,928 2,345 ,023 ,847 11,009 
vc_reactivity** 7,326 24,152 7,326 2,145 ,037 ,462 14,191 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
*Values relative to the game task 
**Values relative to the persuasion task 
 
Table 5 
T-tests for hr and vc against zero, for the alone condition 
 
        CI 95% 
Condition M SD  Mean 
Difference 
t (47) p LL UL 
hr_reactivity* 5,057 18,149 5,05793 1,931 ,060 -,212 10,327 
vc_reactivity* 1,520 21,479 1,52083 ,491 ,626 -4,716 7,757 
hr_reactivity** 4,937 17,544 4,937 1,950 ,057 -,157 10,031 
vc_reactivity** -,645 15,857 -,645 -,282 ,779 -5,250 3,958 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
*Values relative to the game task 
**Values relative to the persuasion task 
 
 
Challenge and Threat Indexes  
 
Table 6 
Anova one-way for the game task and only for presence condition. CO as dependent measure. 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 16,899a 2 8,449 1,931 ,156 
Intercept 6,709 1 6,709 1,534 ,222 
CO_Baseline 4,189 1 4,189 ,958 ,333 
Demands 15,954 1 15,954 3,647 ,062 
Error 205,610 47 4,375   
Total 227,141 50    
Corrected Total 222,508 49    
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Table 7 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of demands 
 
Condition M SD 
Demanding -,26 .42     
Non-Demanding ,92 .44 
 
 
Table 8 
Anova one-way for the game task only for presence condition. TPR as dependent measure. 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 4,470E6 2 2234891,028 3,550 ,037 
Intercept 2752814,957 1 2752814,957 4,373 ,042 
Demands 3168143,318 1 3168143,318 5,032 ,030 
Error 2,959E7 47 629544,400   
Total 3,423E7 50    
Corrected Total 3,406E7 49    
 
Table 9 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Demands 
 
Condition M SD 
Demanding 193,450 158,722 
Non-Demanding -331,194 165,471 
 
Table 10 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2) for the persuasion task only for presence condition. CO as dependent measure. 
. 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 46,544a 4 11,636 1,815 ,143 
Intercept ,718 1 ,718 ,112 ,740 
CO_Base ,596 1 ,596 ,093 ,762 
Demands 24,845 1 24,845 3,874 ,055 
Arg. Quality 9,469 1 9,469 1,477 ,231 
Demands * Qual 6,809 1 6,809 1,062 ,308 
Error 288,575 45 6,413   
Total 368,020 50    
Corrected Total 335,120 49    
 
 
Table 11 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Demands 
 
Condition M SD 
Demanding ,131 ,508 
Non-Demanding 1,617 ,534 
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Table 12 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2) for the persuasion task only for presence condition. TPR as dependent 
measure. 
. 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 5,914E6 4 1478386,538 1,726 ,161 
Intercept 354,450 1 354,450 ,000 ,984 
CO_Base 157989,887 1 157989,887 ,184 ,670 
Demands 3778758,512 1 3778758,512 4,411 ,041 
Arg. Quality 1421969,598 1 1421969,598 1,660 ,204 
Demands * Qual 571456,994 1 571456,994 ,667 ,418 
Error 3,855E7 45 856680,981   
Total 4,674E7 50    
Corrected Total 4,446E7 49    
 
Table 13 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Demands 
 
Condition M SD 
Demanding 489,075 185,520 
Non-Demanding -90,288 195,223 
 
 
Attitude-Change Data.  
 
Table 14 
 
Factor Analysis and Reliability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15 
Anova (2 x 2)  
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 17,389a 7 2,484 1,773 ,102 
Intercept 5,248 1 5,248 3,746 ,056 
Demands 1,574 1 1,574 1,123 ,292 
Arg. Quality ,123 1 ,123 ,088 ,767 
Presence ,086 1 ,086 ,061 ,805 
 
 
Loadings 
Loading % of Variance Cumulative % α 
1 2,429 80,971 80,971 ,874 
2 ,339 11,311 92,282  
3 ,232 7,718 100,000  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
1 components extracted. 
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Demands * Qual 2,616 1 2,616 1,868 ,175 
Demands * Presence 4,462 1 4,462 3,185 ,078 
Quality * Presence ,650 1 ,650 ,464 ,498 
Qual * Dem * Pres 6,826 1 6,826 4,873 ,030 
Error 126,077 90 1,401   
Total 148,556 98    
Corrected Total 143,466 97    
 
 
Table 16 
Descriptive statistics of the Demands x Argument quality  x Presence Interaction 
 
  Presence   Alone  
 Demanding  Non-Demanding Demanding Non-Demanding  
Condition M SD  M M SD SD M SD 
Strong  
1,077 ,328  -,462 ,328 -,103 ,328 ,273 ,357 
Weak 
,128 ,328  ,303 ,357 ,333 ,342 ,306 ,342 
 
 
Table 17 
Contrasts revealing the impact of the version of the game/motivational state on the differentiation between 
strong and weak arguments in the presence condition. 
 
 Strong Arguments  Weak Arguments   CI 95% 
Condition M SD  M SD t(26) p LL UL 
Demanding 1.02 1.18  .10 .04 2.04 .04 .03 1.87 
      t(28)    
Non-Demanding -.49 1.19  .23 .04 1.58 .12 -1.13 .19 
 
 
Mediation of the Unitary Index on Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain 
 
Table 18 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 17,394a 8 2,174 1,535 ,157 
Intercept 5,252 1 5,252 3,708 ,057 
Unitray Index  ,005 1 ,005 ,003 ,955 
Demands 1,518 1 1,518 1,071 ,303 
Arg. Qual. ,127 1 ,127 ,089 ,766 
Presence ,089 1 ,089 ,063 ,802 
Demands * Qual. 2,619 1 2,619 1,849 ,177 
Demands * Presence 4,238 1 4,238 2,992 ,087 
Qual.* Presence ,653 1 ,653 ,461 ,499 
Dem.* Qual * Pres 6,357 1 6,357 4,488 ,037 
Error 126,072 89 1,417   
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Total 148,556 98    
Corrected Total 143,466 97    
 
Mediation of Cognitive evaluations on Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain 
 
Table 19 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 23,265a 8 2,908 2,169 ,038 
Intercept 7,195 1 7,195 5,366 ,023 
Cogn. Evaluations 5,359 1 5,359 3,996 ,049 
Demands ,020 1 ,020 ,015 ,902 
Quality ,025 1 ,025 ,018 ,892 
Presence ,739 1 ,739 ,551 ,460 
Demands * Qual. 3,066 1 3,066 2,287 ,134 
Demands * Presence 5,495 1 5,495 4,098 ,046 
Qual.* Presence ,727 1 ,727 ,542 ,463 
Dem.* Qual * Pres 4,025 1 4,025 3,002 ,087 
Error 115,324 86 1,341   
Total 142,000 95    
Corrected Total 138,589 94    
 
Mediation of Mood on Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain 
 
Table 20 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 16,242a 8 2,030 1,426 ,197 
Intercept ,204 1 ,204 ,144 ,706 
Mood ,004 1 ,004 ,003 ,958 
Presence ,178 1 ,178 ,125 ,725 
Demands 1,830 1 1,830 1,285 ,260 
Quality ,284 1 ,284 ,200 ,656 
Presence * Demands 3,456 1 3,456 2,428 ,123 
Presence * Qual. ,867 1 ,867 ,609 ,437 
Demands * Qual 2,950 1 2,950 2,072 ,154 
Pres * Dem * Qual 5,404 1 5,404 3,795 ,055 
Error 123,864 87 1,424   
Total 144,000 96    
Corrected Total 140,106 95    
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Appendix I: Statistics of Experiment 4 
 
Effectiveness of the familiarity manipulation. 
 
Table 1 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 65,204a 7 9,315 3,018 ,008 
Intercept 1364,580 1 1364,580 442,098 ,000 
Presence 9,889 1 9,889 3,204 ,077 
Repetition 38,058 1 38,058 12,330 ,001 
Quality ,520 1 ,520 ,168 ,683 
Presence * Repetition 1,307 1 1,307 ,423 ,517 
Presence * Quality ,453 1 ,453 ,147 ,703 
Repetition * Quality 3,929 1 3,929 1,273 ,263 
Pres * Rep * Qual 7,240 1 7,240 2,346 ,130 
Error 231,495 75 3,087   
Total 1665,000 83    
Corrected Total 296,699 82    
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the main effect of the Repetition 
 
Condition M SD 
No-Repetition 3,389 ,276 
Repetition 4,748 ,271 
 
 
Atitude-Change Data: Weight Loss Centre Message 
 
Table 3 
Factor Analysis and Reliability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2) 
 
 
 
Loadings 
Loading % of Variance Cumulative % α 
1 2,174 72,472 72,472 ,806 
2 ,523 17,449 89,921  
3 ,302 10,079 100,000  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
1 components extracted. 
136 
  
  
  
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 13,357a 7 1,908 ,983 ,453 
Intercept 95,759 1 95,759 49,308 ,000 
Presence 4,869 1 4,869 2,507 ,119 
Repetition ,105 1 ,105 ,054 ,817 
Quality 4,364 1 4,364 2,247 ,139 
Presence * Repetition ,174 1 ,174 ,090 ,766 
Presence * Quality 2,268 1 2,268 1,168 ,284 
Repetition * Quality ,001 1 ,001 ,000 ,983 
Pres * Rep * Qual 1,877 1 1,877 ,966 ,330 
Error 108,754 56 1,942   
Total 215,556 64    
Corrected Total 122,111 63    
 
Atitude-Change Data: Acid Rain Message 
 
Table 5 
Factor Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 27,786a 7 3,969 2,816 ,012 
Intercept 40,726 1 40,726 28,892 ,000 
Presence ,026 1 ,026 ,019 ,892 
Repetition ,204 1 ,204 ,145 ,705 
Quality 5,467 1 5,467 3,879 ,053 
Presence * Repetition 14,811 1 14,811 10,507 ,002 
Presence * Quality 1,903 1 1,903 1,350 ,249 
Repetition * Quality 4,289 1 4,289 3,043 ,085 
Pres * Rep * Qual ,293 1 ,293 ,208 ,650 
Error 105,720 75 1,410   
Total 176,533 83    
Corrected Total 133,506 82    
 
 
Loadings 
Loading % of Variance Cumulative % α 
1 1,693 56,422 56,422 ,604 
2 ,852 28,403 84,825  
3 ,455 15,175 100,000  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
1 components extracted. 
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Table 7 
Descriptive statistics of the Argument Quality x Repetition Interaction 
 
  No-repetition   Repetition 
Condition M SD   M SD 
Weak 
,267 ,265 
 
,624 ,253 
Strong 
1,238 ,262 
 
,682 ,265 
 
 
Table 8 
Contrasts revealing the impact of the familiarity on the differentiation between strong and weak arguments in 
attitude-change. 
 
 Strong Arguments  Weak Arguments   CI 95% 
Condition M SD  M SD t(41) p LL UL 
No-Repetition 1.21 .21  .22 .09 2.60 .01 .23 1.71 
Repetition .69 .10  .61 .11 .16 .88 -.67 .78 
 
 
Atitude-Change Data: Number of Thoughts 
 
Table 9 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 27,849a 7 3,978 3,449 ,004 
Intercept 355,577 1 355,577 308,237 ,000 
Presence 1,596 1 1,596 1,383 ,244 
Repetition 5,706 1 5,706 4,946 ,030 
Quality 4,760 1 4,760 3,766 ,051 
Presence * Repetition 8,915 1 8,915 7,728 ,007 
Presence * Quality ,211 1 ,211 ,183 ,670 
Repetition * Quality 2,659 1 2,659 2,305 ,134 
Pres * Rep * Qual 1,596 1 1,596 1,383 ,244 
Error 71,522 64 1,154   
Total 456,000 70    
Corrected Total 99,371 69    
 
 
Table 10 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Repetition 
 
Condition M SD 
No-Repetition 2,569 ,190 
Repetition 1,992 ,177 
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Table 11 
Contrasts revealing the different number of thoughts as a function of repetition and no-repetition in the 
presence conditions. 
 
 Presence  Alone   CI 95% 
Condition M SD  M SD t(41) p LL UL 
No-Repetition 3.08 .28  2.06 .25 2.21 .03 .08 1.51 
Repetition 1.78 .25  2.20 .26 .68 .49 .94 .46 
 
 
Atitude-Change Data: Type of Thoughts 
 
Table 12 
Mixed Anova (2 x 2 x 2), Type of Thoughts as Repeated Measure. 
 
  SS Df MS F p 
Type of Thought ,022 1 ,022 ,111 ,740 
T.Thought * Presence ,004 1 ,004 ,018 ,892 
T.Thought * Repetition ,038 1 ,038 ,193 ,662 
T.Thought * Arg. Quality 1,148 1 1,148 5,756 ,019 
T.Thought * Pres * Rep ,189 1 ,189 ,945 ,334 
T.Thought * Pres * A.Qual ,083 1 ,083 ,418 ,520 
T.Thought * Rep *  A. Qual ,529 1 ,529 2,650 ,108 
T.Thought * Pres  *  Rep  *  
Arg.Quality 
,061 1 ,061 ,308 ,581 
 
Table 13 
Descriptive statistics of the TypeThought x Repetition Interaction 
 
  No-repetition   Repetition 
Condition M SD   M SD 
Favorable 
.309 .059 
 
.272 .059 
Unfavorable 
.301 .066 
 
.329 .065 
 
Table 14 
Descriptive statistics of the Type of thoughts x Repetition x Argument quality  
 
  No-Repetition   Repetition  
 Strong  Weak Strong Weak  
Condition M SD  M M SD SD M SD 
Favorable 
,472 ,079  ,146 ,088 ,241 ,085 ,304 ,081 
Unfavorable 
,170 ,088  ,432 ,097 ,241 ,094 ,417 ,090 
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Table 15 
Contrasts revealing the difference in the number of favourable thoughts as a function of message quality and 
familiarity conditions. 
 
 Strong Arguments  Weak Arguments   CI 95% 
Condition M SD  M SD t(38) p LL UL 
Repetition .24 .08  .30 .08 2.83 .0001 .17 1.01 
No-Repetition .47 .08  .15 .09 .55 .59 -.29 .52 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
Atitude-Change Data: Mediation analyses  
 
Table 16 
Regression analyses in the no-repetition condition  
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t 
 
Sig. 
 
Predictor* B SD  
  
 
Arg. Quality 1,021 ,352 ,421 2,901 ,006 
 
Arg. Quality ** 1,366 ,593 ,541 2,306 ,029 
 
Thought Index -,442 ,528 -,159 -,837 ,410 
* Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain as Dependent Measure 
** Thought Index constant 
 
Table 17 
Regression analyses in the repetition condition  
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t 
 
Sig. 
 
Predictor* B SD  
  
 
Arg. Quality ,059 ,417 ,022 ,141 ,888 
 
Arg. Quality ** -,137 ,463 -,055 -,296 ,769 
 
Thought Index ,250 ,436 ,106 ,574 ,571 
* Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain as Dependent Measure 
** Thought Index constant 
 
 
Challenge and Threat Data: Baseline Differences  
 
Table 18 
Between-Subjects Manova (2 x 2 x2) 
 
  Value* F Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. 
Presence ,933 1,255a 4,000 70,000 ,296 
Repetition ,965 ,629a 4,000 70,000 ,643 
Argument Quality ,929 1,336a 4,000 70,000 ,265 
Presence x Repetition ,911 1,711a 4,000 70,000 ,157 
Presence x Arg. Quality ,963 ,670a 4,000 70,000 ,615 
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Repetition x Arg. Quality ,939 1,139a 4,000 70,000 ,346 
Pres * Rep * Arg. Qual. ,932 1,276a 4,000 70,000 ,288 
*Wilks´ Lambda. 
 
 
Challenge and Threat Data: Task-Engagement  
 
Table 19 
T-tests for hr and vc against zero for the presence condition. 
 
        CI 95% 
Condition M SD  Mean 
Difference 
t(49) p LL UL 
hr_reactivity 10.24 22.89 10.24 3.16 .003 -1,319 17,487 
vc_reactivity 4.95 16.09 4.93 2.17 .04 5,295 22,258 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
Table 20 
T-tests for hr and vc against zero for the alone condition. 
 
        CI 95% 
Condition M SD  Mean 
Difference 
t(42) p LL UL 
hr_reactivity 8.35 27.48 8.35 1.99 .06 -,107 16,804 
vc_reactivity 4.59 23.76 4.59 1.27 .21 -2,717 11,907 
CI= Confidence interval (95%); LL= lower limit; UL= upper limit 
 
 
Challenge and Threat Indexes  
 
Table 21 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2), CO as dependent measure 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 169,733a 3 56,578 1,917 ,144 
Intercept ,253 1 ,253 ,009 ,927 
Repetition 141,853 1 141,853 4,807 ,035 
Arg. Quality 25,732 1 25,732 ,872 ,357 
Rep * Arg. Qual ,800 1 ,800 ,027 ,870 
Error 1062,314 36 29,509   
Total 1232,765 40    
Corrected Total 1232,047 39    
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Table 22 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Repetition 
 
Condition M SD 
No-Repetition -1,808 1,248 
Repetition 1,968 1,187 
 
 
Table 23 
Between-Subjects Anova (2 x 2), TPR as dependent measure 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 2,506E6 3 835376,020 1,823 ,160 
Intercept 5758,990 1 5758,990 ,013 ,911 
Repetition 2467491,352 1 2467491,352 5,384 ,026 
Argument Qual 41667,680 1 41667,680 ,091 ,765 
Fam * Qual 10009,496 1 10009,496 ,022 ,883 
Error 1,650E7 36 458295,423   
Total 1,903E7 40    
Corrected Total 1,900E7 39    
 
 
Table 24 
Descriptive statistics of the Main effect of Repetition 
 
Condition M SD 
No-Repetition 236,966 155,524 
Repetition -261,025 147,896 
 
 
Mediation of Unitary Index on Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain 
 
Table 25 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 9,991a 4 2,498 1,507 ,209 
Intercept 46,191 1 46,191 27,875 ,000 
Index_CT ,122 1 ,122 ,074 ,787 
Repetition 1,061 1 1,061 ,640 ,426 
Arg. Quality 4,624 1 4,624 2,791 ,099 
Rep. * Arg. Qual. 4,436 1 4,436 2,677 ,106 
Error 115,998 70 1,657   
Total 173,001 75    
Corrected Total 125,988 74    
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Mediation of Cognitive evaluations on Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain 
 
Table 26 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 33,243a 8 4,155 2,995 ,006 
Intercept ,373 1 ,373 ,269 ,605 
Cog Evaluation 5,012 1 5,012 3,613 ,061 
Repetition ,238 1 ,238 ,172 ,680 
Arg. Quality 7,645 1 7,645 5,511 ,022 
Rep. * Arg. Qual. 4,072 1 4,072 2,935 ,091 
Error 99,886 72 1,387   
Total 174,246 81    
Corrected Total 133,129 80    
 
 
 
Mediation of Mood on Attitude-Change towards Acid Rain 
 
Table 27 
Ancova (2 x 2) 
 
  SS df MS F p 
Corrected Model 11,701a 4 2,925 1,807 ,136 
Intercept 2,466 1 2,466 1,523 ,221 
Mood ,183 1 ,183 ,113 ,738 
Repetition ,577 1 ,577 ,356 ,552 
Arg. Quality 5,701 1 5,701 3,521 ,064 
Rep. * Arg. Qual. 5,038 1 5,038 3,111 ,082 
Error 121,427 75 1,619   
Total 173,797 80    
Corrected Total 133,127 79    
 
